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This thesis focuses specifically on Walter Benjamin's philosophical
insights into the emerging climate of fascism, in Europe, between the two World
Wars. These were inseparable from a challenge to modem understandings of
history. For Benjamin official histories function to record the spoils of the victors
effectively erasing the losing side from the annals of history. This has particular
resonance given that Benjamin, a German Jew, was himself under constant threat
of cultural erasure during the course of his writing, thus making him in a way
the embodiment of a certain constellation of fascist forces. The theme of an
'embodied' fascism will be applied to Benjamin's corpus as well as to other's
directly involved and affected by the rise of German fascism. Throughout this
thesis I chart the ways in which Benjamin applies alternative methods to reading
history, in order to unearth the violence beyond his present situation of fascism.
Benjamin argued that violence subtends all modern state function, insofar as its
power is won and maintained by the silent suppression of its citizens. Such
suppression was the cause of periodic eruptions of violence with society. It was
built into the very fibre of what we call civil society as it is generated through
culture. This reading of Benjamin hones in on vital areas of modern cultural
production such as rhetoric, photography, language, spatiality and
communications technology and attempts to situate them within the scope of
Benjamin's concerns about violence. In addition to critical theory, my research
incorporates the field cultural studies, as Benjamin's main concern was with the
ideological role that certain cultural objects played within the social economy in
the era that preceded German fascism's consolidation of power. Benjamin's
investigations of violence, and its relationship to various technologies at the start
of the 20th Century, form an invaluable source of insight with which to evaluate
the current critical debates about fascism.
2
WALTER BENIAMIN'S TRANSIT:




























25 Photographic Images See Attached.
4
Introduction.
Michel Foucault writes in the preface to Deleuze and Guattari's book,
Anti-Oedipus that 'one might say that Anti-Oedipus is an Introduction to a Non-
Fascist Life.'1 I find this comment somewhat troubling as to my mind it is very
unlikely that one can be either for or against fascism, anymore than one can be
for or against violence, or for that matter for or against love. This is so because I
suspect that is near to impossible to eliminate a tendency toward fascism within
ourselves since it is something that has been nurtured within us throughout our
recent history, and continues to prevail throughout our institutions. I also believe
that Foucault's goal of a non-fascist life is somewhat misguided, as I would argue
that it is near to impossible for individuals to achieve an absolute 'consciousness'
of being fascist or non-fascist in their comportment. Perhaps it is even the case
that all of us have a Little General lurking inside, somewhere in the folds of our
sensibility. I would even venture so far as to say this is not a bad thing, if we
appreciate that fascism is something that is beyond good and evil, something
that is more an affect of power relations, which are constantly shifting and
weighing, than a nasty political attribute roundly worthy of elimination. Indeed
such an abolitionist policy in itself is at risk of becoming potentially fascist as
such. Indeed if we understand fascism as an extremity of realisation amongst the
political possibilities open to a life, than analysis of fascism's expression within
life can take place within far wider parameters.
IDeleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Anti-Oedipus, Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen
R. Lane, Preface by Michel Foucault (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. xiii.
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This brings us back to Foucault and to the point at which I meet in
agreement with him: his succinct definition of Deleuze and Cuattari's strategy on
thinking 'fascism.' Foucault is quick to assert that their pivotal understanding of
fascism considers not 'only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini
- which was able to mobilise and use the desire of the masses so effectively -but
also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the
fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and
exploits US.'2 Beyond this point, however, I am once again compelled to part
company with Foucault's understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's enterprise.
Foucault describes their work as a pursuit of 'ethics,'3 which for me begs the
question of which ethics? I would see it as a Spinozist ethics, insofar as it is more
concerned with the comportment of bodies than it is with the disclosure of a free
standing moral code. The ethics is not in any way prescriptive but rather
observant in carrying out its function. As Spinoza himself proposed 'We do not
yet know what a body can do.'4 Thus life is still in its experimental stages, still
being shaped at any given moment of its duration by a play of forces. Bearing
this in mind, I find it difficult to endorse Foucault's comment that after reading
Anti-Oedipus one will be able to assume a 'being anti-oedipal' as being some sort
of' a life-style, a way of thinking or living." One has no more chance to be
oedipal, or anti-oedipal, for that matter, than one has to be man or woman, or for
2 Ibid ...I .,p. xui.
] Ibid .... I., p. XIII.
4 Deleuze, Gilles, Spinoza: Practical P"ilosophy, Trans. Robert Hurley, (San Fransico, CityLights
Books, 1988) p. 125.
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that matter to be a fascist. These are moral conceits that have no place in Deleuze
and Guattari's conceptual framework which expresses the necessity of an ethical
and moreover, durational process of becoming.
The failure to see living as a complex and even self-contradictory series of
temporary formations of becoming makes Foucault's series of questions
regarding fascism amount to little more than a litany of false problems. He asks
'How does one keep from being a fascist, even (especially) when one believes
oneself to be a revolutionary? How do we rid our speech acts, our hearts and our
pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is in grained in our
behaviour?'6 To ask such questions presupposes fascism to be a solid, rigid
formation that must be cut out of the body politic like a cancer. Moreover it
implies that we know what fascism is, that it is recognisable, that we can easily
identify it, that is possesses a binary logic, - it can be there or not be there - that it
is a stable entity or even that it is an entity. The level of Foucault's response to
Deleuze and Guattari indicates that a true intellectual survey of fascism has
hardly commenced. Not after 1945 and not after 1968, where Foucault begins his
investigations?
However, Foucault's greatest difficulty is yet to come. This happens when
he chooses to associate his campaign against the 'major enemy'8 fascism with the
5 50eleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Anti-Oedipus, Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen
R. Lane, Preface by Michel Foucault (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. xiii.
6 Ib'd ...1 ., p. xui.
7 Ibid., p. xi.
8 Ibid., p. xiii.
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church's moral crusade. Indeed, he makes explicit reference to 'the Christian
moralists who sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul.'9 He
then draws a parallel between their activities and those of Deleuze and Guattari,
whom he suggests for their part, 'pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the
body.'ID Here Foucault would appear gravely mistaken on two fronts. The first is
his confusion of morals with ethics, which as a means of appreciating the way
fascism operates on the ground proves to be utterly useless, since often
unbeknownst to us, in day to day relations, fascism continues to vary its
operations in a manner that profoundly accedes morality's ability to ferret out its
location. Fascism rarely manifests itself as an individual, type, or party. It is
much more likely to manifest itself in a mode of temporary conduct, an
approach, or a management style. The second underestimation on Foucault's
part comes with his suggestion that Deleuze and Guattari pursue the menace of
fascism through "traces." They would argue that, to the contrary traces form the
biggest massifications of fascism to be found anywhere, institutionally speaking.
They even go so far as to describe the trace as dangerous, as something that
'injects redundancies and propagates them.'ll In this way traces become
pathological and block up the critical relations amongst peoples, leading to
amongst other things the proliferation of fascist dictates, which in tum further
proscribe fascist behaviours.
9lb'd ...1 ., p. xiu.
10 Ibid ...1 ., p. xin.
1 1 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 13.
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Ultimately, Foucault will be responsible for perpetuating an even greater
offence, that of neutralising and literalising the very term 'fascism.' Whilst he
manages to free it from strictly historical containment, he then quickly and
falsely accuses it of being some essential evil, which can easily be expelled from
the realm of a righteous (read leftist) political atmosphere. Foucault goes so far as
to suggest that the task of expelling fascism can be made even easier if one
adopts an optimistic attitude. Remember 'one doesn't have to be sad in order to
be militant ... '12His statement is directly at odds with Deleuze's assertion that
'The use of philosophy is to sadden.'l3 Moreover he adds, 'A philosophy that
saddens no one, that annoys no one is not a philosophy. It is useful for the
harming of stupidity, for the turning of stupidity into something shameful. Its
only use is the exposure of all forms of baseness of thought.'14 Foucault's
simplistic rhetoric connotes nothing so much as the stolid atmosphere of that
other base, totalitarian offshoot of fascism: Stalinism. It is outrageous insofar as it
assigns feelings of happiness and sadness 'humour' and' seriousness' to a
formation, fascism, that figures in itself no such relation. Rather, and more in
keeping with Deleuze and Guattari's description of fascism, one could say that if
it does possesses qualities in any sense at all they are comprised out of speeds
and intensities, and not out of rotten feelings.
Waging a war against fascism, one where we would be 'tracking down all
varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround us and crush us to
12 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Anti-Oedipus, Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen
R. Lane, Preface by Michel Foucault (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. xiii.
13 Deleuze, Gilles,Nietzscilcand Philosophy, (London: The Athlone Press, 1983), p. 150.
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the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday'IS would
in reality mean waging a war of all against all in some even more embittered
retro-Hobbesian fantasy. A fantasy moreover which completely precludes the
reality that fascism, even its historical guise, connotes an invisible war, a total
war, a perpetual war that cannot be fought nor won, but rather must be engaged
as an ethical combat within oneself on a plane where politics equals everyday
life. How we confront the singular events of our lives will show how successful
we have been. It is here that the true problem of how to locate fascism becomes
proximate to the life of a body, on this occasion Walter Benjamin's life and body
in particular. A life moreover, that sought not to be non-fascist but rather to
become fascism's greatest ethical observer, so as to raise alarm bells within its
most extravagant perpetrator, the average citizen. It is through observing
Benjamin with the greatest respect for this impetus for a life, that I am able to
embark upon this thesis and to orient my own task along the lines of critical
observation. Benjamin's dedication to a methodology that sought to demonstrate
and not to judge the terms on which history rests, has impressed upon me a
certain critical need to withhold for the most part judgement of any of the terms
in which the debate about fascism gets temporarily housed in Benjamin's body
over the course of his lifetime. Rather it will be my task to transport the reader
over the difficult terrain of these terms to locations of particular behest to
Benjamin's view of fascism.
14 Ibid1 ., p. 150.
15 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, FelixAnti-Oediplls, Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen
R. Lane, Preface by Michel Foucault (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), P: xiv.
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Before looking at the organisation of this thesis I should alert the reader to
a particularity of its approach, as self-consciously defined against the industry
that has sprung up under the rubric of 'Benjamin Studies.' This study is not an
attempt to set the record straight on Benjamin's writings, nor is it to become his
closest reader, nor to become his most loyal and accurate biographer. This project
represents something radically different to those approaches. It is an attempt to
work with Benjamin to devise a new set of political coordinates viable for the
current thinking of contemporary fascism. The work then becomes a mediation
at the margins of Benjamin's project, an activity that concerns itself with
extending the parameters of understanding and of thinking that Benjamin left for
us as a kind of intellectual schema. In carrying out this operation I am not
working over Benjamin, to recondition him if you like, (indeed as a body I believe
he is been worked over quite enough for other's lamentable ends in the last 30
years), rather I attempt to work on Benjamin, that is survey his contributions to a
thinking of fascism from wi thin the boundaries of his experience and times. Here
I wish to map out the singularities of a life, Benjamin's life in this instance,
insofar as currents of German fascism traverse it.
From there I hope to extend the lines of receptivity outward as means of
detecting the fascisms that make themselves singularly known in our own bodies
and in our own times. Therefore I am never just talking about Walter Benjamin,
as though his life is merely a case of here and there, rather I seek to make a
delicate measure of a body which has already met the events that will define it,
that have made a life, Benjamin's life; that have allowed for certain strains of
thought to be actualised precisely within his person. It is through such
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measurement that his coordinates can in some instances be joined up and aligned
with a broader critical project of thinking a politics of mannerism over
essentialism, a politics of means rather than ends, that hopefully and perhaps
most significantly calls for the redeployment of a long-awaited task: to think
fascism. Finally, Benjamin and I are on tour - together - through a certain terrain
of fascism that still bears critical survey today, that still makes modernity its
sounding board, that still instils in us a philosophical value toward destructive
aims, aims that search through the rubble of a life to find the histories which
carve out its duration, make a life worthy of the events that join it. This study
therefore aims not to mark the body of fascism as simply a political body, or even
a body politic, but to mark it within bodies, as a means to chart its sustenance as
a counterpart to civilisation as we have come to condone it in our midst.
This is a Benjaminian politic, a politic concerned with observation, reading
against the grain of popular understanding, a reading of history that is aware of
the constant relay of the past with the future, of which the spark of the present
stands out as merely a dim indication. It is the sort of network that Benjamin
conceived and I think is worthy of being resuscitated, a network that could
potentially alert us to what we should heed in Benjamin that still remains to be
worked through, to be prosthetically extended through the methodology he
proposed explicitly in his last work, 'The Theses for a Philosophy of History.'
That document asserted that through the exertion of the right combination of
forces history can be brought under temporary arrest, so that the dormant
histories of the past that never got a chance to be properly voiced might yet rise
to the surface of our understanding in a future epoch. Benjamin termed the
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observation of this phenomenon 'monadology.' Its results indicates that there is
an enormous contiguity between both the past and the future in any given era of
mankind and further that there exists an endless transit of Events along that
trajectory. In other words at every moment of our lives we are connected to the
lives and experience of others who have preceded us, and those who will follow
us. The covenant of generations includes within it a standard feature of
Nietzschean eternal return, of an additive difference coming out of the apparent
sameness, or facticity, of the human condition. It is this difference or
transmutation of Events that signals the entrance of the future.
Chapter 1, 'Transit Lines: Walter Benjamin's Destructive Landsurveying of
History' puts us onto the trail of mapping Benjamin's recursive action against the
limitations of his historical situation. With his property rights on existence
becoming increasingly infringed upon in Berlin, Benjamin responds by wilfully
cutting himself off from Germany and choosing to make himself the
land surveyor of European Culture. In the experience of Kafka's K, there is no
precedent for Benjamin's role; he enters the village of cultural criticism without
authorisation. Deleuze and Guattari (Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, A Thousand
Plateaus), the only critics willing to stumble upon a strategic modus operandi
within Kafka's work, provide great assistance in here for my attempts to lay the
groundwork for a topography - as opposed to a biography - of Benjamin's life.
In chapter 2, 'Sternphotographie: A Constellation of Walter Benjamin's
Moscow Diary' I chart Benjamin's attempts to spatialise his relationship to Asja
Lacis through an initially ill-defined journey to the newly Sovietised Moscow.
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This spatialisation takes place through a kind of eccentric cartography, a 'minor
science' of urban affects that Benjamin cultivates in order to transform the
referents of objects into pure affect. During his stay in Moscow Benjamin is
introduced to love for the first time as an extreme solidity, a material so tough it
will mould his body on to the operations of a war-machine, with all the
attendant, though thankfully temporary fascistic affects. Benjamin takes great
lessons out of Moscow concerning political and erotic excesses that not only
affect him personally, but also seem to have distributed their affects throughout
the capital of world revolution. It is here that Deleuze and Guattari's work on
smooth and striated space starts to figure in the understanding the experiments
Benjamin conducts himself in the Moscow Diary.
Chapter 3 'Catastrophising the Epoch: Walter Benjamin's Atlas of Fascist
Historiography' attempts to define the perimeters of catastrophe in Benjamin's
world of the 1930s. Benjamin's conviction that the 'world-historical experiment'
unfolding in Soviet Russia underwrote his own experimental ventures in Marxist
thinking; it was a conviction further nurtured under the influence of the noted
Marxist theatre director Bertolt Brecht. Over the course of that politically
tumultuous decade, Benjamin increasingly situates Brecht as the test subject for a
political reality to come, one that cannot yet be demonstrated but whose portent
generates the very aesthetico-political atmosphere surrounding the age.
Benjamin tries to extrapolate from the portent his reflections on Brecht, an image
of a new species of human, the man who is prepared to survive culture itself, a
human whose emergence at this juncture of culture heralds nothing less than the
truth of the paramount maxim of life lived under a state of emergency, that
exception has become the rule, with all the accompanying brutality implied by
such a statement.
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Chapter 4 'What Calls Technology? Or Walter Benjamin's War' outlines
the ground for understanding Walter Benjamin's War. It is based on the
fundamental principle that World War II never left the world stage. In response
to this assumption, new understandings of fascism, history, technology, and war
have to be forged in ways different from archival, historicist methodologies that
threaten to block forever any real thinking of fascism and its current portent. In
the early 1930s, both Benjamin and Martin Heidegger expressed an acute
awareness of the more discreet movements within National Socialism; in
particular their ability to outwardly shape the populist masses through various
spectacles of speech and gesture. At the same time culture, if not civilisation
appeared to be nearing its end, as the masses were drawn further into an
insidious pact between humanity and technology, coupled with politics, whose
most likely outcomes seemed to point in the direction of global annihilation. The
task of diagnosing and critiquing the malady of the age, nihilism, was set to
become the object of philosophical enquiry in the age of perpetual war.
Chapter 5 'Idle Talk' continues to track the philosophical preoccupations
raised in Chapter 4, but sets them specifically on the field of language and the
rhetoric of war. Those have expressed opinions on war as a joining up forces,
linguistic and otherwise are given specific attention here. Included amongst them
are Ernest Junger, Christian Florens Rang, and Immanuel Kant whose
commentaries on the ethos of world war and its relationship to technology on
one hand, and German Idealism on the other, did much to shape our perception
of its meaning and consequence. These writings were particularly salient for
Benjamin as well as for Heidegger.
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Finally, Chapter 6 'Warring Vocabularies' takes a sober look at nihilism's
progress in deteriorating linguistic accountability in the German-speaking world
after WWI. In response to this situation, Benjamin's writing of the early 1930s,
concerns itself with how to cope with communicatory loss within the German
language, specifically through the articles 'Theories of German Fascism' and 'The
Storyteller,' which address the paucity of description coming from men having
first hand experience of trench warfare coming out of WWI. Moreover, he
argues, due to the unprecedented amount of war reportage coming out of the
First World War, information has managed to unseat knowledge as the standard
fare for supplying understanding. This has lead to a boom in the related
economies of propaganda and speculation. These immaterial economies are then
free to mingle with the material economies of property and bodies, leading to
disastrous results, the worst outcomes of which are found in the total war and
global annihilation. Itwould seem that language coupled with technology had
bred an unimaginably dangerous line of abolition in the movement of National
Socialism. One that Benjamin's discourse must tackle far in advance of the last
shot of World War being fired and long after it, as debates around fascism grew
increasingly hushed in the later half of the twentieth century.
Finally, a brief note about the use of photography in this project; its
function will be outlined in detail in the first chapter. Essentially the images are
presented as an example of 'minor photography,' corresponding to Deleuze and
Guattari's notion of 'minor literature.' They write 'the three characteristics of a
minor literature are the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the
individual to political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciationl"
16 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Millar Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreword by Reda Bensmaia, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 18.
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In that spirit that the images included should be embarked upon, not as sedentary
snapshots, but rather as a series of series, a collective of images which converge,
diverge and scatter repeatedly as we survey the terrain of proto-fascism. These
images settle lightly, ambiguously within atmospheres similar to the one's
Benjamin ventured into throughout his lifetime, always with the intent to tread
upon them more than once so as compromise their apparently well-ordered
spatial logics. This prolific approach to an ambiguous sequence of instances sets
up a challenge to the whole notion of escape as something that is required both
of the fugitive photographic image, in terms of framing, and as something that is
required of an exiled man trapped within culture. The answer is not to resign
oneself to evacuate these spaces, but rather to overcode their differential areas to
the point where the majority can no longer deny their repletion and as such the
repletion of meaning becomes a reckonable force in its own right. The best way
to start is with a renewed purpose in looking, in surveying the cultural landscape.
Foucault, in his introduction to Anti-Oedipus encouraged us to 'believe that what
is productive is not sedentary but nomadic."? Bearing this in mind one should be
prepared to make 'mobile arrangements,'IB to view these images thorough
various instances of merger and digression with the typography of the text.
17 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Anti-Oedipus, Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen
R. Lane, Preface by Michel Foucault (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. xiii.
18 Ibid ...1 ., p. XI11.
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TransitLines or Walter Benjamin's Destructive
Landsurveying of History.
When is drawing a line a means of escape? When is freedom no longer the
object, but simply 'away out, "right, or left, in any direction" so long as it is as
little signifying as possible?'l When does a surveyor begin charting a course?
Perhaps it is the case, that his task begins him. That he finds himself in the
middle of a charter of events already in progress. Events which beseech him to
take on a their course as much as his own. Perhaps this was the case with Kafka's
character K. from The Castle, who when he arrived at the inn one snowy night,
seemed to surface from nowhere, only to pick up an official telephone and
impulsively identify himself as the landsurveyor. Through this single gesture he
was instantly and yet unwittingly part of the culture in the village. Perhaps this
was also the case with Walter Benjamin at a point when his property rights on
existence became so infringed upon in Berlin, that he responded by wilfully
cutting himself off from Germany and alternatively identifying himself the
land surveyor of European Culture. His experience is similar to Kafka's K.,
insofar as there is no precedent for Benjamin's role; he enters the village of
cultural criticism without authorisation. Like K. he must spend his time both
devising his function and courting higher-ups, and above all biding his time -
always from a strategic distance. Indeed, Benjamin retains his post in life in a
way similar to how K. retains his post in the Castle, that is to say through earnest
follow up on an absurd course of contestation, misrecognition and postponement
of his job description. The crucial factor with Benjamin, like K. before him, will be
I Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Millar Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreword by Reda Bensmaia, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 6.
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an ability to obscure his points of entry, in such a way that he makes an anti-
genealogy for his intellectual and personal motivations.
This sort of approach requires a fair bit of meandering around one's
ostensible goal. And indeed, what critics find so maddening about Benjamin is
the seemingly endless meandering of his thought, whose outcomes moreover can
be readily described as Kafkaesque.? In a somewhat reactionary stance many
critics seem to approach Benjamin's work with a mind toward bureaucratisation,
obsessively seeking out ways to reorganise and recatalogue his Schrifien. What
they disregard is that maintaining a disordered strategy of mind was quite
possibly the most advantageous intellectual practice for a man in Benjamin's
situation. Here is a man who finds himself dropped in the middle of a modernist
ethical scheme whose political programme institutes a position of dire scarcity
(fascism), or replete abundance (communism), either of which is founded on a
shaky platform of humanism. Benjamin as someone wary of those projects, is
nonetheless implicated in them, as he variously inhabits societies for which there
is a termination scheme imposed upon those who are believed to fail compliance
with these human regulation programmes.
Indeed, for our purposes in mapping Benjamin's political and cultural
whereabouts, it is crucial to bear in mind that his co-ordinates are always already
joined in a constellation of proto-fascism, not beginning in 1933,but rather in
1892,the year of his birth. He is in the unique position to claim that he was born
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into a generation of men, German Jews, whose lifetimes were determined from
the start to end in cultural and historical obliteration. From the outset Benjamin
had to confront a possible failure of traces. The Nazi's determination to rub out
figures like Benjamin from the historical record failed, but others less obviously
succeeded in blurring his conceptual project so far as to obscure it in our
readings of his work.
One of the greater elements of that project, which remains somewhat
obscured in current readings of Benjamin, is his interest in deploying writing as
politics. It is widely known that Benjamin was a great admirer of Kafka's literary
approach. What is less known is the degree to which he relied upon Kafka's
literary work to cast his own politic in the later years of his work. Deleuze and
Guattari (Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, A Thousand Plateaus: 'On The Line'), are
the only critics willing to stumble upon a political modus operandi within
Kafka's writing, and therein provide great assistance in an attempt to lay the
groundwork for a topographical historiography - as opposed to a biography - of
Benjamin's life. This topographical exercise has its beginnings in a rather
conspicuous assumption, one that Deleuze and Guattari will come to associate
with Kafka, and I later with Benjamin. Simply put the assumption is that 'there is
no ideology, and indeed there never has been.'3 Thus it becomes evident to all
parties that it is useless to choose political strategies, outside of your own. Even
then, for the sake of expediency, this position too must be periodically voided.
Therein there are no hard and fast demarcations of belonging, positionality, or as
2 ~eltzer, Francoise, "Acedia and Melancholia" in Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History. Ed.
Michael P. Steinberg (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 145.
3Deleuze Giles and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, (London: The Athlone Press Ltd., 1988).
p.l0.
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K calls it 'fit,' but rather a geography extending outward composed of politicised
gestures. Ideology or fit would imply that these are solid configurations, when in
fact they are simply put, a matter of flows. Initially, K will complain to the
teacher, 'I don't fit with the peasants, nor, I imagine, with the Castle.' The teacher
will reply, 'There is no difference between the peasantry and the Castle.'4 Why is
this so? Because as groups they are constantly negotiating for the same territory
and in so doing rhythmically take on the characteristics of each other. In Deleuze
and Guattari's words, 'they form a rhizome."
A rhizome is not a matter of fit, but rather a concern of mutual
transformation. K. soon realised after making this assertion that he would need
rethink his approach and it so doing enter into mutual relations with both
Barnabas, a Castle functionary and Frieda, a peasant both of whom have intimate
contact with the Castle. There is no room for imitation in these relationships. Nor
is any identification made between his and their position. Instead, K.'s presence
works to shift the ground of Barnabas and Frieda's relationship of obedience to
the Castle. Ironically, in doing so K is becoming more and more engaged in his
role as Castle functionary. K deterritorializes their position, as the same moment
that he reterritorializes his own. Conversely, it is Barnabas and Frieda, who act to
block K's total absorption into Castle law. They function as blocks to encourage
his continued strategy of building an adjacent relationship to the Castle, a way
out that does not resemble escape, so much as it reassembles the layout of the
whole territory. K is the land surveyor after all, and the blocks he finds on his
4 Kafka, Franz, The Castle, Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, (London: Penguin Books, 1992). p. 17.
5 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 10.
2 I
way to the Castle extend his capability to deterritorialise its significance while
dodging an understanding of it as a discreet signifier.
K.'s task eventually reveals itself not to be getting to the Castle, but rather
getting around it. This approach is fundamentally related to Benjamin's project of
a consistent realignment of our approach toward History. Real life figures like
Asja Lacis, Gershom Scholem, Theodor Adorno and Bertolt Brecht play similar
roles to Kafka's characters Frieda and Barnabas, insofar as they act as pressuring
forces that periodically 'harden' or 'solidify' a contemporary position around
Benjamin in regard to the entity of State politics. Through a series of intense
encounters with these individuals, Benjamin is able to at once determine a
political position for himself, and at the same time extend his professional
viability by occupying an ostensible position within a particular political milieu.
Indeed, he manages to operate quite convincingly within these milieus, using the
reflective extension of what is told to him by the others. In point of fact he
possesses no deep-rooted understanding of Leftist debates, seldom enough to
back himself up concretely within these arenas. He relies almost solely on his
rhetorical prowess to get him by. This is not to say that Benjamin operates as a
political charlatan, for at no point does he explicitly identify himself as a
Bolshevik, Zionist, Critical Theorist, or even as a Marxist. Rather it is much more
the case that through contact with the figures of Asja Lads, Gershom Scholem,
Theodor Adorno and Bertolt Brecht respectively, he is able to extend, for a
certain period of time, his own personal capability in tackling the subjects. That is
how he manages to carve out a provisional place within all these ideological
camps. One example of this happens during his visit to Moscow in 1926. Here
Benjamin employs Asja Lacis as his guide through the local terrain of Marxist
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thinking. Within a matter of days of being there, he has cause to remark in his
diary that, 'once again I realised just to what extent the possibility of tacking
these subjects depends on my contact with her.'6 This situation of seeming
political dependency on Lacis does not appear to trouble Benjamin. On the
contrary, he is quite happy for these sorts of majoritarian Politics with a capital
'P' to flow over him, and for them to remain a point of contingency indefinitely.
This is the case so long as he maintains loyalty to a more pressing political
objective, the task of assembling an intimate minor geography of European
proto-fascistic terrains.
This is perhaps the reason why Waiter Benjamin never really made it to
Central Park." Indeed, when recalling Benjamin's writings, we confront another
territory altogether. A territory transversed by a series of long distance calls,
signals coming in from a Europe that has long since been levelled, a summons
that perhaps may even travel beyond the zone of Benjamin's personal finitude.
There is no history of Benjamin's discursive impact in this century that does not
have a past like that, an unworked through dialling route beginning and in some
ways ending along a Berlin based circuit. We must take care not to undermine
the Significance of the disappearance of Berlin and indeed of Europe as the
fundamental aporia within the Benjaminian project. Benjamin does not wish to
be emancipated from the scene of Europe's devastation, but instead wishes to
come to its defence, to argue for its continued recognition as a place beyond the
realm of fascism, to argue for its future, its worthwhile position in the world,
6 B . .
S henjamm, Walter. Moscow Diary. Ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
7 c ~Iem, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 18.
NTh1scomment is a reference of Benjamin's failed effort to come and join the Frankfurt school in
ew York and to the title of his article 'Central Park.'
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despite Hitler's appropriation of the place, and against the ever encroaching
forces of Americanism on one side and Stalinism on the other. What Deleuze and
Guattari characterise as Idiabolical powers knocking 011 the door.'8 If need be
Benjamin would prefer to greet these diabolical powers on the common ground
of a European corpus, and by extension on the territory of his singular body as
he understands it to be fundamentally European.
With this attitude in mind, it should come as no surprise that the nomadic
Benjamin of the 1930s was wary of joining Adorno and Horkheimer in New
York. He took out his insurance policy with Kafka roughly twenty years before
that, and had read the fine print carefully. When Kafka, in the opening lines of
"The Stoker" describes the Statue of Liberty as holding aloft a sword, rather than
a torch, Benjamin meticulously takes note of it. This was not a territorial defect
on the part of Kafka, one made by a man who could barely convince himself ever
to leave Prague. Rather it reads for Benjamin as a substantive prediction of what
America was to become in the first years of the twentieth century: a territory
devoting itself to isolationism and armed with a nationalistic defence policy
against so-called 'outsiders.'
Kafka is ironically positive about this throughout Amerika, convinced that
everyone has a place in the circus of American life. Indeed, every man can
happily play at being himself so long as he remains oblivious to that fact that
behind him I already are the secretaries, officials, professional politicians, all the
8 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreword by Reda Bensmaia, (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 41.
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modern satraps for whom [he] is preparing the way to power.'? Populism such as
this exacts its control through, different though no less beguiling channels in a
technocratic America, than it does in a proto-fascistic Austrio-Hungarian empire.
All function to diminish the rights of the citizen against the State apparatus in
ways that somehow naturalise the process of infringement. Benjamin first started
reading Kafka's work in 1927,10 and it may have been Amerika that first
convinced Benjamin that he and Kafka had a similar outlook on State violence, as
something that is not altogether unpalatable to the average citizen. It is most
probably, "In the Penal Colony,"ll however that awaked Benjamin to the fact that
writing had some definite part in carrying out its outcomes.
Kafka had difficulty getting this story published. In a letter to his
publisher Wolff, who had initially rejected it as "too repulsive," Kafka replied
"By way of an explanation, I will merely add that is not only my latest narrative
which is distressing; our time in general and mine in particular have been and
still are distressing, and mine has even been so for longer than our time in
general."12 "In the Penal Colony," was written during World War I, when
wartime sovereign exception had led to a toughening of the penal code and
permitted infringements upon a private citizen's basic rights of privacy. Fear of
denunciation, arbitrary scapegoating and bureaucratic restriction began to form
part of everyday life in Prague. These conditions were shortly to arrive in Berlin.
9 Ibid., p. 57. This is also the way Kafka would describe proto-fascism to Gustav Janovoch in a
conversation of 1928.
10 See Brodersen, Momme, Walter Benjamin A Biography, Trans., Malcolm R. Green and Ingrid
Ligers, Ed., Martina Dervis, (London: Verso, 1997), pp. 218-219.
II Kafka, Franz, "The Penal Colony," The Transformation ('Metamorphosis') and Other Stories,
Trans. and Ed. by Malcolm Pasley (London: Peguin, 1992).
12 Excerpt from the Catalogue for The City of K.. Franz Kafka and Prague, Centre de Cultura
Contemporania de Barcelona, 20 July- 19 September 1999, (Barcelona: Centre de Cultura
Contemporania de Barcelona, 2002), p. 123.
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The official assures the visitor that "Our sentence does not sound severe. The
Harrow will write whatever commandment the man has disobeyed onto his
body. This condemned man, for instance, (... ) will have written on his body:
honour thy superiors."l3 This is the same sentence is rendered in numbers on the
bodies accounted for by the National Socialist regime. The sheer numbers of
prescriptions written onto the bodies of those it holds responsibility for allows
for a certain mobility, that is to say that it allows the regime to mobilize through
the various doctrinal signification these bodies communicate and display on their
surfaces. The proliferation of messages therein get transported 'off the backs of'
citizens. Such corporeal branding allows National Socialism to spread in
numbers through bodies in a way concurrent with its aggressive annexation
strategies. In this way National Socialism assumes the character of a molecular
flow. Deleuze and Guattari stress that under Nazi protocol, 'the number is no
longer a means of counting or measuring, but of moving: it is the number itself
which moves through space.'14 And therein results a proliferation of conflicting
and often contradictory messages from the regime onto bodies as they move
through the spaces of its ever-expanding Reich.
One example of this messaging strategy appears as part of the brochure
'State and Health,' of 1942 which was meant to promote the success of
Nationalist Socialist policy to countries like France and Denmark. It was
authored by, amongst others, Otto von Verschuer, whom Giorgio Agamben
describes as on of the key persons responsible for the medical politics of the Nazi
13Kafka, Franz, "The Penal Colony," The Transformation ('MetalllorpllOsis') and Other Stories,
Trans. and Ed. by Malcolm Pasley (London: Peguin, 1992), p. 131.
14 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Pin teaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 389.
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Party. As von Verschuer inscribes it, 'this politics begins first of all with the
establishment of a budget to account for the living wealth of a people and
proposes to assume the care of the "biological" body of the nation. While
Helferich estimated the German national assets to be about three hundred and
ten million marks, there is also a "living" wealth worth one thousand and sixty
marks.'IS This "living" wealth, beyond being a means of accounting for bodies,
becomes something that authorises the State to rank them in terms of viability. In
order for a body to remain viable it must carryon (it) the mandate of certain
discursive economics. Any resistance to the assumption of such messages is
understood as something that is bad for State business. Therein anytime bare life
resists its discursive politicisation a flow of potential State wealth escapes and in
so doing reduces Nation worth. The State struggles at all to maintain and
increase the quality of its 'living' wealth through rhetorically and materially
promoting various biological improvement campaigns. This process of enforcing
the State's rhetorical health policy is by no means a stable system and
fluctuations are a constant reminder to the State that it must bear down upon or
even eliminate bodies that do not comply sufficiently with such corporeal reform
strategies.
In keeping with the theme of flows in our discussion, it is significant to
note that Von Verschuer adds to his comments the assertion that, 'Fluctuations in
the biological substance and in the material budget are usually parallel.'16 Such
fluctuations however must remain in check, and the State attempts to do this
through various tracing techniques which include a combination of statistics,
15 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Hcller-Roazcn
(Stanford: Standford University Press, 1998), p. 145.
16 Ibid., p. 145.
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biological determinism and binary logic. These epistemological practices
reinforce the overall notion of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a 'pretraced
destiny, whatever name is given to it - divine, anagogic, historical, economic,
structural, hereditary or syntagmatic." 17l)eleuze and Guattari would remind us
that the trace always involves an alleged "competence.r '" The appearance of
State "competence" can be periodically undermined and this can occur either
through the introduction of a new diagram, or map of the State's operations
which temporarily removes blockages and allows long disused connections to
function again. However, a more likely scenario to take place from within this
overcoded structure is that the trace itself becomes intense and in so doing takes
on a diagrammatic, as opposed to Igrammatic' character trait. That is to say that
it no longer subtends the solidified grammar of the State, but rather forms out of
that grammar a map of its utterances in such a way that it begins to assemble a
radical parabasis to the State's discursive logic, loosening the foundation of it's
signifiers along the way. Deleuze and Guattari illustrate how this might happen:
IAccounting and bureaucracy proceed by tracings: they can begin to burgeon
nonetheless, throwing out rhizomatic stems, as in a Kafka novel. An intensive
trait starts working for itself, a hallucinatory perception, synesthesia, perverse
mutation or play of images shakes loose, challenging the hegemony of the
signifier.'19 In this instance the trace might expose the rhetorical signifier of life in
the Nazi State to be something - that in material terms - equates itself with death,
with a death dealing force. This is force than goes on to exploit the living wealth
by chOOSingto annihilate its own servants rather than terminate its own process.
~ Deleu~e, ~illes, and Guattari, Felix, AThol/sand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
aSSuml (Mmneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 12-13.
18 Ibid, p. 12.
19 Ibid., p. 15.
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This is the moment at which the messages of National Socialism stops resonating
in a State apparatus and causes them to interact with the war machine. The
overall effect being that a line of destruction takes up just so many bodies both
docile and resistant with it in a massive march toward abolition.
In response to the appearance of this telling trait in National Socialism,
Benjamin is compelled to wage a last critical deterritorialization of literature. He
does so through his essay of 1938, which resurrects "Franz Kafka on the Tenth
Anniversary of the Author's Death." In it he identifies Kafka as someone
uniquely able to put the writing on the wall - to document violence, and
moreover proto-fascism, portraying them both as a routine affect of the
machinery of modernisation. Kafka's job at the Accident Insurance Company
was endured for reasons having nothing to do with a consistently stalled writing
technique, but rather it was utilised as a means to train his skills of observation
and reportage. Kafka's writing raised the tenor of bureaucracy to a political
programmatics, making his own line of flight contingent on being wedged
permanently in the bureaucratic apparatus of the office. Benjamin writes 'the
modern citizen ... knows that he is at the mercy of a vast machinery of
officialdom whose functioning is directed by authorities that remain nebulous to
the executive organs, let alone to the people they deal with. (It is known that one
level of meaning in the novels, particularly The Trial, is encompassed by this.F?
Deleuze and Guattari concur with Benjamin and offer further that 'If Kafka is the
greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level
{but at which one? it is not localisable), the barriers between offices cease to be a
2°8 . .
P
enjarnin, Walter, llluminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York, Fontana
ress, 1969), p. 139.
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definitive "dividing line and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that
dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into
microfigures impossible to recognise or identify, discernible only when they are
centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalisation of
the rigid segments.'21 In Kafka's world the office manager becomes something of
an inadvertent rhizomatic figure. Like the trace, he is able to break free of the
overcoded bureaucratic environment and burgeon his appearance in such a way
as to become his own boss, a general manager onto himself, one who starts to
have an hallucinatory perception of his own power. He becomes paranoid and
begins to mutate the bureaucratic codes to his own ends, imagining other ways
they could appear, or be understood.
In keeping himself within that nebulous milieu, Kafka exposes himself to
these figures on a day to day basis and is then able to appreciate that these proto-
fascist managers were at heart, over-industrious bureaucrats, who took the
rigidity of totalitarianism, sped it up, causing it to become a molecular flow
which consequentially poured into all segments of society. Bureaucracy still very
much exists under National Socialism, but instead of functioning sensibly,
manageably on a mass level as in other totalitarian State apparatuses, it becomes
something cellular and therein capable of travelling anywhere it wishes within
the body politic. The fact that violence in these bureaucracies took a superior,
classificatory tone, bespeaks of the magnitude of networks of penetration it
encompassed. The modem citizen could hardly say where the violence began
and the law ended, only that the law seemed to exist both nowhere and
21 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 214.
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everywhere within proto-fascistic societies and therein it was understood as a
kind of mythic entity. Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence,' shares the modern
citizen's preoccupation with 'violence outside the law,'22which finds its cohort
examples in the description of K.'s offices in the Trial.
Benjamin explores the issue of an 'unassignable' law in his
correspondence with Gershom Scholem. In a letter dated September 20, 1934,
Scholem defines the relation of the law described in Kafka's Trial as the "Nothing
of revelation," intended by this expression to name" a stage of life in which
revelation does not signify yet affirms itself by the fact that it is in force. Where
the wealth of significance is gone and what appears, reduced, so the speak, to the
zero point of its own content, still does not appear (and Revelation is something
that appears), there the Nothing appears."23 According to Scholem a law that
finds itself in such a condition is not absent but rather appears in the form of its
unrealisability. "The students of whom you speak, he objects to his friend, are
not students who have lost the Scripture ...but students who cannot decipher it."24
Benjamin's finds Scholem's understanding of a law being in force without
significance objectionable based on his opinion that "a law that has lost its
content ceases to exist and becomes indistinguishable from life: whether the
students have lost their Scripture or cannot decipher it in the end amounts to the
22 Benjamin, Walter, aile Way Street and Other Writillgs, Intro. Susan Sontag Trans. Harry Zohn.
(London: Verso, 1979) ,p. 154.
23 Scholern's correspondence quoted from Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and
Bare Life, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 50.
24Ibid., p. 50.
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same thing, since a Scripture without its key is not a Scripture but life, the life
lived in the village at the foot of the hill on which the castle stands."25
Giorgio Agamben credits Scholem's formulation of 'being in force without
significance' as a faultless description of 'the ban,' (the term Agamben uses to
described the relationship between bare life and the form of law), that our age
cannot master, something which is directly akin to the status of the law in
Kafka's novel.w He gleans further from Scholem's comments, that
For life under a law that is a force without signifying resembles life in the
state of exception, in which the most innocent gesture or the smallest
forgetfulness can have the most extreme consequences. And it is exactly this
kind of life that Kafka describes, in which the law is all the more persuasive
for its total lack of content, and in which a distracted knock on the door can
mark the start of uncontrollable trials ... in Kafka's village the empty
potentiality of law is so much in force as to become indistinguishable from
life ...The existence and the very body of Joseph K.. ultimately coincide with
the Trial, they become the TrialF'
Moreover, Agamben contends this transformation of the body into law
persists so long as 'law is maintained as pure form in a state of virtual exception,
[and] it lets bare life (K.'s life, or the life lived in the village at the foot of the
castle) subsist before it. Law that becomes indistinguishable from life in a real
state of exception is confronted by life that, in a symmetrical but inverse gesture,
is entirely transformed into law.'28 I would argue that it is on this point of
25 Benjamin's correspondence quoted from Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare
Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 53.
26 Ibid., p. 50.
27 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
28 Ibid., p. 55.
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subsistence versus absorption before the law that the virtual fate of the bare life
meets with its real life consequence. It is here, in a real state of exception, that
Benjamin's formulation of an assignfying law outstrips the virtual limitations of
Scholem's configuration of that same principle and emerges as the real life
threshold of this new era of biopolitics. For in a biopolitical era, bare life is
compelled to fold back upon itself, to invert its liberties toward a proliferation of
state orders, to offer the body itself as a foundation for the assertion of sovereign
power, for the transference of an assignifying law. Ultimately, Agamben too
comes down on the side of Benjamin's formulation as the definition of the law
which best described the political parameter of the status of the law in this
present era.
Moreover Benjamin grasps, better than most critics of his time, how this
condition of life under a law that is for all intents and purposes assignifying,
influences writer's like Kafka to transform themselves and their characters in
response to tremendous pressures exerted on the organic body and' assume the
form things assume in oblivion,' meaning that 'they are distorted.'29 Benjamin
goes on to cite a litany of examples of this distortion: 'The 'cares of the family
man,' which no one can identify, are distorted; the bug, of which we know all too
well represents Gregor Sam sa is distorted; the big animal, half lamb, half kitten,
for which 'the butcher's knife' might be' a release' is distorted. These figures are
connected by a long series of figures with the prototype of distortion, the
29Benjamin, Walter, llluminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York,
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 129.
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hunchback.'3D These creatures occupy a corporeality that is composed solely out
of writing, as such they could hold a place in a world so distorted that the virtual
exception of the law now exists as a real state of exception. Under such a state of
affairs these demonic creatures will continue to proliferate in their aberrant forms
and can only 'disappear with the coming of the Messiah,'31 'when the law 'being
in force without significance has come to an end. For the Messiah will only be
able to enter after the door of the law has been closed.F Persisting in this state of
distortion helps these abysmal creatures to elude what Agamben calls 'the
absolute intelligibility of a life wholly resolved into writing' which' corresponds
to the impenetrability of writing that, having become indecipherable now
appears as life.'33This is the condition a true-life figure like Benjamin faces. 'Only
at this juncture of reality 'do the terms distinguished and kept united by the
relation of ban (bare life and the form of the law) abolish each other and enter
into a new dimension.'34 Benjamin would argue that the cusp of this dimension
has already emerged within proto-fascist Berlin, through an era in which, as
Agamben would have it, 'that state of exception turned into rule signals law's
fulfilment and its becoming indistinguishable from the life over which it ought to
order. Confronted with this imperfect nihilism that would let nothing subsist
indefinitely in the form of a being in force without significance, Benjamin
30 Ibid., p. 129.
31 Ibid., p. 129.
32 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Saeer Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 57.
33 Ibid., p. 55.
34 Ibid., p. 55.
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proposes a messianic nihilism that nullifies even the Nothing and lets no law
remain in force beyond its own content.'35
Prior to the arrival of this nullification, the existence and body of Walter
Benjamin are left to coincide with National Socialism, destined to contend with
its influence, as the state of exception could not be separated out from the bare
life of any individual residing in Berlin in the era National Socialism came to
envelope. Under such an exceptional rule of law his existence, his very body
coincided with National Socialism to such a profound extent it began not just to
resemble, or imitate the affects of National Socialism on his person, but to
actually rhizomatically manifest them. His body thus written over with a force of
law that was at once asignifying and profoundly consequential, meant that for
Walter Benjamin one's only form of agency was to become a point on a point of
view on the Events which followed in its immanent wake, to become National
Socialism's reporter.
It was Leibniz 'who subjected the points of view to exclusive rules such
that each opened itself onto the others only in so far as they converged.
Nietzsche, contrary to Leibniz argued that the point of view is opened onto a
divergence which it affirms. In other words each point of view becomes the
means of going all the way to the end of the other, by following the entire
distance. In Nietzsche's scheme divergence is no longer a principle of exclusion,
and disjunction no longer a means of separation.'36 The convergence of
disjunctive events is now a means of communication. Everything thereafter
35 Ibid., p. 53.
36 Deleuze, Gilles, The Logic of Sense, Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Ed. Constantin V.
Boundas, (London, Athlone Press, 1990), p. 174.
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'happens through a resonance of disparities, point of view on a point of view,
displacement of perspective, differentiation of difference, and not through the
identity of contraries.'37 The violence that Benjamin defines in the 'Critique of
Violence' as divine moves along on a similarly disjunctive principle. Following in
line from Agamben's arguments, it is 'situated in a zone in which it is no longer
possible to distinguish between exception and rule.'38 As such divine violence
functions as 'a dissolution of the link between violence and the law. Benjamin
can say that divine violence neither posits nor conserves violence, but deposes it.
Divine violence shows the connection between the two [positing and preserving
violence] and even more between violence and the law - the single real content
of the law.'39 For Benjamin divine violence with its characteristic mode of
'imcompossibility' emerges in the modem age as the State's most powerful agent
for communication and perpetuation of an assignify law, namely the law of
sovereign power'40
In the last paragraph of 'Critique of Violence, Benjamin asserts that 'the
critique of violence is the philosophy of its history - the philosophy of this
history, because only the idea of its development makes possible a critical,
discriminating, and decisive approach to its temporal data,'41 In analysing this
data Benjamin cautions that we must not take the short view: 'A gaze directed
only at what is close at hand can at most perceive a dialectical rising and falling
37Ibid" p. 175.
38 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Saeer Souereign Power and Bare Life, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 65.
39 Ibid" p. 65.
40 Deleuze, Gilles, The Logic of Sense, Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivalc, Ed. Constantin V.
Boundas, (London, Athlone Press, 1990) p. 174.
41 Benjamin, Walter, "Moscow," in One Way Street and Other Writillgs. Intro. Susan Sontag Trans.
Harry Zohn. (London: Verso, 1979), p. 153.
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in law- making and law-preserving violence. The law governing their oscillation
rests on circumstances that all law preserving violence, in its duration, indirectly
weakens the law-making violence represented by it, through the suppression of
hostile counter-violence.'42 The only means to break this cycle of this duration,
and in doing so bring upon 'a new historical epoch' is through 'the suspension of
the law' and 'the abolition of state power.'43 The agent necessary to carry such an
operation would be revolutionary violence, what Benjamin refers to as
'unalloyed'44 violence, implying that it is a pure form of violence, perhaps related
in some sub or superhistorical sense, to law in its pure form. For Benjamin use of
such violence is possible. What is 'less possible and also less urgent for
humankind, however, is to decide when unalloyed violence has been realised in
particular cases.'4SThat the appearance of this unalloyed violence persists as an
uncertainty is largely due to the fact that it remains invisible to the judgement of
mankind. Furthermore Benjamin argues 'the expiatory power of violence itself is
invisible to men.'46 This expiatory power violence relates to history insofar as it
grants it the power of redress.
What I am pointing the way toward is Benjamin's final materialist
document, The Theses for a Philosophy of History, which essentially promotes a
rhizomatic approach to history; a situation where the future and past are
constantly in the process of becoming each other. Undoubtedly some
transhistorical material is always getting into the works of those becomings:
42 Ibid., p. 153.
43 Ibid., p. 153.
44 Ibid., p. 154.
45 Ibid., p. 154.
46 Ibid., p. 154.
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what Benjamin refers as the Messianic. History then emerges as something far
beyond the reach of mimetic historicism, the trace getting preempted by the
code, history emerging as the 'capture of a code, the code's surplus value, an
increase in valence, a genuine becoming,'47 porosity. In this essay, Benjamin is
influenced by Nietzsche's "Of the Use and Abuse of History," quoting him as
saying 'We need history, but not in the way a spoiled loafer in the garden of
knowledge needs it.'48 Thus Benjamin is telling us that he is striving for an
operative history, rather than a nostalgic one. Rather than looking to 'enslaved
ancestors,' Benjamin wished to direct our focus to their 'liberated
grandchildren.'49 This is an 'untimely' view of history insofar as it seeks out
futural probabilities for the coming moment, from the clues embedded within
our understanding of the past. Benjamin:
Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between
various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very
reason historical. It became historical posthumously, as it were, through
events that may be separated from it by thousands of years. A historian
who takes this as a point of departure stops telling the sequence of events
like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his
own era has formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a
conception of the present as the 'time of now' which is shot through with
chips of Messianic time."
For Nietzsche the historical formulation is slightly different, he opposes
historicism not to the eternal, but to the subhistorical or superhistorical: the
Untimely, which is another name for becoming,
47 Deleuze, Giles and Guattari, Felix. 011 the LiIlC, Trans. John Johnston. (New York: Semiotextle),
1986), p.19.
48 Benjamin, Walter, Illumiiuttions, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York, Fontana
Press, 1969), p. 251.
49lbid., p. 252.
50 [bid., P 255.
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"The unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which life can germinate
and with the destruction of which it must vanish. It is true that only by
imposing limits on this unhistorical element by thinking, reflecting,
comparing, distinguishing, drawing conclusions, only through the
appearance within that encompassing cloud of a vivid flash of light -
thus only through the power of employing the past for the purposes of
life and of gain, and introducing into history that which has been done
and is gone -did man become man: but with an excess of history man
again ceases to exist, and without that envelop of the unhistorical he
would never have begun or dared to begin. What deed would man be
capable of if he had not first entered into that vaporous region of the
unhistorical?" 51
Benjamin relates Nietzsche's concept of the 'unhistorical' to the sign of a
Messianic cessation of happening' which enables the materialist historiographer
effectively to blast 'a specific life out of the era or a specific work out of the
lifework. As a result of this method the lifework is preserved in this work and at
the same time [elevated]; in the lifework, the era; and in the era, the entire course
of history.'52 Thus making history as well as biography dependent on a series of
breaks and constant realignments, a vehicle of its own changing significance over
time. One way to actively effect these sorts of ruptures of history, both social and
personal, is to develop a reliance on short-term memory, therein allowing for the
replay of events in their singularity, as opposed to contiguity, in relation to all
other surrounding happenings. This practice undermines historicism insofar as
short term memory eliminates the drive to focus on the totalised account of what
happened. In line with Deleuze and Guattari's thinking on the subject, even the
molar categories of history and biography can deterritorialised through use of
the faculty of short term memory. Qualitatively speaking, 'short term memory is
51 Nietzsche, Fredrich, Untimely Meditations, Trans. R.J.Hollingdale, Intro. J.P. Stern.(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 63-64.
52 Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York, Fontana
Press, 1969), p.254..
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of the rhizome or diagram type and long term memory is aborescent and
centralised (imprint, engram, tracing or photography).'53 With those distinctions
in mind it would appear that short term memory has some distinct traits which
make it amenable as an agent of deteriorialisation. Deleuze and Guattari
characterise short term memory as being 'in no way subject to a law of
contiguity or immediacy to its object.'54What is more, short term memory 'can
act at a distance, come or return a long time after, but always under conditions of
discontinuity, rupture or multiplicity.'55 These attributes which Deleuze and
Guattari's associate with short term memory are common to both Nietzsche's
'unhistorical' and Benjamin's 'monadology' when it comes to defining a spatial
relation to events in history. This is also true of short term memory's approach to
time, which is one of disjointed recurrence as opposed to seamless continuum.
Moreover it extends to the very conceptualisation of how to write history and to
the idea of history of itself, which is at a certain level profoundly integrated with
the idea of memory. Deleuze and Guattari would argue for a charting of history
in which 'one writes using short term memory and thus using short term ideas,
even if one reads or rereads using long term memory for long term concepts.'56
Through this approach history is not the present, which becomes static through
its recording, but history as a functionary of short term memory which 'includes
memory as a process.'57 Historical memory then 'merges not with the instant but
instead with the nervous temporal and collective rhizome.P This approach does
S3 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 16.
54 Ibid., p. 16.
55 Ibid., p. 16.
56 Ibid., p. 16.
57 Ibid., p. 16,
58 Ibid., p. 16.
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not signal the elimination of long term memory, but rather effects an alteration in
the way it organises material. Long term memory (family, race, society, of
civilisation) traces and translates, but what it translates continues to act in, from a
distance, off beat and in an "untimely" way.59
When applied to personal history, short term memory takes on a quality
of 'experimentation in contact with the real.'60 In his essay Moscow, Benjamin
countenances revolutionary life as one where, "each thought, each day of life lies
here as on a laboratory table. And as if it were metal from which an unknown
substance is by every means to be extracted, it must endure experimentation to
the point of exhaustion."61 Adopting such a comportment for himself, Benjamin
spews out before him a political field (similar to Foucault's 'episteme') that is
neither imaginary nor symbolic, instead it represents a heterotopic register of
political spaces yet to come, whose possibility for emergence still lies dormant
beneath the strata of 'the American technocratic apparatus or the Russian
bureaucracy or the machinery of Fascism.'62 Foucault points out that one of the
features of heterotopias is their capability to juxtapose 'in a single real place
several spaces, several sites that are themselves incompatible.'63 These are the
spaces Benjamin wishes to excavate, to find their mineral as well as molecular
contents, to locate their technical enplacements, and to discover beyond these
their monadology. History according a materialist historiography is then borne
59 Ibid., p. 16.
60 [bid., p. 12.
61 Benjamin, Walter, "Moscow," in One Way Street and Other vvritinge. Intra. Susan Sontag Trans.
Harry Zohn. (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 185-186.
62 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreward by Reda Bensmaia (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 12.
63 Foucault, Michel. OjOther Spaces, diacritics, Spring 1986, p. 25.
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of out of a history of abrupt blockages, what Benjamin terms monads. These
monads configure themselves according to a logic of forces: 'When thinking
suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that
configuration a shock, by which it crystallises into a monad.'64 For Benjamin
thinking, and in this instance the thinking of politicised spaces, 'involves not
only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as we11.'65For Benjamin this blockage
presents us with a tremendous opportunity: 'a revolutionary chance in the fight
for an oppressed past.'66 Therein thinking is always rhizomatic, a becoming
encountering a blockage, encountering another becoming.
Benjamin's thought approaches politics as though it were 'an
experimental machine, a machine for ef£ects.'67He learns this approach from
Kafka whose work for him was to be taken literally insofar as when viewed from
a certain perspective, it functioned on the surface of its signs and that the issue
was not - at least, not only - to try and interpret it but above all to practice it. .. '68
Benjamin's enforced transience by those political formations, meant that he
conducted many of these experiments on himself, as a political operative by
other means. Literally then his writing becomes a means of giving authority to
himself, not through anything resembling a Fascist dictate, but rather by
materialising a space in which he might proliferate his political campaign
through various cultural formations that were not strictly speaking authorised
64Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York, Fontana
Press, 1969), p. 254.
65 Ibid., p. 254
66 Ibid, p.254.
67 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Millor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
(University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986) p. xi.
68 This quote was altered from a comment made by Reda Bensmaia in the fore ward to A
TllOllSalld Plateaus, Ibid., p. xi.
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for his perusal. Basically then Benjamin's work might been viewed as a trespass,
a kind of unauthorised intervention taking place at the crossroads of various
historical formations paving the road to a universally adopted totalitarianism,
one I might add that would dwarf the German war-machine of Fascism
according to Benjamin's estimations. It is my opinion that we have yet to pick up
on Benjamin's signal in this regard. In a political discussion in 1938with Brecht
in Denmark Benjamin notes, 'I felt the impact of powers equal to those of
Fascism, powers that sprang up from the depths of history no less deep that
Fascist powers.'69 Surely these depths will rise up again and require our most
sober attentiveness. We can begin to chart these historical uprisings by
examining Benjamin's preoccupation with combinations, what Benjamin referred
to as 'an awakening combination, at once a modem surface and an archaic depth,
'signal' and 'oracle!'70
I mentioned earlier Benjamin's vision of what it means to become a
materialist historiographer; it is to become a critical thinker who is able to 'grasp
the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one.'71
Thus Benjamin's historical preoccupations with series, events that join up in
places never thought of, never concerned to be closely situated. The
topographical map Benjamin gives to history is similar to the one Deleuze and
Guatttari describe as "the most striking topography in Kafka's work: two
diametrically opposed points bizarrely reveal themselves to be in contact."72 For
69 Wohlfarth, Irving, "No-man's Land On Walter Benjamin's Destructive Character" in Walter
Beniamin's Philosophy, Ed., Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 164.
70 Ibid., p. 164.
71 Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intra. Hannah Arendt (New York,
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 255.
72 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreward by Reda Bensmaia (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 73.
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Benjamin's part, he chooses to expose these sorts of alignments in history along
the faultlines of political objective. Thus, Benjamin's approach to historical
formation resembles something of a geological study, a plate tectonics of the will
of nations. Benjamin's early concepts of the ruin and porosity in Naples suggest
that he was conducting a kind of archaeological dig into history to recover its lost
features. Thus Benjamin's approach surveys history on the level of the matrixial
and molecular, beginning with the Trauerspiel and carrying right the way
through to his Theses on the Philosophy of History. This happens well in advance of
Deleuze and Guattari's combined use of the molar and the molecular as a means
of assembling their views about the epochal events of history. This statement is
not meant to inaugurate some stratified competition of philosophical might, but
rather to demonstrate how molecules of Benjamin's thought have lodged
themselves into Deleuze and Guattari's battle plan on the Signifier.
It is important to recognise that Benjamin's is a tactical approach much
more subtle than any taxonomic history standing alone. Benjamin's interest lies
in the potential of historical adjacencies, he is reticent about registering divisions
since he does not accept that they materially exist. 'The historical materialist
leaves it to others to be drained by the whore called 'Once upon a time' in
historicism's bordello.'73 An historical materialist cannot do without the notion of
a present which is not in transition, but in which time stands still and has come
to a stop. Historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past. The
historical materialist remains in control of his powers, and thus is 'man enough
to blast open the continuum of history'74 Benjamin is acting at the elemental level
73 Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York,
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 254.
74 Ibid., 254.
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to remap the coordinates of historical understanding. This fits in line with
Deleuze and Guattari 's assertion that 'what distinguishes the map from the
tracing is that it is entirely orientated toward an experimentation with the real.'75
Such an experimental approach enables Benjamin, in the role of history's land
surveyor to, with one hand detonate historical materialism, and with the other
hand blast over a mimetic code of historical destruction.
In that same spirit of experimentalism Benjamin himself might be
approached as a map, a territory mapped onto himself, following Deleuze and
Guattari's interpretation of the map as 'open and connectable to all dimensions,'
as well as 'detachable, reversible,' and 'susceptible to constant modification.'76
Moreover, they assert that as opposed to a trace, 'the map can be tom, reversed,
adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual group, or social
formation.'77 Deleuze and Guattari also give us ultimate licence for situating a
map; for instance 'It can be drawn on the wall, conceived of as a work of art,
constructed as a political action or as a meditation.'78 Since Benjamin's project
inherently occupies most of these potential locations, there is a great cause for it
to manifest itself here along similar lines of formation. What is not made
manifest in Benjamin's body of work is the proverbial 'map drawn on a wall.'79
The absence of this map raises both a crucial omission and a crucial
opportunity in the survey of Benjamin's opus. It spurs the imagination toward an
75 Deleuze Giles and Guattari, Felix, A T/IOIISatld Plateaus, (London: The Athlone Press Ltd., 1988).
p.12.
76 Ibid., p. 12.
77 Ibid., p. 12.
78 Ibid., p. 12.
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opening out of the territorial locations that lay dormant through his writing. But
in doing so one must remain cautious about the means with which one
endeavour's to expose these zones in the body of the text. If they are inscribed
too much they run the risk of being overcoded. On the other hand too subtle a
survey of them would leave them vulnerable to obscurity, or worse still to open
to endless bouts of aesetheticisation. What is required in not a tracing out of
these areas, but rather a mapping technique that could relate them through
diagrammatic extension, one aimed at composing series of gestures as opposed
to pinning down a singular meaning; one moreover that could install productive
blockages as well as opportunities for subverting them. The apparatus most
suited to this task would be photography. This is not of course the most obvious
tool of deterriorialization. Particularly when we take into account Deleuze and
Guattari's views on photography, as something associated with long term
memory, something that 'blocks desire, makes mere carbon copies of it, fixes it
within a strata, cuts it off from all of its connections.f" When asked if they feel
there is any potential for it to become a deterritorialising tool their response is
tongue in cheek, playing up a Jewish sense of humour 'But, what, then can we
hope for? It is an impasse. Nonetheless, we can realise that even an impasse is
good if it forms part of rhizome.' '81 Benjamin quotes Kafka as having once said
'there is an infinite amount of hope, but not for us. '82 Most people thought he
was expressing desperation. Deleuze and Guattari read him as expressing
humour. It is a politicised humour that they clearly wish to emulate, a humour
which they credit in Kafka as forming' A micropoIitics of desire, a politics that
SO Ibid., p. 18.
81 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreward by Reda Bensmaia (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 4.
82 Benjamin, Walter, llluminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York,
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 142.
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questions all situations ... Everything leads to laughter starting with The Trial.
Everything is political starting with the letters to Felice.'83 It is that way with A
Thousand Plateaus, as well as their book on Kafka. A politics that questions all
situations, which can see levity even in the most molar formations can also allow
for a different formation of photography to appear. A photography that
challenges memory, challenges the narrative form, and challenges the regime of
signification that reigns over the majority of photographic enterprises. This
approach moreover could bring an alternative practice of photography into being
to serve a linguistic enterprise.
What I am proposing is a 'minor' approach to photography, that would
meet the criteria of Deleuze and Guattari's for a minor literature. Namely, that
the images are' affected by a high coefficient of deterritorialisation,'84 'that
everything in them is political'f" insofar as each individual frame is 'connected
immediately to politics'86 and that every image 'takes on a collective
value ... another possible community and to forge the means for another
consciousness and another sensibility.'87 Photography as a 'thing that no longer
forms anything but a sequence of intensive states, a ladder or circuit for
intensities that once can make race around on one sense or another, from high to
low, or from low to high. The image is the race itself; it has become
becoming ... '88This mode of photography has the potential to become something
83Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreward by Reda Bensmaia (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 42.
84 Ibid., p. 16.
85 Ibid., p. 17.
86 Ibid., p. 17.
87 Ibid., p. 17.
88 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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deterritorialising, that would have no particular fidelity to a place, or for that
matter in a signifying placement. Itwould produce images that form a rhizome
with their surrounding texts. Deleuze and Guattari have already suggested that
images might be further along than words, in their potential to deterritorialise.
They offer The Trial as being an example of such a deterritorialised becoming for
the photographic image:
This take place through the vehicle of proliferation: 'The proliferation starts
at the beginning with Fraulein Brustner's room-photos that have the power
to metamorphose those who look at them ... From the photos of Fraulein
Brustner we move to the obscene images in the judge's book, then to the
photos of Elsa that K. shows to Leni (as Kafka did with his Weimar photos
in his first encounter with Felice), then to the unlimited series of Titorelli's
tableaux, about which one could say a la Borges, that they contain so many
differences from each other because they are absolutely identical. In short
the portrait or the photo that marked a sort of artificial territoriality of
desire now becomes a centre for the perturbation of situations and
characters, a connector that precipitates the movement of
deterriorialisation. An expression freed from its constricting form and
bringing about a similar liberation of contents.s?
Therein the category of the photographic no longer slavishly responds to the
commands of the symbolic meaning, but instead proliferates those commands
onto infinity, creating a series of transformations of meaning based on an
intimate connection with a viewer who is able to import them in line with his
own unique zone of expression, dispersing them within his own visual idiom if
you like.
Rather than contextualise the writings, minor photographs are meant to
speed the narrative, but not toward any particular outcome. Instead, they are
meant to indicate something gestural as opposed to symbolic for the viewer.
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Benjamin describes Kafka's work as something that 'constitutes a code of
gestures which surely had no definite symbolic meaning for the author from the
outset; rather the author tried to derive such a meaning from them in ever-
changing contexts and experimental meanings.'90 A minor photography operates
in a similar way, through series, pairings, repetitions and deviations of the
appearance of ordinary locations. These images then are not 'linked' but instead
form a constellation of little dramas. Benjamin in describing how gesture
functions in Kafka's work, explains that 'Each gesture is an event- one might
even say- a drama in itself.'91 Therein these gestures form a map of constantly
shifting happenings, one that neither concerns itself with the vagaries of timing,
nor space, but rather with the instant. As Benjamin had observed in The Theses 011
the Philosophy of History, 'The true picture of the past flits by. The past can be
seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised
and is never seen again.'92 This is very much the work of the photographer, to
seize upon moments that are fleeting from existence. However, the photographic
act does not have to be one of memorial to the dead or drained instant, rather it
can be used as a signposts for instants yet to come which share the same fleeting
appearance.
A 'minor' photography is able to get involved in the proliferation of these
instants, merging them into a collective rhizome, rather than isolating them and
89 Ibid., p. 61.
90 Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt (New York, Fontana
Press,1969), p.117.
91 Ibid., p. 117.
49
forcing their attenuation. Building up such a visual dossier on Benjamin is a
perilous assignment, requiring recovering tactics of a different order than the
archivizing tendency of the trace can offer. This is why a minor approach is
necessary, one that refuses to entertain any desires to house Benjamin, to
remember him, to replace him as displaced figure, to mollify him. Instead these
composites hope to speed his signalled departure to send it racing into a series of
departures and connections. Through a certain distribution of terms this can
certainly be accomplished. Amongst these are 'Connection. The construction of
singular series. Also Conjunction. The construction of convergent series. And
finally Disjunction. The distribution of a divergent series. These three tactics
together equal an affirmation of mobility and of duration. Divergence however
acts as the 'teeth' the interlock the sequences, which are subdivisible in their
respective series.'93 It is this quality of divergence that also allows me to affirm
distance over locatedness, as a starting point of view.
In the book Logic of Sense, Deleuze holds that
With Nietzsche, the point of view is opened onto a divergence which it
affirms; another town corresponds to each point of view, each point of view
is another town, the towns are linked only by their distance and resonate
only through the divergence of their series, their houses and their streets.
There is always another town within the town. Each term becomes the
means of going all the way to the end of the other, by following the entire
distance.f
92 Ibid., p. 247.
93 Deleuze, Gilles, The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Ed. Constantin V.
Boundas, (London, Athlone Press, 1990), p. 154.
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It in is this sort of town that the flight of a minor photography can
commence from end to end, term to term, series to series, convergence to
divergence and further on out from there. This then becomes about my plugging
Benjamin into a very Kafkaesque topographical scenario, one motivated by
Deleuze and Guattari's comments made in regard their prior survey of Kafka's
literary impetus in the form of a photographic image of his father. For my
purposes in surveying Benjamin, I am jettisoning the image of the Father, in
favour of an image of Berlin. Indeed I started this chapter with the image of a
Berlin which had so disenfranchised Benjamin, that he responded by radically
distancing himself from Germany and transferring his adherence to an image
Europe beyond all national boundaries, from there his task of surveying culture
would be projected on to 'the geographic, historical and political map of the
world in order to reach vast regions of it.'95'One might say that by projecting
[Berlin] onto a map of the world, [Benjamin] unblocks the impasse that is specific
to the photo and invents a way out of this impasse, putting it into connection
with a whole underground network, and with all the ways out of this
network ... the problem isn't that of liberty it is of escape. It is a matter of
deterritorializing [Berlin] in the world instead of reterritorializing everything in
[Berlin] and [Europe]. '96 It is a matter making a map that finds ways out of
fascism where [Berlin] didn't find any." A map that will extend to regions that
9-l Ibid., p. 174.
95 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, Kafka: Toward a Millar Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreward by Reda Bensmaia (Universityof Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1986), p. 10.
96 Ibid., p. 10.
97 Ibid., p. 10.
5 I
are in contact with Berlin but at a distance - sometimes poles apart - but where
signals still might get through and be received by various Parties.
Benjamin faces a scenario of events where getting through might be just as
bad as being disconnected, a somewhat horrifying prospect for anyone setting
out. Benjamin's journey is Ia prodigious operation which translates this horror
into a topography of obstacles (where to go? how to arrive? Berlin, Moscow,
PariS?)'98The surveyor has no choice but to journey onward, as he is compelled
by forces beyond his true understanding, diabolical forces that are knocking at
the door, jamming up the signal, confusing the network as to vital task at hand.
That task comes down a redirection of the 19th century's course of understanding,
through twentieth century communication tactics which could potentially act as
line of flight, a means of distribution of a particular thesis; one requiring the
transformation of the image of thought and of history back into a minor
discourse. We'll have to see how far this gets Benjamin. As it stands now he is in
the middle of the night, setting a course for Moscow, keeping a diary and finding
out that words 'can be the final station only when they are never the first ... '99
98 Ibid., p. 31.
99 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
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Sternphot0i:raphie: A Constellation of Walter
Benjamin's Moscow Diary.
STERNPHOTOGRAPHIE.
In Walter Benjamin's essay 'Metaphysics of Youth" there is a section
called 'The Diary.' In it, Benjamin puts forth the idea that through the diary one
is able to direct words as though they formed a ray of light. Later through a
course of translations, this ray of light might then come to articulate itself as a ray
of time. Indeed, what can best be wished for in writing a diary over time,
according to Benjamin's guidelines, is the literal petrifaction of one's words,
transforming what had initially been experienced in life as a series of
hypersubjective flashes of recognition into something immortal, fossilised, and
finally perfected through script. A youthful Benjamin believes that words
recorded in his diary will have a momentous afterlife long after he has passed
away. Whilst he is still alive each of the flashes of recognition he records in his
diary further inform his experiences, which in turn spark the words to burn more
brightly. The heat from these words spark still further, causing words to fuse the
course of events into a constellation, which is then able to join up with an older,
related configuration - the subject's own previously wished for outcomes.
In this section it would seem that Benjamin's ultimate wish as a diarist is
nothing short of human liberation from mortality, a victory of youthful energy
over the ravages of time. He finds however, that it is not bodies, nor the self
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tyrannically encased in the 'I,' which get to mingle with immortality. Instead, he
finds it is the word alone that has the privilege to glow of it own accord, and
prosper beyond the realm of human dimension. For Benjamin, the word's glow
posseses a quality similar to twilight, in that its radiance springs from an
ambiguous origin. Indeed, the word's luminosity must be related to more
prosaic phenomenon, namely the author's experience, in order to comprehend its
nuance, its meaning, its placement within the order of things. Such associative
thinking comes into play in Benjamin's description of twilight as a juncture
'where ideas relate to things as constellations to stars."
Moreover it would seem that as we grow in experience, these associations
align themselves with a constellation of previously held pleasures. These
pleasures most often coincide with a 'yearning for the self, a desire for youth, a
lust for power, a desire to pass calmly through the days to come, and the
pleasures of idleness" make themselves known in momentary flashes when these
desires would seem to be actualised. This actualisation however is illusory
insofar as these flash ups of desire take a parallel route to experience, rerouting
themselves through the pages of the diary. How is this possible? Benjamin
describes the diary as 'the unfathomable document of a life never lived, the book
of a life in whose time everything that we experienced inadequately is
transformed into experience perfected." By that same token we can assume that
1 Benjamin, Walter, Selected Writillgs, Vol. I, 1913-1926. Eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W.
Jennings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. pp. 6-17.
2 Benjamin quoted in Cad ava, Eduardo. Words of Ligllt. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,
1997, p. 28.
3 Benjamin, Walter, Selected Writillgs, Vol. I, 1913-1926. Eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W.
Jennings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. p. 11.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
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desire too is perfected in this act of documentation.
This begs the question of how Benjamin, 'who will write in his diary only
at intervals and will never complete it, because he will die" can expect to attain
such perfection having left behind so may examples of incomplete
documentation? A clue lies with Benjamin's phrase, 'it is the document of a life
never lived." Indeed, it would seem that Benjamin is arguing that diary is in fact
a document of counteractualisation. That its function is nothing short of the
counteractualisation of a life and therein of desire itself if we understand desire
to be a process of living and not life's outcome, its lack, its blockage. Benjamin's
comments imply that the diary is a kind of rogue asssemblage of desire which
need not concern itself with the proclivities of 'calendar time, clock time, and
stocking exchange time' which send its author 'trembling' on the brink of
mortality." By contrast the 'I' of our diary plunges into this brink happily and
with abandon. It, unlike its author, is free to make its own time, be its own agent;
intimating all the while that it holds inside it 'the value of what could have
happened:" Its words 'mime what effectively occurs' in the experience of the
author, and therein in it works to double the actualisation [of those events] with
counter-actualisation," creating a radical parabasis between the author and the
diary itself. This margin allows the author to identify with the events that befall
him, but with the added advantage of viewing them at a critical distance. Therein
the diary would appear to double events in such a way as to 'give the truth of the
5 Ibid., .p, I I.
6 Ibid., p. I I.
7 Ibid., p. II.
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event the only chance of not being confused with their actualisation.'!"
This is not to say that events do not catch up with the author himself, but
they do so along the lines of a fault of character as opposed to fate. In one of the
last sentences of this section Benjamin writes 'we shall befall ourselves,'!'
meaning that it is none other than ourselves which we contend with in life. It is
nowhere else, than the dark recesses of our character, the folds of the self, that we
confront our greatest challenge as individuals, as authors of the illusive 'I.'
Therein the diarist must always begin his account in the middle of the night, by
describing the darkness that enfolds him, the circumstances that obscure his
perception, his unique zone of expression.
By the same token if the author has lost his way, if his narrative drive
forward has been dimmed by the forces beyond his true understanding, if his
door has been darkened with 'terrible bad luck,' then he must go by the way of
light: he must look to the stars. He must write himself out of this dilemma.
Moreover, he must chart a course parallel to the events that befall him, parallel
with a course in which he befalls himself. He can only move events by starting
his journey with a detour away from words, starting instead with a quest for
personal enlightenment, for meaning within his own life. Benjamin writes in a
letter of 1916 to Herbert Belmore:
') Ibid., p. 161.
10 Ibid., p. 161.
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We are in the middle of the night. I once tried to combat it with words ...
At the time I learned that whoever fights against the night must move its
deepest darkness to deliver up its light and that words are only a way
station in this major life struggle: and they can be the final station only
when they are never the first ... 12
Even at this early stage Benjamin is aware that he must circumvent words
in order to eventually, strategically direct them. Therein, Benjamin's long range
thinking becomes preoccupied with the notion of delivering up the light of
discourse. In the short term, and as a means of training himself toward this
greater task, he occupies himself with the task of confronting the limits of his
own character. He commences this task in earnest in December of 1926, by
somewhat haphazardly depositing himself into another politico-linguistic
context altogether, that of Soviet Moscow in the early years of Communist Party
rule. For Benjamin this is a place, at least potentially, where the illuminating
device of discourse, in particular leftist discourse, might be directed differently
than in Benjamin's local neighbourhood of West Berlin. The particular leftist
discourse that guides Benjamin there emanates from the Bolshevik revolutionary
theatre director Asja Lacis, his former intimate and the inspiration for his most
recent piece of writing, One Way Street.
It would seem to be both their understanding that she will call the course
of events in Moscow, as she speaks the language and appears at least initially to
hold reign over all the vital Communist connections that Benjamin wishes to
acquire for himself once in the city. Most significantly however, this present role
casts her as an experienced manipulator of political discourse. Indeed, Benjamin
anticipates relying on her solely in this endeavour as his barometer of the leftist
political climate in Moscow. This is not the first time Benjamin will rely upon
12 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
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Asja to carve out an alliterative field for him. The details of such transactions to
take place in Moscow however, as I will illustrate below, were worked out
months, if not years, in advance of Benjamin's arrival there. These previous
encounters have intimate through-lines with his other destinations and exist as
rough drafts of the encounter he ultimately stages with Asja in Moscow.
ACTIONPHOTOGRAPHY.
The first of these alliterative fields is Riga, in November 1925, a place
arguably that provided an 'ordinance' for Benjamin's trip to Moscow. Benjamin
came to Riga unannounced in 1925 to see Asja Lacis. He records his clandestine
entry into the city in a section entitled 'Ordinance' in One Way Street, published
the following year in 1926. A copy was subsequently brought to Asja in Moscow.
Once there, Benjamin gave her the original dust jacket designed by Sasha Stone,
and announced his dedication of the volume to her. The section he chose to read
to Asja one early evening on that trip was 'Wrinkles.' It was very much intended
as a demarcation of the territory of their mutual admiration. It directly spells out
Benjamin's enduring preoccupation with her as a subject. The other section
'Ordinance' performs a very similar rhetorical operation to that of 'Wrinkles'
insofar as it carves out a minor occupancy for Benjamin within Asja's ordained
space, Riga. The place is ordained with excessive meaning for Benjamin simply
by the anticipated presence of Asja Lacis within its scheme. And indeed, it will
be instantly ordinanced by her, when she makes her first appearance within its
spatial order. It is up to Benjamin then, in choosing to arrive here unannounced,
to temporarily disorder that space by coming in as a complete outsider. What
Benjamin is undertaking than becomes a reconditioning of Riga as a smooth
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space, what for Deleuze and Guattari amounts to nomadic space on the ground.
This is also the way Benjamin authorises it when he writes his initial account:
I arrived in Riga to visit a woman friend. Her house, the town, the
language were unfamiliar to me. No one was expecting me, no one knew
me. For two hours I walked the streets in solitude. Never have I seen them
so. From every gate a flame darted, each cornerstone sprayed sparks, and
every streetcar came toward me like a fire engine. For she might have
stepped out of the gateway, around the corner, been siting in the streetcar.
But of the two of us I had to be, at any price, the first to see the other. For
had she touched me with the match of her eyes, I should have gone up
like a magazine."
What Benjamin is employing here is something of an eccentric
cartography, a scientific survey of urban affects if you like, something that is
necessarily minor in its conceits. This makes it no less of a scientific model, but
instead of approaching the landscape as an (meta) physical survey, Benjamin
chooses a model which is 'vortical,' one that Deleuze and Guattari assert
'operates in an open space throughout which things-flows are distributed, rather
than plotting out a closed space for linear and solid things.':" It is here that
objects, as words had done before in his diaries, take on the function of rays of
light. Benjamin referents all belie this transformation of meaning into affect.
Flames, sparks and fires are the things that incite Benjamin in this projectile
landscape. The forms that potentially spawn them seem to be immolated by the
force of his concerns, and by the still greater force of anticipatory energy building
inside him when confronted with this open frontier of happenings. Implicitly one
understands that this incitement demonstrates neither the desire nor the
provision within it to locate either Asja's street name or her house number. This
n Benjamin, WaIter, One Way Street and Other Writillgs, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Susan Sontag
(London: Verso, 1979), pp. 68-69.
14 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreword by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) P: 361.
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small detail however marks the difference between what Deleuze and Guattari
term smooth (vortical, projective, or topological) space and a striated space
(metric) space: in the first case 'space is occupied without being counted,' (as it
was in Riga) in the second case 'space is counted in order to be occupied, (as it
will happen in MosCOW).'15Through this distinction we are yet again admitted
into the space of the Moscow Diary, as a model, similar to Deleuze and Guattari's
model of 'nomadic science,' which proves to be 'problematic,' rather than
'thereomatic': where figures are considered from a viewpoint of the affections that
befall them: sections, ablations, adjunctions, projections,1l6 as opposed to their
specific of differences or essential characteristics.
The supposedly solid figure that forces Benjamin back from the brink of
the object world in Riga is the same as the one in Moscow. It is none other than
Benjamin's supreme subject of desire, Asja Lacis. Indeed it is the Soviet's pseudo-
characteristic solidity that ultimately makes Asja the only probable engineer for
this tale. Indeed it is an if the 'insider knowledge' Benjamin assigns to Asja's
position within Soviet Moscow, makes it so that in order to be equal to that task
she is necessarily 'caught between a rock and a hard place, between the war
machine that nourishes and inspires' the people's revolution and 'the State that
imposes upon them an order of reasons.,17 A position Deleuze and Guattari
would characterise as the as the borderline between nomadic science and State
science, in other words between a revolutionary wish to promote 'becoming,
heterogeneity, infinitesimal [shifts], passage to the limit and continuous variation
in the social field, and a State desire to eliminate such variables in favour of
15 Ibid., p. 361.
16 Ibid., p. 361.
17 Ibid., p. 361.
60
imposing 'civil, static and ordinal rules.t" Caught between solidity and fluidity,
'the figure of the engineer (in particular the military engineer), with all of its
ambivalence, is illustrative of the situation'!" Benjamin confronts when entering
into this overly striated territory of Soviet life and despite this fact ultimately
wanting to cut through it using the tools of a nomadic [political! science.
The pretext for this approach is cut through Benjamin, in the first sentence
of One Way Street when he asserts that this 'street is named Asja Lacis Street after
her who as the engineer cut it through the author.?" The question here then
becomes one of authorisation. Who is authorised to make this sort of cuts
through Walter Benjamin Street, affecting a detour, and yet at the same time
forcing upon Benjamin a tyranny of political direction: a One Way Street? This
situation could be described as a borderline phenomenon. One which illustrates
perfectly Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that at all times, what is happening is
that 'nomad science exerts pressure on State science, and conversely, State
science, appropriates and transforms the elements of nomadic science.?' It is
never a question of which is better or worse, more libratory, more revolutionary.
The significance of these alignments happens elsewhere, indirectly onward from
such exertions of force. What I am arguing is that this type of street cut is not
made to the 'Wrinkles' in the fabric of Benjamin's Communist idealism, but
rather to something far more nuanced and illusive in his constitution.
Specifically, what Iam pointing the way toward is Benjamin's first discovery of
love as one of the key gears in building up one's own intimately designed war
18 Ibid., p. 363.
19 Ibid., p. 362.
20 Benjamin, Walter, aile Way Street and Other Writings, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intra. Susan Sontag
(London: Verso, 1979), p. 45.
21 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreword by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 363.
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machine, an energy that necessarily runs outside of State-imposed ordinance.
Love as a counter-' ordinance' to the state as it were; giving a rogue order to make
love and war. Moreover this is a love taken to extremes as a means to delve past
the limit and into other territories of unregulated violence, namely fascism and
its unregulatable war machine. What we in fact encounter in Moscow is a topo-
logic of extreme, yet banal limitations and endurance beyond what is initially
deemed tolerable in the first instance of Benjamin's diary writing. This is where
engineering becomes relevant to Benjamin and to our discussion insofar as it is a
key element in the outcomes of desire.
'Desire,' for Deleuze and Guattari 'is never an undifferentiated instinctual
energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered set up rich in
interactions: a whole segmentarity that processes molecular energies and
potentially gives desire a fascist determination.f" Deleuze and Guatttari add that
'leftist organisations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to
be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the
fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both
personal and collective.:" Fascism does not arise when the masses passively
submit to power, or want to be oppressed by a strict regime, nor are they tricked
by an ideological lure, rather it is through the desire to add a little suppleness to
the system, to make things better that leads to the proliferation of microfascisms.
In postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, molecules of
fascism are brewing everywhere. They happen when we underestimate the
magnitude of the affairs we are a party to for better and worse, feel that our
22 Ibid., p. 215.
21 Ibid." p. 215.
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paranoia about a situation is based on imaginary factors, and finally through
judgemental thinking about the other party.
These sorts of mircrofascisms are what Benjamin is reporting on in his
Moscow diary. This is what he was picking up on in Moscow, when he describes
a particular evening as Asja's apartment when 'a violent argument breaks out in
Russian about Meyerhold's production of the Inspector General. The point of
contention is his use of velvet and silk, fourteen costumes for his wife, the
performance moreover lasts more than five hours.:" Add to this the story of the
playwright and Soviet activist Ernst Toller, who 'was welcomed with
unbelievable pomp. Throughout the city posters proclaim his arrival. He is given
a staff of assistants, translators, secretaries, beautiful women. There is, however,
a session of the Comitern taking place in Moscow at the same time. Paul Werner,
an archenemy of Toller, is among the German delegates. He requests or writes an
article in Pravda: Toller betrayed the Revolution, is responsible for the collapse of
one of the German Soviet Republics. Pravda adds a short editorial note: Our
apologies, we were unaware. Whereupon Toller becomes a persona non grata in
Moscow. He arrives at the auditorium where he is to deliver a much publicised
lecture - the building is closed. The Kameneva Institute informs him: Our
apologies, the hall was unavailable. (Someone had forgotten to telephone himl.?"
On top of this are Benjamin's dealings with figures like journalist Joseph Roth of
whom he tells 'the long and short of it: he came to Russia a (nearly confirmed)
Bolshevik and was leaving it a royalist. As usual, the country is left footing the
bill for the change in colour that occurs in the convictions who arrive here as
24 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), P: II.
25 Ibid .• pp.12-13.
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scintillating reddish-pink politicians (under the banner of 'leftwing' opposition
or idiotic optimism). He face was all creased with wrinkles and he had the look
of a snoop.?" The compounded outcomes of these and numerous other exposures
to microfascisms within the Left make a strong impression on Benjamin,
hounding his political conscience for many years to come.
To understand how this transpires we must decipher a difficult formula
for how to conduct nomadic science on the ground. Deleuze and Guattari
schematise it in the following way. For my part I will now proceed through their
formula, plugging in the specifics of the potential components we are dealing
with here in Moscow: 'Well first off one does not go by specific differences from
a genus [Berlin + the Berlin Chronicle] to its specifics [Benjamin = Berliner] or by
a deduction from a stable essence [Benjamin = child + proto-fascistic Berlin] to
the properties deriving from it [Benjamin = an anti-fascist philosopher], but
rather from a problem [y = unrequited love] to the accidents that condition and
resolve it [Answer: Benjamin's war machinej.r" A nomadic approach to reading
into Benjamin's amorous predicament in Moscow therein 'involves all sorts of
deformations, transmutations, passages to the limit, operations in which each
figure designates an 'event' much more than an essence ... ,2S Despite what Lacan
might say in the operating systems manual on desire to come after World War II,
'the problem is not an 'obstacle' it is the surpassing of the obstacle, a pro-jection,
or in other words a war machine.?" Desire is rather a process, it is continuous,
sometimes to the point of self-abolition or the abolition of others. This is a
disturbing knowledge that Benjamin would come to partially attain as an
26 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
27 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Pia teaus, Trans. and Foreword by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 361.
28 Ibid., p. 361.
29 Ibid., p. 361.
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outcome of his experiences in Moscow. Terrifyingly it is an insight that Goebbels,
in his memoirs, would associate with Hitler in 1940: 'In the world of absolute
fatality in which Hitler moves, nothing has meaning any longer, neither good nor
bad, time nor space, and what other people call success cannot be used as a
criterion ... Hitler will probably end in catastrophe.?' A line of abolition results,
which ends finally, according to Goebbels, with Hitler deciding 'to join forces
with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own people, by
obliterating the last remaining resources of its life support system, civil resources
of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.),,31Doomed to ride out Hitler's
mutated circuit, Benjamin would also end in catastrophe. But his would follow
on from an alternate, though intersecting line: the Communist line. In choosing
to support leftist solutions to the problem of a rising German fascism until it was
too late to tum course sufficiently, Benjamin was in effect manning a derivative
prototype of war machine from the imposed German model. Indeed leftist
thinking of the 1930s was often characterised by a mixture of reactionary rhetoric
to fascism, bourgeois idealism and a rigid adherence to programmatic outcomes,
one only need look at Benjamin's diaries to find evidence of this in his exchanges
with Party loyalists. To some extend even his own Marxist model of releasing
free radicals culled from historical debris, into a corrupt historical engine of
historicism is tinged with too crude a dialectal understanding of history, giving
too much significance to the striated spaces of historical accounting. Deleuze and
Guattari caution that 'We must remind ourselves that smooth space and striated
space only exist in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated into a
striated space; striated space is constantly being transversed into a smooth space;
striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space.:"
30 Ibid., p. 231, Footnote 32.
31 lbid., p,.23 I.
32 Ibid., p. 361.
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Benjamin does experience glimmers of understanding of this through his journey
to Moscow, in particular through his struggles in his relationship with Asja Lacis.
Indeed, it is through trials on his own heart, and upon leaving Moscow, that
Benjamin is able to launch in earnest into his study of 19th century Paris, the
Arcades Project, which in directory-like form stages a pre-eminent display of the
working interlogistics between smooth and striated space. A foretaste of this
understanding comes to light on 6 December 1926, Benjamin enters into a station
that will change his life course forever. He makes provisions should he not be
awaited in his arrival at this crucial junction:
In the train I had made a mental note of the name and the address of a
hotel in case there is nobody waiting for me at the station. (At the border
they had made me pay extra to travel first class, claiming there were no
more seats in second) I was relieved that there was no one there to see me
emerge from the sleeping car. But there was no one at the platform either.
I was not overly upset. Then, as I was making my way out of Belorussia-
Baltic railway station, Reich appeared. 33
Benjamin has already started from a point of striation as a German
Bourgeois when he entering Soviet Moscow. However, even at that, his striation
has already been transversed by an introjection of smoothness when he comes up
against the impossibility of coming off the train as a second class passenger,
which would seemingly lodge him back into the space of the German
bourgeoisie. However, this is suddenly of no consequence, when there is no one
to witness his departure from the train. With no one at the platform to meet him,
Benjamin is allowed to regain a smooth entry into the Belorussian-Baltic space of
the railway station. That is until Reich appears, and forces him back into the
striated space of recognition. Nonetheless, the smooth space of an unknown
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Moscow was awaiting him beyond the journey from the station and Benjamin
will learn to employ other more successful nomadic approaches to the Clty as the
weeks go by. These are the sort of hydraulic models, what Deleuze and Cuattari
group with the affects of nomadic science and the war machine, 'consist in bemg
distributed by turbulence across smooth space.?' It is these types of force of flow
that will speed Benjamin's entire experience here, transporting him from one
point to another. As a result of allowing himself to be taken up and buffeted by
these hydraulic forces, Benjamin will emerge simultaneously affected by all the
points along the way. He will emerge as the machine both of his discontents and
his likenesses, his upsets and victories. Only then can Benjamin become the
motor of this installed programma tics of endurance incarnate, trudging forward
to face the steep terrain of fascism, to taking its suicide garnbit like a true
engineer by outwitting is shutdown mechanisms and realigning them into a stall
pattern.
NERVEPHOTOGRAPHIE.
An unfortunate set of circumstances converges with the birth of this
spectre of suicide. It almost seems as if Moscow marks a point of deviation from
Benjamin's given course of fatality, academic and otherwise in that same year. By
1926 Benjamin had entered into a collision course with fate, which brought with
it the culmination of various trials including those of unrequited love with [ula
Radt, chronic depression based on his financial woes, professional devastation
1.1 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow 01l1ry. eel. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Cershom
Scholern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p 9.
11 Deleuze. Gilles, and Cuattari, Felix r A Tuouemu! Plaicau«, Trans. and Foreword by Brian
Massumi (Mmneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 363.
with the rejection of his habilitation thesis, and death, through the loss of his
father with whom he had been locked in unresolved financial conflict for several
years. The shock of these events overloaded Benjamin's psychic capacity,
resulting in a nervous breakdown. Benjamin conspicuously characterises the
term 'nervous breakdown' as' a soothing phrase' with which to describe his
condition." Given that there was little left that was readily classifiable in
Benjamin's experience at the time, it is little wonder why the term poses just that
slight bit of ironic relief for him.
Benjamin speaks of his nervous breakdowns as a series: 'more precisely I
had one after the other.r" This repetition can be registered in Benjamin as
nothing less than a signal, a signal to alert him to the ultimate power failure to
come at the end of the line. Ifwe understand that repetition on the order of
experience will cause the chain of signification to ignite again and again, we are
then, like Benjamin, also able to recognise these system failures as something
ultimately feeding into a power surge. Now it was Benjamin's task to discover
the location with which to spark a necessary transformation in the way he
functioned, to act as switch-point for him to discard this faulty logic of
perception that had led him so far off his envisaged route. The key to selecting
this space for Benjamin, became how to tap into an already existing and much
larger rush of energy in Moscow; both as a city scape, and in the embodied form
of Asja Lacis. That his descriptions of the city he finds there and Asja's condition
within it mingle so effortlessly in the page after page of the diary attest to his
desire for these two formidable bodies together to yield some palpable change in
30 Witte, Bernd. Walter Benjamin. Trans. James Rolleston. Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1991. P: 99 .
.10 Ibid., p.99.
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his perceptions, and in doing so in some way alter the course of his interior
demolition before it is too late.
POSTERIORPHOTOGRAPHIE.
Though Benjamin abruptly starts his Diary on 9 December, in a
resounding gesture resembling nothing so much as an engine going from stall to
ignition, the story begins much earlier. In Gary Smith's edited version of the
Diary Smith chooses to preface this first abrupt entry with an essay by Gershom
Scholem. This is somewhat of an odd choice given that Scholem was already
residing in Jerusalem for some time and therefore was not a party to the
planning stages of Benjamin's visit to Moscow. As far as the intimacy of their
correspondence went, Scholem makes it clear that Benjamin gave him neither a
definitive idea of why he was going nor any indication of what was happening in
Moscow when he got there, in the one letter Benjamin sent to him from there.
Moreover, this letter is dated December 10, precisely one day after his arrival.
Surely this is a defensive move on Benjamin's part so that Scholem would have
no way of knowing the extent to which Benjamin's passion for Asja determined
his stay there, and indeed she is mentioned nowhere in the short letter. Instead,
Benjamin focuses his letter on happenings in Berlin and his recent professional
achievements. Scholem rationalises Benjamin's decision to leave him in the dark
on what could potentially be a failed mission to Moscow by asserting
'retrospectively' that 'It was clear that he did not care to share his almost certain
misfortunes in undergoing this journey.':"
37 Ibid, p. 7.
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This rather conspicuous comment inadvertently sheds light on another
facet of Benjamin non-writing, the crucial omission of Asja Lacis. Benjamin's lack
of correspondence on her specifically leaves Scholem's analysis to deal with her
simply as a troubling and irritating enigma. The fact is that at the time Scholem
had no real idea of who Asja Lacis was, nor the decisive role she played in
Benjamin's decision to go to Moscow. After Scholem gets hold of the diary
himself and as late as 1982, he still remains reluctant to rank her as the greatest
factor figuring into Benjamin's decision to go. Instead, he seems determined to
cling to the idea that Benjamin's dilemma of whether or not to join the German
Communist Party was the essential motivating factor. Any communist
orientation on Benjamin's part however, seems very hard to demonstrate given
the consistently bourgeois perspective Benjamin provides us with throughout the
narrative of the diary. Indeed, his greatest preoccupations in Moscow apart from
Asja Lads seem to revolve around shopping for presents, eating exotic meals out
and attending the theatre in the evening. It could hardly be argued that Benjamin
was trying out the proletarian lifestyle during his stay.
As far as Scholem's ability to assess Asja's longstanding impact on
Benjamin's life, it is enough to say that he was not even aware of her name until
she came to Berlin in 1925. Benjamin met her the previous year in Capri. Scholem
only ever heard tell of her in that year on two occasions. On the first occasion,
Benjamin described her in a letter to him as simply 'the Bolshevik from Riga.' In
a second letter from Capri, Benjamin referred to her as a 'Russian revolutionary,'
who was according to that same account 'the most remarkable woman [he] ever
met.'38Given this last statement it seems ironic that Benjamin chose not to remark
38 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 7.
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upon her further, as late 1926, the time of his letter to Scholem from Moscow. It
seems particularly odd given that at that point the couple had been involved
with each other for over two years. Benjamin's reticence about this relationship
indeed seems to have left Scholem with little choice but to conclude at least in
1926, that Benjamin's trip was one preoccupied more so with getting to grips
with a political economy rather than an erotic one.
Nonetheless, Scholem's account manages almost inadvertently to come to
grips with some rich insights into how Benjamin's portrayal of Moscow was to
figure in his later works, and also how it might have been linked with other
critical inquiries at the time about Moscow and its situation amongst Leftist
thinkers. Nevertheless, it will require a radical re-terriorialization of Scholem's
comments to unearth such insights. It requires us to relay the ground of
Benjamin's departure from Moscow in several ways. Again we must redirect
light differently and read by way of a circumspection of sorts of Scholem's
account, in order to arrive at what seems to be nothing short of a ghostwritten
preface to Benjamin's appearance in Moscow. Often this kind of surveying
activity reveals to us contiguity within Benjamin's account that is not
immediately apparent. Indeed what at first seem unrelated and even
diametrically opposed elements reveal themselves upon closer inspection to be a
select group, or pack of contiguous themes in the work. In order to unearth these
themes we must loop our terrain, looking for molecular 'houses,' rather than
molar landmarks such as St. Basil's Cathedral. Benjamin writes of these 'houses,'
'It is only after you have crept along a series of them in search of a very specific
one that you come to learn what they contain.':"
J9 lbid., p. 25.
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PERIMETERPHOTOGRAPHIE.
The first loop in our circumspection of the Moscow journey starts with a
quote from Scholem outlining the three factors that contributed to Benjamin's
journey to Moscow.
First of all his passion for Asja Lacis, and second his desire to get a closer
look at the situation in Russia and perhaps to even establish some sort of
official tie with it, thereby resolving the issue of his eventual membership
in the German Communist Party, a question he had been weighing for
over two years. A further contributing factor was no doubt provided by
the literary obligations he had assumed before setting out on his journey
and which committed him to writing an account of the city and its
inhabitants, in short rendering a 'physiognomy' of Moscow."
What Scholem assumes here was that all these factors are Icontributing' to
Benjamin's journey, rather than immanent factors which must be raised in order
to precipitate Benjamin's trip, forces which are contiguous with one another.
Certainly, the ground for Benjamin to come to Moscow was laid out in 1924,
when he met his first Soviet Revolutionary in the flesh and fell in love with her.
This event then hastens Benjamin's more than-two-year struggle of whether or
not to join the Party. This concern is then joined to his accumulation of literary
obligations, which are invariably tied up with financial obligations. Benjamin
must make Capitalism and Communism join together to back him. In terms of
Capitalism, the support comes in the form of the literary advances he receives
prior to his trip and in terms of Communism in the form of State subsidies. It is
Benjamin's wish that a happy dialectical understanding between the two systems
can be reached. However, it will emerge only if he properly aligns these interests.
40 Ibid., P: 7.
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It is only then that these two systems that dog him ideologically, can be resolved
into a satisfying materialist economic strategy. Toward this end, Benjamin seeks
advances in Germany as rigorously as he seeks subsidies in the Soviet Union.
Scholem finally concedes, 'after all, he partially financed his trip by
various advances received for these pieces.?" Even then, Scholem can only see
the advances. In light of the economic advances Russia poured into Germany at
the time, both culturally and financially, largely from communist circles, one
cannot help but wonder if Scholem's biased audit of Benjamin's accounts isn't
corrupted by some strain of nationalism. Furthermore, he fails throughout to
acknowledge the Russian subsidies, both monetary and emotional, that really
enabled Benjamin to carryon in Moscow once he got there. Even as he is
acknowledging these advances as a crucial factor to the feasibility of Benjamin's
plan, he is at the same time failing to appreciate the efforts that Benjamin must
have gone to in order to secure these advances. Indeed, Benjamin would have
had to be far more concerned with convincing his colleagues that these on site
accounts were necessary. Given that Joseph Roth had been commissioned by the
Frankfurter Zeitung to report on his travels from the Soviet Union from late
August until December 1926/2 Benjamin would have to convince editors that a
further commentary was needed. Especially one that would come literally on the
heels of Roth's departure. Indeed, the last of Roth's accounts wouldn't even have
been published until January 1927/3 a month into Benjamin's stay. Scholem also
fails to recognise that the Benjamin's motivation to seek out these commissions to
begin with is fuelled by his passion for Asja Lacis and a desire to see her in
Moscow, making this again somewhat of a circular enterprise.
41 Ibid., p. 5.
42 Ibid., pp.28-29 Footnote 51.
43 Ibid., pp.28-29 Footnote 51.
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Scholem then adds in a further awkward comment, asserting that the
Moscow Diary is an 'astounding'" bit of writing. Such a startling reaction on his
part however can only take place through a failure to see the Diary as a complex
system of justifications for Benjamin's being in Moscow. The 'intense blend of
observation and imagination.:" Scholem experiences largely comes out of
Benjamin's determination to survive in a space that is at first completely
uncharted to him and one which he will have to struggle daily to locate his own
vital territorializations. Scholem also remarks upon Benjamin's 'futile' attempts
in the city, not taking into account that within what appears to be futility is
actually Benjamin's making a utility out of his apparent failures. Benjamin in the
Diary is constantly moving on from his apparent failures, making a virtue of his
transitory status to replace untenable figures that exist on the scene of his visit.
Even Asja looses her central importance to the narrative half way through, and is
replaced with several other more serviceable figures such as Reich, the theatre
director Meyerhold, and Asia's companion, Basseches, the Austrian journalist
and engineer, finally Rachlin, Asja's roommate when she moves out of the
sanatorium.
This last figure Rachlin, who appears late in the narrative, seems to
provide Benjamin with an alternative, if ambivalent source of erotic attraction.
We see Benjamin in the last several pages trying to elude her advances, and at
the same time utilising them as a means of comparison, to assure himself of his
continued attachment to Asja. By the end of the narrative all that was assumed to
be unproductive space in Moscow has advanced and what was initially thought
44 Ibid., p. 6.
45 Ibid., p. 6.
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to have been conquered territory has dwindled in its importance. All the circuits
are reversed and Benjamin attempts to intellectualise the experience are
abandoned in favour of what he refers to in a letter to Martin Buber of 23
February 1927 as a 'creatural' turn in his writing, perhaps referring the title of the
journal itself Die Kreatur.
Moreover, Benjamin displays what can only be described as an almost
ferocious approach to the completion of what will eventually be known as the
'Moscow' essay. In just three short weeks its arrival to Buber's editorial desk
appears imminent, in a Kafka-like feat of masterworking - this is a dare say
Benjamin's 'Metamorphoses.' He writes to Buber:
My presentation will be devoid of all theory. In this fashion I hope to
succeed in letting the creatural speak for itself: in as much as I have
succeeded in seizing and rendering this very new and disorientating
language that echoes loudly through the resounding mask of an
environment that had been totally transformed. I want to write a
description of Moscow at the present moment in which 'all factuality is
already theory' and which would thereby refrain from any deductive
abstraction, from any prognostication, and even within certain limits from
any judgement - all of which, I am absolutely convinced cannot be
formulated in this case on the basis of spiritual 'data' but only on the basis
of economic facts of which few people, even in Russia, have a sufficiently
broad grasp. Moscow as it appears at the present reveals a full range of
possibilities in schematic form: above all the possibility that the
Revolution might fail or succeed. In either case, something unforeseeable
will result and its picture will be far different from any programmatic
sketch one might draw of the future. The outlines of this are already
brutally and distinctly visible among the people and their environment."
It is at this point that one must recognise that we cannot approach
Benjamin's Moscow Diary as theory. Nor can it be understood through
theoretical paradigms, for to do so would deny its fundamental' creaturality' the
46 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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resonance of its emotional, immanent life. Perhaps this is why critics of Benjamin
have largely shied away from this piece of Benjamin's writing. Indeed, there are
precious few critical analyses of the Diary. Most choose to view it as a fairly
plodding, politically naive account of a failed mission to the Soviet Union. This is
why I have chosen Deleuze and Guattari's work to figure so crucially in my
editing of this text. Their work is mean as to act as a users manual, a mechanics
of reading texts conjunctively, experimentally, alchemically. Deleuze and
Guattari's work, unlike a standard theoretical apparatus, acts in continuity with
the microelements already at work within the text. It does not act as disciplinary
force on the text, seeking to reform its excesses as though it was a disobedient
child.
Reading the Moscow Diary alongside Deleuze and Guattari enables
criticality to instead become a tool of edition. Editing in the sense of not a cutting
into a text, but instead re-networking its long neglected connections, using wires
presumptively thought to have crossed, triggering off communication which
relies on discursive receptors beyond the here and now and what can be
materially understood. If Benjamin's documentation of Moscow is intended to be
read as creatural, than we must take it on its own terms, its becoming text
becoming animal with all the seeming limitations that brings. One of those
limitations will be an expectation that Benjamin's creatural text will somehow
imitate a creature, that it will gnaw, howl, bite at the object within its reach,
Moscow. To imagine this scenario, would be to totally miss the point of what
Deleuze and Guattari are hoping to conjure with the notion of becoming-animal,
or in this instance with Benjamin's text, with becoming-creatural. Using their
model of becoming, we can only say that Benjamin's text is becoming-creatural
when 'it enters into composition with something else in such a way that the
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particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be [creatural] as a
function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity into
which they enter.':" In other words, a text is becoming, animal, creatural,
woman, child, whatever only when it temporarily incorporates the manner of the
thing it is becoming, and not when it incorporates its molar, organic form. When
Benjamin describes the text's creaturality, it happens through the activity of
'seizing and rendering this very new and disorientating language.:" and not
through the qualitative nature of its prose. The diary does not resemble a
creature, in as much as its approach periodically adopts aspects of creaturality
such as seizing and rendering to carry out its desired affect. Simple put, the text
is emitting creaturality, it is creaturing.
As Deleuze and Guattari schematise it, 'the becoming-animal effectively
shows a way out, traces a line of escape, but is incapable of following it or
making it its own.:" This limit doesn't force Benjamin's Diary to go elsewhere.
Rather, it forces it into becoming something out running the slow prudent pace
of theory, and thereby entering into a velocity where 'all factuality is already
theory.' Therefore its rate of progress cannot be stabilised, nor at the end of this
run can it ever be brought down like a lame dog. No, Benjamin's creaturality is
stronger than one might imagine, much stronger than it is accounted for by a
distanced reader like Scholem.
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What Benjamin senses out of Moscow is as a result unforeseeable to most
city planners, who remain blind to the extent of the parameters of this new
bureaucratic economy, and even more so to its violence. Benjamin will ask
himself: How can anyone ever be for or against violence? Anymore than anyone
can be for or against love? Not surprisingly, there is even a link between violence
and becoming animal it is 'because it is accompanied by, at its origin, as an
undertaking, by a rupture with the central institutions that have established
themselves or seek to become established.?" This rupture creates a leakage in
some very powerful institutions such as the family, religion and the State. The
rupture that is created allows power to shift into the hands of the oppressed,
prohibited, those in revolt, those on the fringe of recognised institutions. One of
course recognises in Benjamin the fundamental belief that civil society is
subtended constitutionally by violence, and therein the politics of becoming-
animal becomes that much more ambiguous insofar as it tactics also comprise
violent outcomes. It then comes down to a question of alliances and of allowing
one to become contaminated with a certain molecular strain of political
appropriation.
With this in mind, it is Martin Buber, and not Gershom Scholem who
Benjamin will choose to align himself with in his time of communicatory need
coming out of Moscow. 'My esteemed Herr Buber ...,51 It is Benjamin's letter to
Buber, which decisively marks the switch point of the smooth space of Moscow
into the creatural terrain of Benjamin's understanding, the becoming animal of
his critical analysis. The justification for this tum is apparently based upon some
50 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreword by Brian
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elusive 'economic facts' that 'most Russians cannot grasp.:" What Benjamin does
not say, but rather implies is that the term economy in this work has been made
to take flight of its ordinary signification and to enter into another territory (one
altogether apart from any Communist Manifestation.) The creatural line of
escape Benjamin has the foresight to follow is characterised by Deleuze and
Guattari as something that 'vacuums up in its movement all politics, all
economy, all bureaucracy, all judiciary: it sucks them like a vampire in order to
make them [sur]render still unknown sounds that comes from the future-
Fascism, Stalinism, Americanism, diabolical powers that are knocking at the door. /53
These diabolical powers are not to be avoided as such, but instead molecularly
absorbed in such a way as to establish affinities and not filiations with them.
These affinities can then be recoded and spread through Benjamin's minoritian
networks {which included the likes of 'Bertolt Brecht or Karl Korsch, both
Marxist of unusual pedigree - genealogically outsiders - with troubled relations
to the Partyr" as a form of redirecting political understanding and delivering up
the light of discourse. This must be accomplished by a creatural approach to
writing where 'all factuality is already theory,' where theory is understood to
operate like a 'burrow' 55 digging ever deeper in the recesses of language and of
understanding. Deleuze and Guattari contend that 'because expression precedes
content and draws it along (on the condition, of course, that it is nonsignifying):
living and writing, art and life, are opposed only from the point of view' of a
majority literature.r" What Benjamin is constructing in his writing however is a
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minor literature and therein he is installing the means by which all of these
nodes of expression, his various works, can at least potentially converge and
communicate with one another. However at the time of Benjamin's writing, the
force of a rising Stalinism was 'still too close, still too perceptible, too
individuated'" for the diary to suffice as a proper format in which to engage
these concerns. Indeed what Scholem praises in the long essay 'Moscow' that
eventually appears in Buber's journal is its 'unbelievable precision, and
'unusually intense blend of observation and imagination.r" Qualities, moreover,
that for Scholem are seemingly lacking in the diary. It is not a coincidence that at
the exact moment that Benjamin begins writing 'Moscow' 'he abandons
becomings-animal for a more complex assemblage/:" He does so because he
becomes fundamentally aware that a molar formation of Communism has taken
on a new and more powerful valance through the proliferation of molecular
totalitarianisms throughout Moscow. Indeed, in later years the beast of
totalitarianism would take on a sophisticated molecular form enabling it to
inhabit and infect codes across the social strata of Soviet life. Benjamin in
Moscow was simply picking up on a relatively weak strain of that contagion,
compared to virulence it would attain in years to come.
DEPTHPHOTOGRAPHIE.
Gary Smith, the editor of the Moscow Diary in English asks us to read 'as
if through a palimpsest.?" Do we go along with such a theory of editorial
57 Ibid., p.37.
58 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 6.
59 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Kafkn Toward a Millor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan,
Foreword Reda Bensmaia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). p. 37.
60 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diarv. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 137.
80
superimposition, by Benjamin, by Smith? It is clear that something has been
'rubbed out' in Benjamin, but just how serious or extensive this effacement was
remains indeterminate. What we do know is that Benjamin's overwrite is never
meant only to bear traces of earlier writing, but rather to describe what might
potentially emerge. On this level, it is fundamentally not 'a programmatic sketch
one might draw of the future."! Instead it occupies' a different space of broadcast
altogether.?" An intensely personal one. All of Benjamin's work throughout the
1930s lies immanently in the Moscow Diary.
Smith also cites Benjamin's debut in writing for radio, as an event whose
source material is located in the journal/" This might not have happen in the
obvious way Smith seems to imply. Instead is the architecture of Moscow which
draws Benjamin's attention to a potentially 'different shape' in which to
appreciate the impact of broadcast. Benjamin: 'I saw the enormous Moscow radio
transmitter, whose shape is different from any other I have seen.'?' Nevertheless,
Smith continues to rely upon literal referencing and thus goes on to footnote no
less than 15 occasions in which Benjamin addresses, in essay form, a Moscow
based theme." 'Many of the motifs of the Diary that Smith cites including general
discussions of theatre, film, poetry and toys'" emerge as key areas of interest for
Benjamin's cultural criticism in the intervening years between 1927 and his death
in 1940. I would go so far as to say that they form some of the crucial outlines of
Benjamin's final work, the Arcades Project. If it were not for Moscow, Benjamin
might never have stepped into the area of radio broadcast, or had the courage to
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introduce such bold dialectics with his own era into the Arcades Project. Indeed
Moscow at this time competes with Paris of the 19th century, in terms of a city's
ability through its infrastructure, to capture and exemplify the ideology shapes
of the mass's imagination. Benjamin writes: 'There are people here who don't
care what things are called and simply accept them as they are, children for
example lacing their skates in the street.?" It is this kind of cultural politic which
fascinates Benjamin and bespeaks volumes about what subtends the day to day
operations of Stalinization in Moscow.
Smith asserts that the text 'engages readers familiar with Soviet cultural
politics at the earliest stages of Stalinization.?" I would argue strongly that it
holds more interest for those who know what would emerge so soon afterward.
Indeed, Smith characterises the period of Benjamin's stay as 'the final winter of
literary independence, Stalin was winning the struggle against Trotsky for
succession to Lenin's place, and cultural policy was hardening.:" Benjamin even
in that 'final winter of literary independence' could sense something ominous to
come in the atmosphere that surrounded him on his visit. Furthermore, his letter
to Buber absolutely confirms this. Benjamin writes: 'Moscow, as it appears at the
present reveals a full range of possibilities in the schematic form: above all, the
possibility that the Revolution might fail or succeed. In either case, something
unforeseeable will result and its picture will be far different from any
programmatic sketch one could draw of the future. The outlines of this are at
present brutally and distinctly visible amongst the people and their
environment.:" If Benjamin's Moscow Dairy, however, fails to present an
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adequate prognostication, for Smith and others, convincing enough to suggest a
sophisticated understanding of the situation I would argue it was not because
Benjamin was in the dark so to speak as an outsider in Moscow. Indeed, his
intimacy with Lacis and later Reich lead him onto insights far greater than any
casual visitor could hope to obtain. Rather, the reason for his unwillingness to
acutely schematise Moscow comes down to two factors: firstly, Benjamin's
intellectual commitment to historical materialism, and secondly, his loyalty to a
tradition in Jewish mysticism which holds that attempting to predict the future is
strictly forbidden. An exchange with Asja Lacis demonstrates how these biases
divulge themselves in Benjamin'S Moscow Diary.
On January 13, before he begins reading to her from the Diary he
mentions 'Lukac's thesis that historical materialism was at base applicable to the
history of the workers movement.?' Asja appears 'tired' at the moment. To
counter this Benjamin must 'resort to the Moscow Diary' where he reads her
'random' passages that happen to catch his eye. Things go 'less well in this case'
as Benjamin had chanced upon the part where he dealt with 'communist
education.' 'It's utter nonsense,' said Asja. '
She was annoyed and claimed I knew nothing about Russia. Obviously I
could not argue with this. Then she herself began to speak: what she was
saying was very important, but she became very agitated as she talked.
She spoke of how she herself had not understood Russia at least at the
outset, how she wanted to go back to Europe a few weeks after her arrival
because everything seemed finished in Russia and the opposition was
absolutely correct. Gradually she realised what in fact was taking place
here: the conversion of a revolutionary effort into a technological effort.
Now it is made clear to every communist that at this hour revolutionary
conflict does not signify conflict or civil war, but rather electrification,
canal construction, creation of factories. I replied by bringing up
Scheertbart, since I had already endured so much talk on account of him
71 Ibid., p. 82.
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from Reich and Asja: no other author had so clearly emphasised the
revolutionary character of technological achievement. (I regret not having
used this excellent formulation in the interview.) With all this 1managed
to delay the time of her departure by a few minutes."
It is through this exchange with Asja Lacis that the real work of the
Moscow Diary begins. It starts with Asja's conversion, a process by which she
will come to understand herself not as a revolutionary but instead as a
technocrat. Itwill come down to the point of her changing her signification from
a state warrior to an electrician; (Benjamin's fantasy of her as an electrical
engineer seems to have been a realistic one after all). Benjamin responds by
bringing up Paul Scheerbart, whose book Glasarchiiektur (1914) was a favourite
of both he and Scholem." This volume greatly influenced Benjamin's work on
the Arcades in later years. For now though it seems to provide a structural
component to Benjamin's interpretation of what 'technology' is meant to signify
for Reich and Asja. Bringing up the reference also seems to suggest that this
understanding of 'technology' exists mainly as a rhetorical reality. Thus,
Benjamin is able parenthetically to regret not using it at his interview, which one
is left to surmise, is with communist party officials.
Itmay seem that this debate takes place only in and around rhetorical
grounds, but in fact its significance extends must further. This small excerpt is an
example of the micropolitical climate in Moscow. It is as important as any
detailed discussion of Stalin, in revealing what forces, including rhetorical ones,
are immanently present in the Soviet Union to fuel the manufacture of a Stalinist
infrastructure in micropolitical bodies as well as macropolitical sites. What
Benjamin manages to delay in waging this debate with her are a few precious
72 Ibid., p. 82.
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years before she falls victim to the pathology of her own rhetoric. In 1936, after
publishing a book on German avant-garde theatre, she was interned in
Kazakhstan for over a decade. She would not be allowed to work as a director in
Russia again until 1956.74
It is not just Asja who will suffer the material consequences of Benjamin's
belief, that what results in the Soviet Union will be far different from any
programmatic already sketched out by the Party. Indeed, an early striation of
Stalin's crackdown is almost immediately visible in the limits imposed on
Moscow's intelligentsia as early as 1927. The outcomes are not visible, simply
because there were no outcomes yet, but only potential lines of flight to be taken
by the people and their environment. The most virulent molecules of
totalitarianism had yet to germinate amongst these people, cracking through the
tenuous layers of revolutionary rhetoric, until they eventually fissured into
Stalin's crackdown.
Using Deleuze and Guattari's work on totalitarianism and lines of flight
we are able to fill in some features of the communism to emerge under Stalin's
regime. First of all, the administration of communism required the appearance of
'a great organised molar security.:" However, what it really attended to was 'the
management of petty fears, establishing within its strata a permanent molecular
insecurity.:" In Moscow Benjamin 'observes how many times a meeting has to be
arranged here before it finally takes place. Nothing ever happens here as planned
or expected - this banal formulation of life's complications is borne out so
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implacably and so intensely in every single instance here that you quickly come
to grasp the fatalism of the Russians. However slowly the calculable advance of
civilisation progresses within the collectivity, its initial effects will only further
complicate individual existence. One is better off in a house that only has candles
than in one that has electric lights that don't work because of constant power
failures."? On the other hand, without her union card, Asja 'would have had no
medical care and might possibly have died.i" She now has a place at the
sanatorium and her daughter is housed at the children's centre whilst she
recovers. Therein the Soviet Union was run simultaneously through' a
macropolitics of security and a micropolitics of insecurity:" that ran through the
bodies of its comrades. When Stalin consolidated his power, 'it was as if a tiny
line of flight 'blasted these two segmentary political series apart, making them
capable of their worst appearances, bouncing them off the wall of Marxist
ideology, making communism fall into a black hole, taking the path of greatest
regression and its vagaries constructing the most rigid of segments.?" Perhaps, it
was at first as Benjamin had imagined it, just' a tiny trickle to begin with, leaking
through the segments, escaping their centralisation, avoiding their totalisation
under the present system.r" The change in values of the people and their
environment was however, busily overcoding the machine, agitating comrades
like Asja Lacis so badly that they ended up with nervous breakdowns or worse.
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'A molecular flow was escaping/ in the city. 'It was minuscule at first,
then swelling, without, however, ceasing to be unassignable.:" Benjamin had
tried to trace it through his tram rides with Rachlin at the very end, but got
sidetracked worrying over Asja's well being. The reverse, however, was also
taking place. After all 'molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if
they did not return to the molar organisations to reshuffle their segments, their
binary distributions of sexes, classes, and parties.f" It was here that the avant-
garde opposition really got caught out in Moscow. They didn't know how to
redistribute themselves after their social contracts were voided. This is when
Benjamin's acquaintances and colleagues in Moscow get caught in the shuffle of
reconsolidated power. It is then that the line of escape for them really goes dead.
Scholem illustrates what happened next in the following statement: 'to
the extent that I have been able to trace their fates sooner or later .... They would
all become victims of Stalin's rule once it began to consolidate power.t" Scholem
reports that even Benjamin's 'friend Asja Lacis would be forced to spend many
years in a camp in the wake of Stalin's 'purges.?" Stalin's regime then becomes
molarised, 'consolidated' through the imposition of these 'purges;' a systematic
of forcible leaks consolidated in the regions where minor leaks had already
occurred. Leaks that once occupied the smooth space of Moscow as minoritarian
identifications, (Scholem's vague identification of Benjamin's group of peers as
'Trotskyites,')" were reterrioralised and striated by Stalin to signify a fluid
criminal element. Once identified this community had to be shut down at its
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source, and ultimately overpowered by a tidal wave of anti-intellectualism; one
that had already been swelling up in the city.
Scholem's account acknowledges Benjamin's courage in 'plumbing' the
depths of these dangerous leaks. Scholem: 'In addition, Benjamin's growing
awareness of the opportunism of many of his closest acquaintances, dictated
either by fear or cynicism, was something he could not ignore and in the end
lead to violent confrontations, even with Asja.?" Indeed, what further eroded the
pipeline for Benjamin was the matter of a dirty little secret in the rigid
segmentarity of Soviet Moscow. The members of the artistic and political
opposition (a grouping meant to include all of his contacts in Moscow) were in
point of fact, in league with the spirit of anti-intellectualism that characterised
the immanent crackdown. Smith asserts that one factor that influenced
Benjamin's decision not to join the Party, came out of his anxiety about the
'proletarianization of the cultural sphere'" that was taking place all around him
in Moscow. Indeed, following the performance of Meyerhold's staging of
GogoI's The Inspector General mentioned earlier, Benjamin is forced into a lengthy
debate, in which the judgement of the individual critic is displaced by the
'articulation of the initially eruptive, wordless mass verdict.?"
Benjamin could not fail to see 'the upheavals caused by this monster
force,'?' on Soviet culture. Nor could he suffer the open secrecy of his colleague's
opportunism in response to these staged critical agitations, not when it was
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'threatening to bring everything tumbling down.'?' The outrage that Benjamin
felt as a result of these experiences in Moscow opened a window of insight for
him on how the Stalinization of culture might progress. In his mind, the chances
were slim that this rigidification of culture would fail, as the critical factors were
already in place for it to happen whilst he was there.
This awareness makes the Moscow Diary somehow resonate with such
singular desolation in spite of its initial message of elation sent onto Scholem on
that second day. 'It is as if at the very moment when things might come to
resolution, its undertaking is threatened by something reaching down into'
Benjamin's core; 'by a death, a demolition,' that would later force him to revisit
his Moscow Diary as a Spanish [ourney." Although this time in the guise of the
Destructive Character. That the critical messages to Asja Lacis contained with
the Diary were withheld from publication until after her death in 1980 adds yet
another veil of tragedy onto this literary affair. This was another publishing
mistake, no less harmful than the one that sent Asja Lacis to an internment camp
for a decade, and not releasing her again until Benjamin was long dead. How
could she have known that what Benjamin had written about her was not
'nonsense,' but rather a heartfelt attempt to address her situation, to listen to her
earnestly, and to learn solemnly the importance of the lessons she was imparting
to him?
Scholem suggests that 'She functions merely as a friendly ear for his
accounts of his activities, as the almost always elusive object of his courtship, and
finally and not exactly infrequently, as his adversary in hostile, wrenching
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disputea/'? Itwould seem as though Scholem remains profoundly deaf to Asia's
role as a sounding board for Benjamin's emergent political voice. It is precisely
through the channel of Asja's ear, that Benjamin is able to draw out - through a
complicated process of resonation - an opinion of the situation there. To say that
she is 'merely a friendly ear' is an absurd conclusion to draw if indeed as he says
their relationship was overwhelmingly "adversarial.?' If the reader concentrates
more closely on what is being said, as opposed to the tone of the address, he can
discern a tremendously valuable set of political co-ordinates that can be
realigned so as to reveal the real wiring of that intimate relationship. Including
the fact that Asja was most certainly Benjamin most important political calling
companion, in this she was not elusive, but eternally faithfully, even at times
when her presence on the line could not be materially registered, it was always
felt by Benjamin with all its weight of anticipation.
Beyond that, the frequent 'hostile, wretched disputes' were the sparks
that joined their passionate connection. They also belie the communicatory
violence that kept the circuit of this connection in running order. Itwas through
this antagonism that hope was kept alive, that both believed the survival of their
association worth fighting for despite the constant incurred losses in
understanding from year to year.
December 31. The snow that night had the sparkle of stars. (On another
occasion, I saw snow on her coat such as probably never occur in
Germany.) When we arrived in front of her house, I asked her more out of
defiance and more to test her than out of any real feeling, for one last kiss
in the old year. She wouldn't give me one. I turned back, it was almost
New Year's, certainly alone but not all that sad. After all, I knew that Asja,
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too, was alone. A bell started ringin~ faintly just as I reached my hotel. I
stood there for a while and listened. 5
This is a constellatory moment. A moment that could never take place in
Berlin. It is a moment when Benjamin has come to Asja's home, only to inflict
upon her another violent, amatory summons. In defiantly asking for what he
know he cannot have, Benjamin's is somehow sealing the pact of their libidinous
contract, perpetuating the fact that this denial on her part can only further
conjure a disruptive promise of his return. Thus, the two will be fated to return
to this spot again, perhaps in another city, for this ritual display of unrequited
love to play itself out again. Even as Benjamin is turned back alone and on the
street, he is not all that sad, because he knows that Asja too is made alone, in her
sadness through his abrupt departure. This sadness triggers the summons all
over again. The bells start ringing as soon as he reaches his destination apart
from her. This is the thing that stops Benjamin, calls him to attention, reconnects
the telephonic circuit between them.
Deleuze and Guattari speak of Chekhov, the great creator of novellas, in a
way that 'brings up an aparallel evolution of the two men who have absolutely
nothing to do with each other'" -beyond words. What the critic Shetov says of
Chekhov is not unlike what Scholem, says of Benjamin following the Moscow
visit: 'There can be practically no doubt that Chekhov exerted himself, and
something broke inside him. And the over strain came not from hard and heavy
labour; no mighty overpowering exploit broke him, he stumbled and fell, he
slipped .... The old Chekhov of gaiety and mirth is no more ... Instead, a morose
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and overshadowed man, a 'crirninal.?" Deleuze and Guattari question what
actually happened to Chekhov. They ask whether it is possible to exert oneself or
break something, without falling into a black hole of bitterness and sand. They
ask if Chekhov really fell. And if that is not to judge him entirely from the
outside. Finally they point out however grimly Chekhov portrayed a character
he always carried 'a hundred pounds of love for him.?"
This final point in Chekhov is a way in, a way to read the Moscow Diary
around the space of the lines that compose it. A way to check Benjamin's
melancholia, his criminality, against a passionate leap of faith. A faith that must
always be exerted, broken even - for Benjamin to emerge beyond Moscow, to
move past the middle of the night and onward into mourning. Mourning like
that is like holding a hundred pounds of love in one's chest and climbing a
mountain range. There is no choice but to stumble and fall, to slip on the sand
beneath one's feet, when carrying such a burden.
This load is the supple segmentarity keeping Benjamin an 'and' or 'plus'
with Asja. Their relationship is based on a certain geometry, what Deleuze and
Guttari describe as ' a multiplication of a double at the limit of what they can
endure in their state [of convalescence], and 'with tacit understandings serving
them as internal messages'?' - no matter how long-distanced the calling. 'Finally,
there is a line of flight, all the more when they are separated, or vice versa, each
of them the clandestine of the other, a double all the more successful now that
nothing has importance any longer.'!" How could it, each having been interned
97 Ibid .. p. 206.
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in their own time? 'Now everything can begin anew, since they have been
destroyed but not by each other."?' Each imprisoned within their formerly
idealised terrain, Benjamin in France, Asja in the Soviet Union. The Moscow
Diary insures that 'Nothing will enter memory, everything was on the lines,
between the lines, and the AND that made one and the other imperceptible, with
disjunction or conjunction but only by a line of flight forever in the process of
being drawn, toward a new acceptance, the opposite of renunciation
resignation.i'" For Benjamin could this mean 'a new happinessj'?" A redirection
of purpose, a realignment of love into other territorial outposts? Content in
knowing something always evades, and surpasses even seemingly fatal
blockages.
FALLOUTPHOTOGRPHIE.
Scholem concludes that the Moscow Dairy 'as a narrative of courtship that
remains frustrated almost to the very end of his stay, the diary is desperate in its
outright urgency.i'?' It is not the run up to ' a failed courtship' that most
preoccupies Benjamin toward the second month of his stay. Indeed, urgency
could never characterise Benjamin's dealings with Asja; delay is the very means
by which the courtship is sustained. Rather it is the case that such an urgency in
Benjamin's work can only belie something of far great political urgency: the loss
of innocence in his brief love affair with Communism. Urgency factors in here
more than a distress signal, one that is triggered by the anxiety over a power
101 Ibid., p. 206.
1Il2Ibid.,pp. 206-207.
101 Ibid., p. 207.
104 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 90.
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surge to come. It operates on a more subliminal level as an erotic charge within
Benjamin's person, one that in some ways competes for his attention towards the
end of his stay. Benjamin, January 8:
It is precisely this transformation of an entire power structure that makes
life here so meaningful. It is as insular and as eventful, as impoverished
and yet in the same breath as full of possibilities as gold rush life in the
Klondike. The dig for power goes on from early morning to late at night.
The entire scheme of existence of the Western European intelligentsia is
utterly impoverished in comparison to the countless constellations that
offer themselves to the individual here in the space of a month.
Admittedly this can lead to a certain state of inebriation in which it
becomes almost impossible to conceive of a life without meetings and
committees, debates, resolutions, and ballotings (all of which are the wars
or at least the manoeuvres of the will to power). But this [... ] is the
[precise goal] that so unconditionally forces one to take a position, that
poses the dilemma as to whether one is going to remain in the hostile and
exposed, uncomfortable and draughty spectator area, or whether one is
going to adopt some sort of role in the commotion on stage. 1105
Here Benjamin characterises the progressive bureaucratisation of the
Soviet State as the 'wars or at least the manoeuvres of the will to power.' He
describes this process as 'inebriating,' as people become increasingly intoxicated
with the inflation of their position through the newly bestowed title of comrade,
and the purported influence that will granted through such recognition.
Benjamin too feels the pull to be included somehow. His dilemma of whether or
not to join the stage of this activities, will be a question that will plague him
throughout the entire decade of the 1930s, and ultimately Benjamin's
ambivalence about participating in anything involving a commotion will mean
that he will be forced to devise an entrance into the political debate perhaps by
more a subtle means of political encounter.
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One of the crucial ways he is able to foster such encounters is through the
intimate contacts he establishes in Moscow. Through these sort of contacts the
cause for urgency can be more discreetly raised. In the course of his stay,
Benjamin befriended Nickolaus Basseches. Basseches was an Austrian journalist
and engineer; he was born in Moscow, the son of the Austrian consul general.
Benjamin spent many evenings dining with him during his stay in Moscow.
Crucially, he helped Benjamin with the formalities of his departure. On the night
of January 16, Benjamin and Basseches dined with 'a certain Dr. Kroneker' who
worked in Moscow as 'the Austrian representative of a large Russo-Austrian
firm.?" Basseches told Benjamin he was a Social Democrat. Benjamin writes, 'But
he struck me as quite intelligent, had travelled widely, and spoke to the point. In
the course of the conversation, we got onto the subject of gas warfare. I made a
number of comments that impressed them both.'l07 The fact that he finds it
difficult to identify Kroneker as a conservative through this exchange, clearly
surprises Benjamin. The peculiarly of this political exchange, nonetheless, will
not prove to be an anomalous occurrence on the road to the maturation of
Benjamin's political stance. It stands here as an early glimmer of what will
amount to the much ruder awakening Benjamin is to face when its comes to
choosing his political alliances in the dark days when fascism rapidly
consolidated its power in Germany. It is then that the real inadequacy of such of
right/left allegiances becomes painfully apparent to Benjamin. The inability to
readily draw distinctions about who is and who is not vulnerable to the
gleaming technocratic mandate of fascism belies the party's great power to draw
105 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
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up constituencies from nearly every group in society, including within its
eventual ranks all classes and backgrounds.
FRAGMENTPHOTOGRAPHIE.
Scholem's final remark asserts, 'Part of the puzzle [of Moscow] therefore
remains unsolved, which is entirely appropriate to a life such as Walter
Benjamin's.?" I don't find this an acceptable conclusion, and neither I would
surmise would Walter Benjamin. Here I am not so much concerned with locating
the part of the puzzle that remains unsolved, but rather with the very idea that
Benjamin was seeking resolution on this trip. It seems to me that very early on in
the narrative, and perhaps even before its commencement, Benjamin's aims lie
not with conclusion but rather with a potentially fundamental shift in his
ideographic co-ordinates.
Scholem is correct insofar as he is keen to assert that Asja Lacis alone does
not stand in as a motivation for Benjamin's journey, and that indeed Moscow
does figure in as a significant factor in its own right. However, not in the way he
imagined. As quickly as Benjamin learns first hand about Soviet Moscow, he
quickly unlearns the conceits of ideology. What Benjamin finds in Moscow is not
Party politics, but rather an intimately overlapping network of economies that
are seldom readily apparent. Indeed what Benjamin can and does manage to see
around him are people and the environment in which they are immersed. It is
through their bodies that all other potential networks emerge and this is what
Benjamin is journeying toward in his understanding of the Soviet situation. This
J08 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 8.
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is not necessarily a journey that can be undertaken with the expectation of
positive outcomes. Again, Scholem seems to sense this is a rationalisation of
Benjamin's decision not to immediately communicate his findings in Moscow.
As regards to their relationship Scholem tells us that Benjamin and Lacis
'were together in Berlin in 1924 and in Riga in 1925 and perhaps again in Berlin
on one more occasion before he set off to Moscow primarily to see her."?' It is
that occasion I want to conjure now. It is the missing piece of the puzzle that is
not an end to the narrative but something a-signifying, something that effectively
pre-empts everything that will transpire- by a-voiding it. Effectively this means
that the diary is never allowed to begin or end without a crucial but determinant
omission. This omission is the thing that later enables Benjamin to surpass the
systemic violence the city inflicts on Love. Itwill enable him to run powered on
Baudelaire alone for a decade after Benjamin ceases to have anything like regular
communication with Asja Lacis.
TELEPHOTOGRAPHIE.
It starts with a telephone call to his apartment in Berlin in January 1926,
several months before Benjamin sets off for Moscow. Asja Lacis is on the line.
Later she will effectively serve as a line of flight. Right now Benjamin is listening
for her tone. There is a little light music in the background. She answers always
in the affirmative to Benjamin's Berliner ear, ,Asja,' ,Ach, ja,' 'Oh, yes.' Instantly
Benjamin recalls that Asja 'absolutely loves to say important things by
telephone/!" This will be the first time she will 'speak of wanting to live with
109 Ibid., p. 7.
110 Ibid., p. 105.
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Benjamin in Crunewald.'!" This time he will say yes, but first will she come to
Berlin? Oh, yes. Berlin. For a time every note of the visit to come Asja makes
floods into Benjamin's mind. He feels the joy pour through him, saturating all his
modes of receptivity. He allows himself to be happy to hear her. Then there is
static on the line and the conversation fades out. He whispers down the receiver,
'I love you insofar as you know ...' Later on, Asja, who will mishear it as only the
end to the conversation, will echo this sentiment.
It is the beginning. Benjamin is just warming up. For Moscow. The
declaration he makes to himself after that will be the most powerful. A silent
declaration that they will meet, that he has called upon her and that she has
answered. Oh, yes. What he has not yet been made aware of is that in
summoning her to Berlin he has also summoned other events. Forces that he
can't recall just now, as he hangs up the receiver, effectively suspending what is
about to happen, what perhaps would happen on one other occasion to come.
Forgetting to say that is what becomes important. He will spend all his time after
Moscow trying to find the words again. One could say that he avoided saying
them one could say that at a certain crucial stage, the line went dead and
Benjamin had to find an alternative means of dialling out. Others would say he
simply stopped putting his faith in long-rang thinking. I would say he is still
holding the line.
What happens in the void of that conversation that Benjamin feels he
must keep devoid from us? Is that void at the site of a journey, which might
somehow be raised elsewhere in the Moscow Dairy, perhaps in the following
111 Ibid., p. 105.
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account where he confesses his a-voidance of the possibility of sharing a future
with Asja? Does it matter to Benjamin or to us if that was a direct or indirect line
of escape, or for that matter if a line of flight emerged out of it that now brought
us to the place of our present concerns? Benjamin:
December 20. On three or four occasions I directly or indirectly avoided
sharing a future with her: when I didn't 'run of£' with her in Capri, but
how? - when I refused to accompany her from Rome to Assisi and
Orvieto, when I didn't follow her to Latvia in the summer of 1925 and
didn't want to be tied down waiting for her in Berlin that winter. What
came into play were not the financial considerations, nor even the fanatic
urge to travel, which had diminished in me over the past two years, but
rather the fear of those hostile elements in her which only now do I feel I
can confront.!"
Benjamin's confession allows us to trace out nothing of his desire, save for
the critical blockages that allowed him to avoid acting on his feelings for Asja. In
staying put, refusing to enjoin her advances, not following along, remaining free,
playing at being broke, or transient - what ostensibly motivates Benjamin in all
these particular scenarios of flight is an underlying fear of confrontation. Still,
this does not void Benjamin out of the proceedings, nor protect him indefinitely
from harm, but rather it creates a gap, an abyss in which all failed meetings will
someday have to be met. It creates in Benjamin the cavernous sensation of
falling, falling backward, falling into traps that in the past he somehow avoided.
Only by falling into each one simultaneously in Moscow can Benjamin say that
he is ready to confront her hostility, which has been avoided up until this point
largely through a strategy of topographical evasion. In Moscow Benjamin will
learn that it is not so important to stay out of the line of danger, as it is to stealthy
keep one's ground when one is intimately near to it.
112 Ibid., p. 35.
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These non-journeys exist as dormant monads whose future is pending the
eruption of tensions between Benjamin and Asja; eruptions that Benjamin says he
is now willing to precipitate in Moscow. These pregnant monads if deployed
strategically 'can be converted, in a cross-historical switchboard or cultural
mnemonics, to produce new possible configurations of futures.'!" (Example:
Benjamin was to have had a child with Asja.) Monad 'is a term, as we noted,
allied to an alteration of systems of reference as such. The time of this eruptive
occasion with Asja, like the non-present of so-called Jetztzeit (Benjamin's now
time of virtuality) a 'state of emergency' or emergence implies a momentary
voiding of received contents -as if by the sheer assertion of formal or material
elements.v" Thus, the understanding is that the task of the Diary is always
somehow or other the transvaluation of history. Nominally, this event takes
place in the Moscow Diary on January 13.
From there all of Benjamin's illusions about his future with Asja,
Moscow's future are shockingly and systematically expelled. The result being
that his future takes a violent turn toward politicisation, effectively terriorialising
over a formerly smooth amorous terrain with a splintery aortatory factionalism.
Benjamin's weakened heart is broken by Asja's repeated campaign to wage
hostilities against him. One example of this is had on January 14, when Benjamin
and Asja were walking side by side when suddenly Asja asked him to lend her
some money. Benjamin:
The previous day I had discussed with Reich the possibility of borrowing
150 marks from him for the trip home, so I told Asja that he had no
money, still not knowing what the money was needed for. She replied
that I never had any money when one needed it, and proceeded to make
113 Cohen, Tom, Ideology and inscription, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), P: 10.
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other reproaches, mentioned the room I had never got for her in Riga,
etc. I was quite exhausted that day, and, moreover extremely
exasperated by the subject she had so tactlessly broached. It turned out
she had wanted to rent an apartment she had heard was available. I
wanted to tum off in another direction, but she held me back, hanging
onto me as she had almost never done before, not letting up on the topic.
Finally, beside myself with anger, I told her that she had lied to me. She
had assured me that by letter that she would immediately reimburse me
for my expenses in Berlin, and so far neither she nor Reich had breathed
a word about this. This struck home. I became more violent, continued to
pursue my attack, in the midst of this she finally bolted and rushed off
down the street I did not follow her; instead I took a sharp right and
proceeded home.115
During the course of these intimate battles, his political resolve has become
strengthened. It is the politicised efforts that have ironically strengthened his
heart muscle along the way. The beat goes on. What is Benjamin listening out for
in Moscow? It is 'the sound of the contiguous future, the murmur (rumeur) of
new assemblages of desire, of machines, and of statements, that insert
themselves in the new assemblages and break with them?'!" Is that sound of
breaking what gets forever redistributed in the void of our understanding of
political phenomena like Stalin, desiring topographies like Moscow, machinic
bodies like Asja Lacis, who produce the sounds that at once terrify and enthral us
onwards despite our fears. Or rather as ever more elaborate assemblages,
sounding boards on which to test our fears about the future. Is Benjamin the
child who goes out into the world to learn what fear is, to make a record of it, to
cause others to heed a familiar refrain of history that is both' diabolical and
innocent or both at the same timei''"
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If so what makes Asja Lads more important than any particular listener? I
would maintain that it comes down to her unique gift of receptivity, which
requires a beloved combination of intimately decoded playback and reflexive
emitting of the homing signal of love that if present would envelop the listener in
a wall of protective sound. Benjamin:
December 24. We were very close that night. Asja got a lot of laughs out of
some of the things Iwas saying to her ... She couldn't make her mind up
to leave, she was feeling good and tired. But in the end it was not even
eleven when she left. Iwent right to bed because my evening had been
full, however short it may have been. Irealised that solitude does not exist
for us as long as someone we love, although they are somewhere else way
beyond our reach is feeling alone at the same time. The feeling of solitude
would therefore seem to be basically a reflexive phenomenon that only
strikes us when emitted back to us by people we know, and most often by
people we love, whenever they enjoy themselves socially without us. And
even the person fundamentally alone in the world only experiences his
solitude when he thinks of a woman, even an unknown woman, or of
anybody else who is not alone and whose company he, too, would cease
to be.!"
Why does this signal corrupt so often when the two are together? It is the
magnetised grooves in the recording that draws them together, that are too
much, that tears them apart? Oddly, their relationship seems to work better on
the telephone. It takes only one day after their reunion in person to bring long
held tensions to the fore. Suddenly, conversation ceases, an uneasiness fills in
and both struggle not to speak in code, desperately decoding every word, every
gesture, terrified that each would speak in humiliating tones of exposed feeling,
longing that is too great not to be harmfully articulated. Itwill most certainly end
in tears.
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The second day of Benjamin's visit, 10 December, Asja and he attend a
performance of Stanislavsky's The Czar's Bride. Benjamin explains to Asja during
the break that he senses she feels uneasy in his presence. 'During the final
entr'acte, the administrator approaches us. Asja speaks with him. He invites me
to the next new production (Eugene Onegin).'1l9 This of course is a performance of
Pushkin's sweeping tale of unrequited love, what amounts to a foreshadowing of
Benjamin's dismal adventures here. From here a maniacal overcoding will ensue
as an initial means of recovering the situation, an extreme of feeling will pervade
- the rising fascism of the lover's commitment. Such a set of determinations
engineers the early outcomes of Benjamin's experience in Moscow. However, the
economy of fascist overcoding that categories Benjamin's desire for Asja at any
early stage in the narrative; as evidenced by his extremist quality of reportage on
her as a subject, his petty fears about her affection towards him, and his constant
judgment of her situation forming a system of just so many black holes,
undergoes increasingly more frequent moments of being over-ridden by
unforeseen political developments in the text whereby Benjamin finds himself
directly effected by the city's new Stalinist atmosphere. These factors, at least
initially, seem to take precedence at times when his hopes are dashes by her and
his mind turns outward to larger political agendas. The first crucial instance of
this takes place on the morning of 15 December - just 5 days after the incident at
the theatre - when Benjamin is meant to meet Asja in the morning and she never
turns up. Instead he spends part of the morning with Reich, Asia's partner,
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whose influence on Benjamin on this visit will become surprisingly valuable. The
first lesson he implicitly imparts to Benjamin takes place in the form of a
translation. Reich translates Kamenev's speech to the Comintern for him:
One only knows a spot once he has experienced it in as many dimensions
as possible. You have to have approached a place from all four cardinal
points if you want to take it in, and what's more, you also have to have left
it from all these points. Otherwise it will quite unexpectedly cross your
path three or four times before you are prepared to discover it. One stage
further, and you seek it out, you orientate yourself by it.120
This advice redistributes the possibilities of what Benjamin might actually
stumble upon here, given enough determination. He finds himself fortunately
placed back at the starting point, and therefore able to perform a transvaluation
of his experience in Riga leading into this trip. Benjamin suddenly becomes
attuned to the perimeters of the task of spatialisation he must accomplish here,
and on the many levels this will need to happen. Again it is helpful for him to
turn to the stars to establish his directive compass. Kamenev's words remind
Benjamin that desire never locates itself simply at a fixed point, but rather is
open to endless readjustments, as vagaries of language and understanding shift
constantly under one's feet, making no place nor individual actually available
for possession. Again reading constellations of events, and not singular
occurrences become key to Benjamin's success. 'When Benjamin chooses to rel y
upon the reading of the stars, however, reading is not meant to be understood in
terms of possession: the nonsensuous similarity of stars prevents them from
120 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
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being seized either by the language that they now are or by understanding in
general.'!" Instead he accepts that space must be constantly reconfigured around
oneself, and therein constantly reconstellated above one's apprehension. That is
not to say that a determination of sorts cannot be made, as we see through the
strategies of terriorialisation, striation and molarisation. These however must
always be regarded as temporary formations, always open to renegotiation and
modification. For the time being and the foreseeable future Benjamin still chooses
to plot his alignment in close course with Asja's movements. Indeed, to pick up
on Tom Cohen's theme of the monadic network, it would seem that Benjamin's
constellation is working overtime as a mnemonic switchboard. Benjamin asks
himself the question, 'Was I always going to go on looking at the moon and
thinking of Asja?'122in hopes that it will reprogram or reproject what has
happened here indefinitely in the universe of his mind. Indeed, when the tape
loop on this experience seems to be straining, Benjamin believes he can turn it
around. He runs the following edit through it:
She stood there for a long time, waving. I waved back from the sleigh. At
first she seemed to tum around as she walked away, then I lost sight of
her. Holding my large suitcase on my knees, I rode through the twilit
streets to the station in tears.?"
Still there is always time to transform one's understanding of a place. Benjamin
in the end reconciles Moscow according to the fatality portended by the journey
through the following maxim:
121 Cadava, Eduardo, Words of Light, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 27.
122 Benjamin, WaIter. Moscow Diarv. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 121.
123 Ibid., p. 108.
105
Nothing ever happens as planned or expected - this banal formulation of
life's complications is borne out so implacably and so intensely in every
single instance here that you quickly come to grasp the fatalism of the
Russians.P'
Benjamin's willingness to take on board this fatalism, and bring it back
from Russia to Berlin, meant that it was immanently due to re-emerge in the
relationship between Benjamin and Asja Lacis, following its relocation to that
city. Asja lived with Benjamin in Berlin from December 1928 to January 1929,
repeating the periodical cycle of Benjamin's Moscow journey. In that time
Benjamin starts divorce proceedings against his wife Dora, in hopes that it will
free him to marry Asja. The bitterness of Benjamin's quarrels with his wife over
these proceedings ironically proves too much for Asja to bear, its continuation
eventually prompts her to leave Berlin. Scholem reports that' as far as he knows,
she never saw Benjamin after that, although she continued to correspond with
him until her arrest under Stalin.'125This cut off of correspondence from her,
whether or not he chose to respond to it, must have deeply disturbed Benjamin,
fuelling his imagination toward the worst possible outcomes.
Even before that time a foreboding moratorium on discussing her became
apparent in his correspondence with Scholem: 'As far as him, after his letter of
September 18, 1929 he never referred to her again in his communications.'?"
Scholem adds 'Thus this side of his life remained completely dark to me.'127
124 Ibid., p. 31.





Another side of Benjamin's life would also remained obscure from Scholem's
vantage point, and one perhaps equally fundamental: Benjamin's political
agenda in writing. Indeed his true mission in Moscow, in shaping his political
character and furthermore that of delivering up the light of discourse, is
something that only succeeds in furthering puzzling Scholem on the issue of
what Benjamin's life was really about. Given his obvious dimness to the
subtleties of Benjamin's motivations, it is not surprising that Benjamin chose to
keep him in the dark about the whole love affair between he and Asja in
Moscow. Indeed, Scholem would only hear tell of it many years later in 1980,
when the German-language version of the Moscow Diary was set for publication.
This would also account somewhat for Scholem's failure to predict the
devastating, if acute effect her departure from Berlin would eventually have on
Benjamin. In the short period before this consequence ensues, he is only able to
see Asia's departure as one of critical relief for Benjamin. At the time Scholem is
still convinced that her departure has somehow motivated Benjamin to display
some astonishing ability to cope, never witnessed before in him: 'Something that
remained astonishing in this year [1929] of greatest excitements, upheavals, and
disappointed expectations in his life was his capacity for concentration, his
openness to intellectual matters, and the harmonious style of his letter. There
was in him a profound serenity - only poorly described as stoicism - that
remained untouched by the awkward situations in which he found himself at the
time and the upheavals designed to throw his existence off course.'!" The
prognosis was too good to be true. The upheavals were still there, waiting to
destabiIise Benjamin time and again. This short period merely represented the
12H Ibid., pp. 158-159.
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calm before the storm of their next eruptive appearance. The next month
Benjamin suffered a nervous breakdown.
Just a page onward from these hopeful sentences, Scholem must report: ' ...
the untoward circumstances took their toll. He wrote me that in October he had
suffered a breakdown connected with agitation over the divorce suit and had
been completely immobilised for ten days.,129Benjamin: 'I was unable to make a
phone call and talk to anyone, let alone do any writing.i'" If we take anything
away from this essay, it is that such a communicatory paralysis could only be
accelerated the worst possible suffering on Benjamin's part. Following that bout
of anguish, he fell completely silent for almost three months -evidently the
month after Asja's departure to Moscow. According to Deleuze and Guattari
silence is the 'pure, moving material of expression.'?" It is what Tom Cohen
identifies as the 'prefigural occasion that is heard, today, in what Benjamin calls
reine Sprache or pure Ianguage.T" Such a long silence eventually transformed
itself into a mode of quiet productivity for Benjamin. Though when he emerges
from it he is only able make a nonsignified reference to Asja's departure in 1930.
Nonetheless this is an operative development insofar as it coincides with a
second prefiguration of the Arcades Project, which he refers to in a letter of that
same year to Scholem as 'the theatre of all my struggles and all my ideas/P' It is
not all cause for celebration, however as this theatre more seriously signals the
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other theatre, Asja's theatre of Moscow, a prefigural theatre of war in a war to
come. The stage set in Moscow has now been transposed to Paris, which will
surely emerge as yet another critical theatre of struggle over an advancing
totalitarianism that will directly intersect Benjamin's own path. For the time
being though, in 1930, itmarks the start of a new, fraught constellatory
relationship for Benjamin between a woman and a city, this time with
Baudelaire's passer-by acting in the role of a reticent Asja; acting indirectly as the
fourth great love of his life. Again, as in Moscow he chooses to follow the stars
through this city at its twilit hour. When one's door has been darkened with
'terrible bad luck,' then one must go by the way of light: he must look to the
stars. This is the start of the refrain, and another mythically illuminated verse in
Benjamin's Dairy. A call somewhere is being placed. This time to Bertolt Brecht.
He had been introduced to Brecht by Asja Lacis. Within a single year of their
meeting in 1929, Benjamin 'had produced a folder of diaries about his
conversations with Brecht and an historic, ten-year [political dialogue] was
launched.'!" Its time now to account for the impact of some of those entries.
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Catastrophising the Epoch: Benjamin's Atlas of
Fascist Historiography.
This is a story about catastrophe. A different kind of catastrophe
than anybody had ever thought of. A catastrophe that happens simply
because 'things just go on' as they had been going without ever any notice
being taken. This is the stuff that keeps you awake late into the night, once
you've realised it - always too late. That 'it could happen to someone
looking over his life. That he realised that almost all the deeper obligations
he had endured in its course, originated in people on whose "destructive
character" everyone agreed. He would stumble on this fact one day,
perhaps, by chance, and the heavier the blow it deals him, the better his
chances of picturing the destructive character.'! This is the sort of
catastrophe that befalls everyone eventually.
It just happened to get to Waiter Benjamin in the summer of 1938.
He was visiting BertoIt Brecht in Denmark that summer. In Brecht's son's
bedroom there was a map of New York. From it, Benjamin took a peculiar
interest in Central Park. One night when looking at it he remembered a
foreboding sensation he had felt earlier that day. He entered his
recollection of it into his diary that evening as follows: 'I felt the impact of
powers equal to those of Fascism, powers that sprang up from the depths
1 Benjamin, Walter. One Way Street and Other Writings. Intro. Susan Sontag Trans. Harry Zohn.
(London: Verso, 1979) p. 157.
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of history no less deep than Fascist powers.'2 That at night these
monstrous powers climbed the walls of Benjamin's bedroom. This was a
nightmare no less frightening than the one he had reported to Scholem in
a letter of 3 March 1934; the one in which he suggested that he could
construct a pictorial atlas of the secret history of National Socialism
assembled from the content of his dreams} Still, the humiliating reality
that Benjamin was experiencing day to day was far more terrifying,
making the difference between waking and sleeping through fascism that
much harder to distinguish - especially by 1938, when no end to the
nightmare was in sight.
Benjamin was inside this nightmare of secret histories, or at least he
was too closely involved with its protagonists, to tum away from its
foreboding implications. There was not one but several catastrophic
figures lurking there. Hitler was not amongst those figures. Indeed, it has
been remarked upon on several occasions that Hitler was not the figure of
primary interest for Benjamin.' Instead he turned his attentions to figures
he considered to be more revolutionary in their catastrophic game plans.
In Brecht's opinion a true revolutionary can only spring forth from the soil
of 'baseness and vileness." If Benjamin wished to get anything
accomplished, he too would have to dig deep to find his inspiration on
2 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 98.
3 Cadava, Eduardo, Words of Light. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.
4 Cohen, Tom, Ideology and Inscription, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 107.
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such grounds. Taking things as it were in anterior direction, though down
through the same pathways as fascism, Benjamin is economical in his
planning, 'he has few needs, and the least of them is know what will
replace was has been destroyed,'6 after the present diabolical path of
history has run its course. Rather he focuses his attention on loosening the
past, making it discharge in such a way that another ground for being
might emerge from the one he is now basing himself on.
Breaking such ground allowed his imagination to conjure the
destructive character, a neo-revolutionary type before him, all the while
Brecht furiously challenging him to register his next move against fascism.
So impatient Brecht had grown with Benjamin, that one day he suggested
a reinvention of the terms of play. In a diary entry of July 12, 1938 on Karl
Korsch, Benjamin writes:
Yesterday after playing chess, Brecht said:' You know, when
Korsch comes, we ought to really work out a new game in which
the moves do not always stay the same; where the function of a
piece changes after it has stood on the same square for a while: it
should wither become stronger or weaker. As it is the game doesn't
develop, it stays the same for too long,"
Brecht ultimately wanted to up the stakes. Even higher. In
response, Benjamin ostensibly retreated from the game, in signature
fashion, which amounted to a sign off to his Arcades Project, to be had in
5 Benjamin, Walter, "A Radio Talk on Brecht," New Left Review, October, (Oxford, Alden Press,
1980), p. 93.
6 Benjamin, Walter. One Way Street and Oilier Writings. Intro. Susan Sontag Trans. Harry Zohn.
(London: Verso, 1979) p. 157.
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Zeniral Park. At first this essay reads as a dead man's wish list, but when
considered over the whole of Benjamin's life, one realises that it is really a
map, through which Benjamin placing himself into an entirely different
sort of circulation. Precisely by placing himself out of circulation and into
another time scale of existence: the infinite. Itwas a territory Brecht
couldn't touch. Indeed, the element Gershom Scholem found lacking in
Brecht was Ia delight with infinity, of which there was nothing in Brecht,
where everything boils down to only the revolutionary manipulation of
the finite."B This implied a 'strait gate' to the demise of capitalism. Whilst
Brecht continued to tinker with a capitalist economy for the foreseeable
future, Benjamin was busy playing in other markets, markets of cosmic
duration no less. The same markets the German fascists hoped to corner
through their insatiable campaigns to plunder the past treasures of
antiquity; ill amassed by other so-called victors over the course of history.
The commodification of such objects, were meant to shore up their epic
power, to serve as talismans, ensuring the Nazi's triumph thousands of
years into the future. According to Benjamin's this was in line with the
Nazi's death star logic, 'The labyrinth is the correct route for those who
always arrive at their goal early enough anyway. The goal is the market.'9
The socially disenfranchised of course have no true luxury of
dallying, and therein always arrive somehow too late to bargain with the
7 Benjamin, Walter "Conversation's with Brecht" Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 88.
8 Scholem, Gershom Walter Benjamin: TIle Story of a Friendship, (London: Faber: 1982), P: 208.
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dictates of historical duration. Instead, they must rely on the black market
of gambling, flaneria (strolling), and collecting -activities wagered against
spleen. Benjamin's wariness about the reformation of 'the market' to
ultimately remunerate his losses indicates that he is not playing Brecht's
game- on the straight and narrow. That is to say with a clock set by stock-
exchange time, the time of mortalitie, 10 a duration that amounts to little
more than a silent alarm set for annihilation. Benjamin reports that he
found that little detonation device hidden as one of the anagrams for Paris
in Spleen 1.11 With this knowledge in hand he chooses to rely on another
anagram altogether. One that can be found in his pseudonym in 1938,
Deltev Holz, presenting the reader with a theological cross to bare, or
given stock exchange time, a crossroads with which to fork outcomes from
within the scope of a progressive survey of the political landscape.
Irving Wohlfarth tells the story of how Benjamin
under a simple but telling title Deutsches Menschen and the editorial
pseudonym DetIev Holz, a relatively complete, but practically
unnoticed, edition of letters eventually came out in Switerland-
further confirmation of Benjamin's claim that all genuine German
Jewish dialogue had been banished from the public sphere.P
9 Benjamin, Walter. "Central Park" in New German Critique Winter 1985 p. 40.
10 Ibid., p. 47.
11 Ibid., p. 47.
12 Wohlfarth, Irving, "Manner aus der Frernde": Walter Benjamin and the German Jewish
Parnassus," New German Critique, Number 70 Winter 1997, p. 49.
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And therein the market. As it turns out 'Exclusion and exile were
the fate of Benjamin's little book but also its underlying theme. In an
unpublished introduction he writes that his intention is to show
the face of that" secret" Germany that one likes to look for
nowadays behind the shrouds of murky fog. For there is indeed a
secret Germany. But its secrecy is ... the work of noisy, brutal
forces which, in refusing it public access, have condemned it to
efficacy of a secret kind.P
Wohlfarth writes: 'The latter day mystique of a "secret Germany"
is, Benjamin here hints, in more or less tacit league with the forces of the
day; and these forces have been all along the self - same ones that reduce
the truly other Germany - the one with which Benjamin aligns himself-
to secrecy of quite a different material kind. It is thus not merely Judaism
that has "secret relations" and "hidden traditions," Germany does too.
And it is between these several hidden traditions, German and Jewish,
that the truest, noblest, most revolutionary exist. The truly secret Germany
has nothing foggy or occult about it: 'it is the clandestine tradition of
revolution epitomised by [intellectuals] like Benjamin who were reduced
to poverty and even into exile.'14
In Benjamin's "Radio Talk on Brecht" he speaks of Brecht's object
as this poverty.l? Brecht defines poverty in a truly Baudelairean fashion,
through a logic of modernity which dictates that 'The state should be rich
13 Ibid., p. 50.
14Ibid., .p. 50.
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but many should be poor, the state should be permitted to do much, but
man should be permitted to only a little.'16Benjamin' to put it as briefly as
possible' categorises the condition that results as 'the physiological and
economic poverty of a man in the machine age.'17 Is this not the condition
experienced by Brecht as the lyrical playwright in the age of high
modernism? Brecht wears such characteristic poverty as 'a kind of
[professional] uniform, and well suited to give anyone who consciously
wears it high rank.'!" This rank however also is accompanied by a far bit
of class rage. Brecht screams out that the Nazis have 'proletarianized
me,'19which sounds a deep echo of Baudelaire's lament that Louis
Napoleon de-politicised him. For each man respectively, the outrage
comes from the regime that comes into power against their personal will,
only adds further insult to them by forcing on them a literalisation of their
political rhetoric. They become damned to live out the ends of their
figurative political dictates. One who cries out for depoliticisation will
suffer as one depoliticised, one who cries out for proletarianisation will
suffer as one proletarianised. Worse still they will suffer as someone
silenced by the hand of their own political discourse turning against them.




18 Ibid., p. 95.
19Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht" Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 98.
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To paraphrase Brecht himself, 'this is an age which lays hands upon
itself.'20
Brecht laments 'It isn't just that they've taken my house, my fish-pond and
my car from me; they have also robbed me of my stage and my audience.' 21
Benjamin attempts to resist such ends by setting himself up from the outset as a
political 'strategist,' one taking the offensive position as opposed the defensive
one, one might assign to Baudelaire and Brecht, as a pair of political
reactionaries. From Benjamin's point of view, a good cultural critic does not react
only when a crisis erupts, but rather sees the everyday political situation as a
mounting crisis. Benjamin's defines his role as a critic as being one of 'a
strategist' in the ongoing 'struggle for Iiterature.v- A campaign that is not acute
but chronic.
Indeed, in Deutsches Menschen 'the letters included are written from 1783-
1883, a period which spans the rise and decline of German humanism,' a period
moreover some would say is far in advance of the crisis of German fascism, and
yet Benjamin would have it that they represent 'the opening of age when the
bourgeoisie can maintain only its positions, and not the spirit in which they had
conquered them.'23 Benjamin had attempted to reinstate this spirit of this
20 Benjamin, Walter. One Way Street and Other Writings. Intro. Susan Sontag Trans. Harry Zohn.
(London: Verso, 1979) p. 271.
21 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht" Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 98.
22 Wohlfarth, Irving, "No-man's Land On Walter Benjamin's Destructive Character" in Walter
Benjamin's Philosophy, Ed., Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 50.
23Ibid., p. 51.
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German humanist project when he characterises the task of Deutsches Menschen
as being that of 'saving a few samples of genuine humanity from antediluvian
times.'24 Indeed, he refers to the project as 'an Ark built after the Jewish model'
which might survive when 'the Fascist flood began to rise.'25Such Messianic
projections makes the posthumous signature Walter Benjamin equally tricky to
bring to a conclusion as that of his pseudonym Detlev Holz, i.e., to singularly
verify any identification of Benjamin as Benjamin. Instead such ambiguity stands
in as shorthand for a number of possible immanent historiographical outcomes -
one didn't say 'infinitely' better ones. Redemption does not equal progress.
Anymore than revolution necessarily signifies change. Meanwhile catastrophe is
starting all the time, starting with the catastrophe you have sensed all of your
life, the catastrophe of persistence without change. The catastrophe that
Benjamin and I now enjoin you to short-circuit. To arrest. To apprehend.
Benjamin: 'To the image of "redemption" belongs also a firm, apparently brutal
grasp.'26 And finally 'The question is to be pursued as to what extend the
extremes to be grasped in redemption are those of the "too early" and the "too
late."'27
Whilst staying with Brecht in Svendborg on 25 August 1938, Benjamin
records the following Brechtian maxim in his diary: 'Don't start from the good
24Wohlfarth, Irving, "Manner aus der Frernde": Walter Benjamin and the German Jewish
Parnassus," New German Critique, Number 70 Winter 1997, p. 53.
25 Ibid., p. 53.
26Benjamin, Walter. "Central Park" in New German Critique Winter 1985, p. 46.
27 Ibid., p. 50.
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old things but the bad new ones.'28Benjamin responds to this with utter silence.
In an earlier instance, Benjamin characterises Kraus' cadence of speech as "a
silence that catches the storm of the event in its black folds, billows, its livid
lining turned outward."29 Such a silence is now practised by Benjamin who in
engaging the event this way is able to turn Brecht's maxim inside out to reveal its
most livid implications, and therein impose the antithetical starting point in his
own investigations: namely the stubborn persistence of bad old things, which
always seem to forestall any good new things from escaping the bounds of
obscurity. What must be imposed then is an alternative philosophy of duration, a
revolution that runs outside of the dictates of clock time. In "Some Motifs on
Baudelaire," Benjamin credits Bergson in with coming up with such a
philosophy - one that asserts that 'the actualisation of duree rids man's soul of
obsession with time.' 30 As a historiographer of the future, Benjamin's destructive
character would have it that 'we live our lives as automatons that resemble
Bergson's fictitious characters who have completely liquidated their memories.'3!
As Benjamin wrote of the Destructive Character,
Some pass down things to posterity by making them untouchable and
thus conserving them. Others pass on situations by making them
practicable and thus liquidating them. The latter is called destructive.F
28Benjamin, WaIter "Conversations with Brecht" Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 99.
29 Benjamin, Walter. One Way Street and Other Writings. Intro. Susan Sontag Trans. Harry Zohn.
(London: Verso, 1979) p. 262.
30 Benjamin, Walter, Charles Baudelaire, Trans, Harry Zohn, (London, Verso, 1997), p. 138.
31 Ibid., .p. 135.
32Benjamin, WaIter. aile Way Street and Other Writings. Intro. Susan Sontag Trans. Harry Zohn.
(London: Verso, 1979) p. 158.
119
Not surprisingly, destruction is linked to duration in Benjamin's
critical practice from 1930 onward. This combination also figures into
Benjamin's conceptualisation of the relationship between natural science
and theology. The constellation of these forces at work in Benjamin's
thinking can be seen through the concept of 'monadology' as it is
ultimately cast in his final work of 1940 "Theses on the Philosophy of
History."
It is in the years between 1927 and 1940 that the lines of natural science
and theology begin to collide in and around Benjamin. The year 1927 also marks
the collapse of an arborescent project of 'understanding' fascism for Benjamin.
Such a project is carefully jettisoned somewhere between Moscow and Svenborg,
in favour finally of a nomadic re-education in what it meant to break the cover of
leftist party politics and go by way of default onto a territory unlike any other:
into the prehistory depths of the violence presently 'known' as 'fascism.' The
training begins in Stalin's Moscow of 1927 - a journey at least speculatively
prompted on Brecht's provocative suggestion. Moreover such a programme is
undertaken within the contours of a prehistoric, almost primeval sensibility
gleaned through the writings of Kafka. These contours emerge time and again a
means with which to strategically cope with what will be a litany of provocation
from Benjamin's formidable follow up of the Brechtian line. Not surprising, the
line had to be patched through, at least initially by an engineering team of sorts,
which included amongst its figures none other than the revolutionary figure par
excellence for Benjamin, Asja Lads.
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Breaking the Waves
Asja Lacis in her memoir, Profession: Revolutionary, contests the critically
held opinion that May 1929 was the year Benjamin first made the acquaintance of
Bertolt Brecht in Berlin. Rather, Lads posits the date of their meeting nearly three
years before that, in late 1926, just prior to Benjamin's imminent trip to visit her
in Moscow. This little known meeting is said to have been arranged through
Lads, who had worked alongside Brecht as a theatre director. This bit of
information is included in one of the very first footnotes in the English version of
the Moscow Diary." In the text itself, Benjamin notes Brecht as his first urgent
topic conversation with Lads; i.e., not the status of their relationship, which is
only vaguely addressed later in the day. The fact that these two references to
Brecht are located so early on in the text suggests that one might conduct a
subsequent reading of the Diary with covert reference to Brecht's well-known
Marxist politics.
Beyond that it functions to destabilise the 'official' story on how Brecht
and Benjamin actually came into acquaintance and leads to speculation about the
role politics may have played in speeding their meeting about, and also in
Benjamin's desire to assess the situation Moscow for himself. In Lads' version
Benjamin comes to Moscow primarily based on his desire to further a
relationship with her. The early reference to Brecht as well as the footnote, serve
to contradict that reading insofar as they indicate that one can just as easily read
between the lines of their ongoing exchanges for a nascent influence of a
specifically Brechtian brand of politics. One must therein not underestimate
Brecht's resonance on Benjamin's Moscow record.
JJ Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1986), p. 9, footnote 5.
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This influence would of course become highly amplified subsequent to
their 'second' meeting in 1929, so much so that his other intimate friends and
associates could not help but take note of it at that time. This also holds true for
Benjaminian scholars. Given their record of the situation it is relatively easy to
ascertain that Brecht by 1929 had come to eclipse Asja's Lacis' one-time
formidable (political) influence on Benjamin. This was indeed so much the case
as to bring what Benjamin described Brecht as a 'new elemental force in the truest
sense of the word, into his life.'34What becomes less obvious, when taking into
consideration a possible earlier meeting between the Brecht and Benjamin are the
strains of Brechtian thinking, in other words' crude thinking' that may have
potentially made their way into the Moscow Diary.
As we recall from the previous chapter, Benjamin, upon his arrival back in
Berlin in early 1927, wrote a letter to Martin Buber describing his forthcoming
essay on Moscow for Buber's journal Die Kreatur. In it, Benjamin had explained
that his primary aim in writing about Moscow would be 'seizing and rendering
this new and disorientating language that echoes loudly through the resounding
mask of the environment that has been totally transformed.'35 This statement
comes in line with Benjamin's ongoing critical aim of generating a tension
between conflicting concepts of language." However after his experiences in
Moscow he prepares himself to go one step further dialectically speaking and
adds by way of a further explanation: 'I want to write a description in which all
34 Scholem, Gershom Walter Benjamin: Tile Story of a Friendship, (London: Faber, 1982), p. 159.
35 Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1986), p. 121.
36 Wohlfarth, Irving, "No-man's Land On Walter Benjamin's Destructive Character" in Walter
Benjamin's Pllilosopily, Ed., Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 167
122
factuality is already theory and which would thereby refrain from any deductive
transaction, from any prognostication, and even within certain limits from any
judgement.'37 This approach effectively liquidates the decisive potential of any of
these categories, which are ostensibly the tenets of moral reasoning in civilised
society. It is for this very reason that they must be liquidated.
In the last year of this decade Benjamin, will come to assert' that there is
no document of culture that is not also a document of barbarism.'38 Irving
Wohlfarth will argue that it is Brecht who offered the idea to Benjamin of
'effacing the traces,' of such violent, politicised judgements that make up the
sanctity of language and linguistics. Itwas the example given by Brecht's
'alienation techniques' that motivated Benjamin's subsequent crusade 'to
liquidate the barbarity of formulaic language.?" If Brecht exerted his initial
influence on Benjamin as early as 1926, this notion of barbarity could well have
impacted on Benjamin's formulaic of a 'creatural' approach to language and
knowing. Creaturality, an alternate notion to barbarism, might function as a way
of acutely acknowledging the violence always inherent to the becoming-animal
of all revolutionary language. Brecht's crude thinking made material through
crude writing. Irving Wohlfarth writes: 'On his return from Moscow, Benjamin
had written that, at the 'turning point in historical events' that was 'announced,
if not posited, by the fact of 'Soviet Russia,' the question at issue was not which
reality -Western or Soviet - was 'better,' but only which reality was inwardly
convergent with the truth. Itwas a 'world-historical experiment' unfolding in
37Benjamin, Walter. Moscow Diary. ed. Gary Smith. Trans. Richard Sieburth, Preface, Gershom
Scholem. (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1986), p. 132.
38 Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 248.
39 Wohlfarth, Irving, "No-man's Land On Walter Benjamin's Destructive Character" in Walter
Benjamin's Philosophy, Ed., Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 167.
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Soviet Russia that underwrote his own experimental ventures into Marxist
thinking, notably "The Author as Producer" (1934) and" Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction" (1935).'40 The question that dogged him throughout
these projects, however was 'Which truth was inwardly preparing itself to
converge with the real?' 'The Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939-1940 'represented for
Benjamin the final irrevocable divergence of Soviet reality from the Communist
idea. '41In 1930, however, an experimental venture within the bounds of
Communism could still be undertaken in earnest.
An experimental venture of this type was taken up by Benjamin in 1930, in
response to Brecht's Versuche, or 'Experiments,' the first literary writings to
which he could give his critical backing 'with reservations, gave the most
probing analysis Benjamin maintained of existing socio-political tensions.'42 In a
radio programme devoted to Brecht of 1930 Benjamin writes:
The 'Experiments' are points of application for Brecht's talent. What is
new here is that the full significance of these applications is unconcealed;
for their sake the writer takes leave of his 'work', and like an engineer
drilling for oil in the desert, directs his attention to precisely calculated
points in the desert of the present. .. 'The publication of Versuc1ze', the
author begins, 'comes to a point in time when certain projects should be
no longer confined to individual experiences, but should rather be
directed to the transformation of particular institutes and institutions.'
This is not a proclamation of renovation, but a manifesto of rebellion.P
By 1931 Benjamin too will take leave of his own 'work' and like an engineer
drilling for oil in the desert of civilisation, direct his attention precisely on the
40 Wohlfarth, Irving, "Manner aus der Frernde": Walter Benjamin and the German-Jewish
Parnassus," New German Critique Number 70 Winter 1997, p. 55.
41Ibid., .p. 55.
42Wohlfarth, Irving, "No-man's Land On Walter Benjamin's Destructive Character" in Walter
Benjamin's Philosophy, Ed., Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 156.
43 Benjamin, Walter, "A Radio Talk on Brecht," New Left Review October 1980, (Oxford: Alden
Press), pp. 92-93.
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crossroads of history that formed the desert of civilisation that was present-day
Europe. It is 'through the wretchedness of the interior' of that history, as a
sometime 'prisoner' in his West Berlin neighbourhood, that Benjamin is at once
able to experience 'claustrophobia' and vertigo. 'Russia, figures conversely, as an
answer to the need for fresh air,'44and grounded thinking. As such it is the
Archimedean point from which the old world might be moved. Inklings of
Benjamin's physics to come are on the rise during this time and will become
evident in the essay on Kafka, the Work of Art Essay, and finally culminating in
the concept of monadology "Theses on the Philosophy of History."
Thus Benjamin's own point of trajectory eventually shifts and narrows its
axis to Brecht's thatched-roof house in Svendborg in 1938. This decision is
reached after Asja Lacis is moved to the gulag and feared dead. This micro base
of operations does not stop Benjamin from seeking to initiate an equivalent
process to this 'world-historical experiment' in social transformation Brecht's
'work' had engaged. A critical distance between their respective projects would
soon arise, however, when Benjamin made the decision to relocate his project to
even more arid regions of culture than Brecht dared venture. Namely those of
exile, a culture's evacuated spaces - a vacuum in which solutions to the
antinomies of bourgeois society could be worked out on a micro-level with the
due pressure of the extremity of the circumstance duly noted as a functional,
destructive element. Brecht would scarcely recognise that Benjamin had chosen
him as his primary test subject. He would 'work' on him in the decade to come as
scrupulously as he worked on his other subject of studied devotion, Baudelaire.
44 Quotes from Irving Wohlfarth, "No-man's Land On Walter Benjamin's Destructive Character"
in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy, Ed., Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 173.
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Publication of a Friendship
In June 1929, Benjamin would finally write to Scholem to inform him
about the close acquaintanceship that had been developing between he and
Brecht. Benjamin could only say at that time, 'There is a lot to say about it and
about him.'4s Three weeks later he mustered this report: 'You will be interested
to know that a very friendly relationship between Berlolt Brecht and me has
recently developed, based less on what he has produced (I know only the Three
Penny Opera and the ballads) than on the well founded interest one must take in
his plans.'46 Clearly, Benjamin himself was preparing the way forward, through
to what end still remains unknown. What we can be gathered though from
Benjamin elusive comments, is that things were already starting to break up, and
that former lines of communication as a result would have to be redrawn. That
he expected Brecht's contributions to have an elemental effect on him is
apparent, no one however could surmise at this moment how severely Brecht
would shake the foundations of Benjamin's own comportment in the world.
By 1930, the first real signs of a fundamental break down of Benjamin's
trajectory started to appear, clearing the way for something else. Scholem
comments, that it wasn't until that year that he was fully able to acknowledge the
importance of this relationship for Benjamin. This realisation occurred when
Benjamin announced that he had scrubbed 'his plans to learn Hebrew ad acta for
good.'47 This decision coincided with another one Scholem would equally term
4S Scholem, Gershom Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship, (London: Faber, 1982), p. 159.
46 Ibid., p. 159.
47 Ibid., p. 159.
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catastrophic, namely Benjamin's stormy attempts to divorce Dora Pollack in that
same year, in order to free himself up for marriage to Asja Lads. The divorce
went through after a protracted period, however the strain of the events caused
Asja Lads to flee back to Moscow, effectively ending the relationship forever in
its amorous aspects.'48 As a result of the coincidence of all of these incidents
combined Benjamin suffered a nervous breakdown and fell into silence. Before
this breakdown of communication could be legitimately authorised however, he
had one additional task to attend to, dislodging his beholdeness to Adorno, in
favour of Brecht. Benjamin writes to inform Adorno about 'great chunks of
conversation in meetings with Brecht, whose crashing surf has not reached you
yet.'49Indeed, given Benjamin's plans at redirection of his entire course of
writing just three short years later, it never would. The force of this impact
would be lost on Adorno far off in America; however mutual friends who were
on Benjamin's side of the continental divide, were far less oblivious to what was
happening to Benjamin. An alarmed Sigfried Kracauer described Benjamin's
attitude toward Brecht as being 'slavish and masochistic.v" What this slavishness
and masochism was really about however, failed to crest upon him. Benjamin
was going to entertain something of the finitude he had avoided all his life, in the
company of Brecht, he was going to lay himself open to something that was
nothing short of a 'revolutionary manipulation' at the hands of Brecht, a self
described maniac, ahead of his time, a man for whom the finite was the limit.
Nonetheless, he was the only one that could harness the power moreover of what
he was planning.
48 Ihid., p. 160.
49 Ibid., p. 164.
50 Ibld., p. 164.
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Brecht commanded that Benjamin get more concrete in his political
positions; the constant antagonism to do so was the thing that Benjamin was
meant to have masochistically endured over the ten years of their friendship.
Brecht wanted Benjamin to become a Communist activist, as he believed himself
to have become through his staging of agit-prop theatre. Benjamin literally takes
onboard what Brecht is only meant to have figuratively suggested, in the
writings he will produce over this decade. He does so with the tacit
understanding that there was never a figurative statement on Brecht's part, only
literal ones. Commands. Statements that bellowed at him from imposing heights,
Brecht shouting from the coast, 'Rest not on the wave that breaks against your
feet, so long as it stands in the water, new waves will break against it.'5]
Benjamin however was far more of a political navigator than Brecht or anyone
else might have imagined, indeed he learned a thing or two from a fleeing Asja
Lacis, who was the only one in Benjamin's intimate circle to have even come
close to predicting where Benjamin would end up, or which waves he was
prepared to crest to get to that end. These waves, understood literally by
Scholem and Adorno, stood figuratively between the Jewish asylum poles of
Jerusalem and New York. Despite their opinion, Benjamin's land surveying
continued to convince him otherwise For Benjamin, they persisted in being
located on European turf.
Benjamin did concur with Scholem and Adorno's opinion on another
point; that a national crossing was due to take place. But for him personally that
crossing would have to happen on a far more modest scale. Benjamin got as far
as Svendborg. As far as Brecht's house. A place where his distress signals might
51 Benjamin, Walter, Understanding Brecht, Trans. Anna Bostock, Intro. Stanley Mitchell, (London, NLB,
1973), p. 13.
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be kept to a seismic level he could record. One could perceive this decision as
masochistic, that an exiled Benjamin, after 1933, was choosing to install himself
into another theatre of war. And one not altogether apart from Berlin. This
judgement fails to perceive Benjamin's quite sadistic desire to obtain a private
theatre of war from which to observe the developments of German fascism on a
miniaturised scale. This theatre was of course the epic-theatre-in-exile of Brecht's
house. Indeed, how Benjamin chose to situate himself in Brecht's house amounts
to nothing short of setting up a test environment for purposes of
experimentation. The science of understanding fascism that Benjamin was to
develop in this context was nothing less than astonishing. That we fail at
amazement to this day only belies the fact that Benjamin was onto something of
seismic proportion. Firstly, though one must credit this new type of
experimentation to Brecht. Only a consciousness set up by Brecht in the
intervening years beforehand could have prepared him for what he was to
observe in his home. Indeed, his time in Svendborg gradually enabled him to
'treat elements of reality as though he were setting up an experiment with the
conditions at the end of the experiment and not at the beginning. Thus they were
not brought to the spectator Benjamin but distanced from him. When he
recognises them as real conditions, it is not, as in naturalistic with complacency,
but with astonishment.'52 This is history brought to a crescendo of its finite
means. Itwas epic theatre which was to Benjamin's mind the impetus to make
life 'spurt up high from the bed of time, and for an instant, hover iridescent in
empty space. Then its puts it to bed.'53 This was monadology turned inside out,
interrupted, history made vertiginous, folded outward to reveal in elemental
contents. Human life in this way was to discover its animality, its creaturality.
52 Ibid., p. 4.
53 Ibid., p. 13.
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Benjamin had reported on this subject once before and not so long ago, in
Moscow. Now he sensed he was climbing the stairs of the labyrinth again, was
he inside or outside of it, this time he could not tell either, and something just
then made restless, entering into a sleepiness without sleep, a fitful awakeness.
He thought of calling in Brecht, it was too late. Itwas now six months since his
last visit to Brecht's house. Itwas the summer of 1934. The nightmare of National
Socialism was now officially in progress. Benjamin was already climbing toward
his destiny.
221une. I was in a labyrinth of stairs. This labyrinth was not entirely roofed over.
I climbed; other stairways led downwards. On the landing I realised that I
had arrived at the summit. A wide view of many lands opened up before
me. I saw men standing on other peaks. One of these men was suddenly
seized by dizziness and fell. The dizziness spread; others were now falling
from other peaks into the depths below. When I too became dizzy, I woke
Up.54
There is never just one man standing on the summit of such awakenings.
So too, it was never the case that Benjamin was the only man standing on the
summit of his epoch, but rather there were several men standing at any time on
other peaks of understanding in the crisis that was fascism. I can think of several
other men who might be part of a pack like that, one of them of course was
BertoIt Brecht. In becoming-dizzy alongside these men, Benjamin joins there
pack, becomes proximate to them, joins their multiplicity in surveying those
peaks. He is a dog, like the other Germans who stand as he does on the apex of a
potential end to history. This is a woeful outlook if it is the case that 'everything
that is German is bad,'55 as it was at least according to Brecht's estimations.
54 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 93.
ss Ihid., p. 97.
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Another dog in this pack could be identified as Georg Lukacs, whom Brecht
accused of being 'a German by choice' one that as a result, has 'run completely
out of steam.'56 And therein presumably left behind by the pack to suffer from it
alone. Benjamin worries about this consequence for himself, of the time to come
when he will be presumed to have run out of steam as a German - by choice,
only to be left behind by the pack. This is why Benjamin is tempted into
becoming a diarist of figures like Kafka, like Brecht - who have already opted
out of that category ironically as a way of being 'landed' in their territories
without actually having to lay claim to a 'frontier area.'57 The true desire of any
dog. Obedience without mastery. Cunningly, by relating his position to them as a
diarist Benjamin is able to remain on the edge of the crowd, at the periphery of
the frontier without ever having to trespass it himself, or at least not yet. Taking
this distanced approach however, he belongs to it nonetheless, holding on to the
edges by perhaps a hand or a foot, so that he does not plunge completely into the
nether regions of its zones. To avoid that plunge he engages in another type of
swimming - into their discursive eddies - to the antipodes even, just so that he
can remain at the periphery of their implications. He knows that he would die if
he were drawn into the centre of the current, as surely as he would if he left go of
the others in his same boat. This is not an easy position to stay in, its not an easy
position to hold, for these men are in constant motion, leaping up at you, peer
over you claiming to be more authoritative on the subject of fascism then they
should safely be.58
56 Ibid., p. 97.
57 Ibid., p. 90.
58 Ibi?, 94. Benjamin rec.ords Brech~'s behaviour in a ?i~ry en.try of Jun~ ~2, 1938:.He assumes a
cunnmg, furtive expreSSIOn,stands In front of the chair m which I am sitting - he IS
impersonating 'the State' - and says, with a sly, sidelong glance at an imaginary interlocutor: 'I
know I alight to wither away.'
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Their movements are unpredictable and follow no rhythm. They surge
forward despite the forces at work against them - go to North, go east, go to
London, Moscow, as Benjamin sees it 'Brecht's plans stretch out to the period
beyond exile.'59He is not the only one left in perpetual motion by the diasporic
consequences of fascism; none of the individuals in the crowd remain in the
same position in relation to the others. Although all will lament exile as 'not
being a proper base for plans and projects,"? they seem simultaneously to revel
in their exile, giddy from a certain pressure to maintain cultural stability in the
midst of chaos. Why identify as a dog any longer, when the wolves have been let
loose on you? So too is Benjamin in this position of being hounded, chased off his
turf and yet he remained doggedly loyal to its periphery. This disenfranchised
reality forces one into perpetual motion, gripped by a mania to generate new
ideas in the arid regions of this vast tautology Jewishness, Communism, this
endless rehearsal of one's 'outlaw' condition for the consumption of others; all of
this demands a high level of tension, but on another level gives Benjamin a
feeling of violent, almost vertiginous, happiness -energies near enough to
become its observer, its sage.
There is at least a temporary happiness for Benjamin in Denmark, a
sensation of productivity, because although he was not able to do it with Kafka,
in choosing to pack alongside Brecht has meant that he was able to stumble onto
something of a dizzying find. 'Jewish' fascism. A black hole in a black hole. Not
the kind of holeiness that Brecht accuses Kafka of or for that matter Benjamin;
not an identificatory piety, but something far more maniacal, far more
59 Ibid., p. 92.
60 Ibid., p. 92.
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'permissible.'61 He is so close to this phenomenon in Denmark that by 1938 that he
can feel it breathing down his neck, inciting in him day after day in a series of
conversations with Brecht, night after night a series of dreams he reports to
Scholem, in a series of happenings that compel him to wager everything on hand
toward the potential of making a pictorial atlas of the 'secret' history of German
fascism out of materials reaped from its Others that have been publicly put down
like dogs: Jews, gypsies, Communists, and homosexuals.
This might seem a mad idea at first, even to Benjamin, until it dawns on
him through Brecht's concept of alienation effects that 'progress is inseparable
from regression, culture from barbarism, and the so-called exception is the
rule.'62Who but the forcibly alienated, i.e., Germans like himself who were
brutally exiled in line with the Nazi programmatic of 'total reterriorialization' of
German soil, would voluntarily bind themselves to travel along its unstable
national periphery, holding on by a hand or a foot to the grounds of a Germanic
culture they believe is still theirs? Surely this decision would have to be an affect
generated from within a culture which over twenty years generated such a black
hole within State operations and within its citizenry functioning, that no one
could remember who they were before the time of war. All they could cling onto
was a myth of Germania. A territory that had never quite materialised in reality,
but to which at least imaginarily, everyone had formerly been sovereign to. The
'Jewishness' that emerges from this belief system goes a long way towards
61 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), P: 87.
62 Wohlfarth, Irving, "Manner aus der Fremde": Walter Benjamin and the German-Jewish
Parnassus," New German Critique Number 70 Winter 1997, P: 55.
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shaping what becomes a schizo= position to occupy from beyond the vantage
point of fascist Germany. Wohlfarth asserts that,
For Benjamin there is no question of his not wanting to preserve the whole
of German culture in tact. It never was 'in tact' for him, as it was for others
of his status. Indeed, for him 'to oppose 'culture' or 'progress' to
'barbarism' in the name of say the Popular Front was to ignore their
complicity. The crisis did not date from the sudden, personal disaster of
enforced emigration: the bourgeois humanist heritage was long since
shattered. The only viable strategy was, in Hegel's phrase "to enter the
enemy's strength," the better to tum his destruction against itself.64
Such strength had been building in Benjamin since his trip to Moscow in
1927. By tracking the moves of this phenomenon in diarist form, beginning with
Moscow, Benjamin meets some of the demands of creaturality in reading that
totalitarianism requires. It's a good thing that Benjamin picked up these
techniques through Asja's domineering lessons, and ones that a dog like Brecht
seldom let out of sight of his mastications. Potential usage of this technique was
demonstrated when Brecht, in conversation with Benjamin, spoke of a 'worker's
monarchy.'65 Benjamin resisted this notion and compares this creature to certain
'grotesque sports of nature dredged up from depths of the sea in the form of
horned fish or other monsters.'66 What Benjamin is delving into here in recording
the phenomenon of a figure like Brecht is a rhizomatic formation, of a creature
and its environment, something that comes across to us as a monster of another
type, but no less a monster. For Benjamin the search to identify this hybrid
63 Phrase borrowed from Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and
Foreward by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 34.
64 Wohlfarth, Irving, "Manner aus der Fremde": Walter Benjamin and the German-Jewish
Parnassus," New German Critique Number 70 Winter 1997, p.48.
65 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asethetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 99.
66 Ibid.. p. 99.
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creature becomes all about tracking indivisible distances. Distances that are
ceaselessly transformed, which cannot be divided or transformed without their
elements changing in nature all the time. How does one chart a political field like
that? The answer is always to be ready for the next required contingency, to
always listen hard, so hard that one cannot see. Not because there is nothing to
see. Indeed, that there is something to see was at the heart of Brecht's criticism of
Kafka as a visionary: 'he saw what was coming without seeing what is. '67Rather
it is the case more often that that which is visible is not productive to describe.
On the other hand, what is not visible, what is not materialised in the sense of
what becomes remarkable, becomes something equally important. It is what
Deleuze and Guattari cite as that which becomes' a formation, a pack, a legion.'68
It does not concern itself with 'totalisation or hierarchizaton,'69 but rather with
'modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, coupling.'70 'Canetti
notes that even in a pack each member is alone even in the company of others;
each takes care of himself at the same time as participating in the band, .... when
the pack form a ring around the fire each man will have a neighbour to the right
and to the left, but no one behind him; his back is naked and exposed to the
wilderness.V'Deleuze and Guattari 'recognise this as a schizo position, ... on the
edge in the line of duty,'72 one occupying at anyone time the position on the
edge veering back to the centre, the centre always veering to the edge, and so
goes the constellation of forces toward the summit of the event.
67Ibid., p. 88.
68 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian






This is how we find Benjamin in his dream on the summit, waking himself
up when he sees the others getting dizzy and falling. The last man he sees do that
is Brecht, who experiences his own vertiginous happiness, alone, dreaming of
fascist regimes that extend thirty thousand years into the future, a long way
down by anyone's estimation, and as he is falling into the depths of this reverie
fails to see that it is getting him anywhere, whereas an alerted Benjamin picks up
this signal and decides to diary his plummet. This decision would coincide with
the one where he decides to re- learn Marxism from ground level. Choosing this
position the second time around was not accident. 'Nor was it an accident -
although regrettable - that at the end of his life Engels turned to the natural
sciences'Pas a means of delving into the various strata and types present within
the social hierarchy. As for Brecht, what he really lacked was the ability to adopt
a creatural sensibility and in so doing get to fascism's degree zero: its ability to
turn a pack mentality into the beginnings of a war machine. In terms of gaining
an insight into how molar creatural formations like National Socialism operate,
'Nothing can be more valuable ... than the love of nature and a comprehension
of the natural sciences, in particular zoology.'74 Zoology operates as a machine
that proliferates before it infinite minutiae of interrelated specifications of type.
Its hierarchic system prides itself on knowing that it is always already the case
that there are 'packs in masses and masses in packs.'75 By the same token, there is
always the potential for one formation or type pass into the space of another. By
the late nineteenth century some of the major classificatory principles of zoology
would get reterritorialized by a new categorical sphere, that of sexology.
73 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
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Foucault, describes this new science as concerned with the 'specification of
individuals.' Using the example of the nineteenth century homosexual Foucault
describes an individual who became
a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a
type of lifestyle, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing went into his
total composition that was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere
present in him ... The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the
homosexual was now a species. So too were all those minor perverts
whom nineteenth century psychiatrists entomologized by giving them
strange baptismal names, there was Krafft-Ebing's zoophiles and
zooerasts, Rohleder's auto-monosexualists, and later mixoscopophiles,
gynecomasts, presbyophiles, sexoesthetics inverts, and dyspareunist
women. These fine names for heresies referred to a nature that was
overlooked by the law, but not so neglectful of itself that it did not go on
producing more species, even where there was no order to fit them into.76
As a keen scholar of 19th century epistemologies, Benjamin would have
been very familiar with of such 'specification of individuals,' though it is not
clear whether or not he would have necessarily associated such individual
typing as 'processing of data in the fascist sense.'77 It is rather more likely that he
would have kept such scientific systems classification in mind, when studying
Brecht as a new 'species' of fascist.
Regardless of these theoretical concerns, practically speaking it was
summer now, the year 1934 and his applied research was about to commence in
earnest. Benjamin had taken the plunge into exile, he resurfaced in Svendborg,
nonetheless his had familiarised himself already with the depths it required to
get there. It was in a conversation with Brecht of the same day that he advised
76 Foucault, Michel, History of Sexuality. Vol. I. Trans. Robert Hurley, (London: Peguin Books, 1990), p.
43.
77 Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 212.
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Benjamin that 'Depth doesn't get you anywhere at all. Depth is a separate
dimension, its just depth - and there is nothing whatsoever to be seen in it.'78
Both Brecht and Benjamin were technically short sighted, it was only Benjamin
that chose, however, to overlook this natural defect, the peer downward when
one's vision failed to procure the long view. In this way he believed he was
outwitting optics, outwitting the thing also that was right under his nose. He
aimed his gaze slightly higher in that case, and found himself facing Brecht once
more. Benjamin:
To conclude the discussion I told B. that penetrating into depth is my way
of travelling to the antipodes. In my essay on Kraus I actually got there. I
know that this one on Kafka doesn't come across to the same degree: I
can't dismiss that he landed me in a diarist style of notation. It is true that
the frontier land defined by Kraus and, in another way by Kafka
preoccupies me a great deal. In Kafka's case, I haven't yet, I said,
completed my exploration of this area. I am aware it contains a lot of
rubbish and waste, a lot of pure mystification. But I can't help thinking the
important thing in Kafka is something else, and some of that I touched
upon in my essay ... 79
Benjamin here is confessing to be 'landed' in a diarist style of notation. This is not
to say that he is 'land-locked' as the frontier he assures us is always in sight. But
then, this mission does require an expansive knowledge, so much as it does,
again, require a fair bit of depth. Depth insofar as a clearing away, of rubbish and
waste that goes a long way down, that wades within a lot pure mystification, that
is so phenomenologically slippery that it evades Benjamin's grasp, whose
dimensions can only be touched upon. Prompted by all this philosophical
meandering Brecht responds with an almost knee-jerk cut- off reaction - of true
78 Benjamin, WaIter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asetlzetics mid Politics, Translation
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79 Ibid .. pp. 89-90.
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epic proportion - he interrupts Benjamin's depthy train of thought on fascism in
favour of an official report from Austria. Benjamin: 'The conversation broke off,
as it was ten 0'clock and time to listen to the news from Vienna."?
Kafka in a position of observer would surmise of Brecht: 'One who listens
too hard cannot see. As for poor Benjamin, he predicament is that he is
convinced he 'need say nothing, only show.' That strategy is lost on a Brecht who
makes his actors wear signs around their necks to identify their political
positions, furthermore the nodding ass in his office has a sign around his neck
that says 'Even I must understand.f" There is no room for subtly in this
relationship, but that is exactly the diaristic treatment 'a la Nietzsche'82 Benjamin
is determined to give the situation. In a conversation of 6 July, Brecht mentions to
Benjamin the prophetic aspect of Kafka's work. He asserts that 'Kafka, had one
problem and one only, he says, and that was the problem of organisation.w
Brecht meanwhile has the opposite problem he is over-organised, over prepared
for fascism, so much so that this over-organisation against it becomes a fascism of
its own, with all of the attendant pleasures of such extremity. Deleuze and
Guattari assert that such blinding assurance that one has an insight into the
workings of fascism gives 'everybody and anybody the mission of self-appointed
judge, dispenser of justice, policeman, neighbour hood SS man.'B4Having
seemingly 'overcome fear, ... sailed from the shores of security,' Brecht has
entered into I a system no less concentricized, no less organised: the system of
petty insecurities that leads everyone to their own black holes in which to turn
80 Ihid., pp. 89-90.
81 Ihid, p. 89.
82 Ihid., p. 89.
8.1 Ihid., p. 88.
84 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 228.
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dangerous, possessing a clarity of their situation, role, mission even more
disturbing than the certitudes of the first line'ss of Nazism. Benjamin gives
evidence for this phenomenon happening to Brecht in his diary entry: 'Brecht, in
the course of yesterday's conversations: 'I often imagine being interrogated by a
tribunal.'86 For Brecht the coming tribunal exists as a space of productivity, of
appropriate recognition finally coming his way, only the most politically
subversive figures could gamer such an audience. For a man ironically deprived
of his audience by such interrogatory forces, the happiness of them finally
getting around to commissioning him to perform, can only solicit the most
perverse joy, the most vertiginous operations of satisfaction. In reacting to such a
fantasy formation Benjamin too, must adjust his perceptions. His must match
Brecht's devout Marxism with his own personal counter strike against him, in
this case, using the agent Kafka, his most internalised figure of identification as a
fall guy. What is already falling as Nietzsche observed, needs to be kicked.P
5 August. Kafka was a Jew-boy living in a world where literature was the
primary reality offered, if not the only one, a sorry, dismal creature, a
mere bubble on the glittering quagmire of Prague cultural life, nothing
more."
Was not Benjamin in the same position in Berlin in the 1920s, during his early
journalist period, the time where he was actually able to secure his oum
commissioning? Benjamin cannot sustain this opinion. Within a matter of weeks
85 Ibid., p. 228.
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he realises this and feels the need to retaliate, this time outwardly so, against
Brecht.
31 August. The night before last a long and heated debate about my Kafka. Its
foundation: the charge that it promotes Jewish fascism. Its increases and
spreads the darkness surrounding Kafka instead of dispersing it. Yet it is
necessary to clarify Kafka, that is to say, to formulate the practicable
suggestions which can be extracted from his stories. It is supposed to be
that such suggestions can be extracted from them, if only because of their
tone of superior claim. But these should be sought in the direction of the
great general evils, which assail humanity today. Brecht looks for the
reflection of these evils in Kafka's work. He confines himself, in the main,
to The Trial .... Brecht calls The Trial a prophetic book. "By looking at the
Gestapo you can see what the Cheka might become." Kafka's perspective
is of a man caught under the wheelsf"
Benjamin who was listening intently to Brecht, might have performed
another staging of the Gestapo, not taking the cue from Brecht's intimation of
them as piggish working-class city cops, but rather one gleaned from The Trial no
less, where K. is confronted at the end, by two piggish bourgeois men in top hats
as his deadly assailants. Men appearing to be of his same class, in other words.
Indeed, 'K. was sitting also dressed in black and putting on a pair of gloves that
fit tightly over his fingers,'90 when he was importuned by their visit. He takes
their appearance for a farce, surely they must be actors, and not real gentlemen.
K. says to himself, 'Tenth-rate actors they send for me,' glancing around again to
confirm the impression. 'They want to finish me off cheaply.'?' K. is indeed
under the wheels, but of which apparatus? That of the homeowner, the petty
bourgeois who necessarily gets it in the neck?92Benjamin: 'His situation is
89Ibid.,p.90-91.
90 Kafka, Franz, The Trial, Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Epilogue Max Brod , (London: Vintage,
1999), p. 245.
91 Ibid., p. 245.
92 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
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Kafka's. But whereas the type of petty bourgeois familiar today - the fascist, in
other words - resolves to combat this situation by means of his invincible iron
will, Kafka scarcely offers any resistance; he is wise. Where the fascists bring
heroism into play, Kafka asks questions.'93 The irony is that "They're not
prepared to answer questions,' said K. to himself and went to fetch his hat.94
Benjamin observes that Kafka's 'boundless pessimism is free from every tragic
sense of fate. For not only is his expectation of disaster based entirely on
empirical realities (although there it is total), but, in addition, the criteria of
ultimate success are attached with an incorrigible naivete to the most trivial and
commonplace activities, such as the visit of a commercial traveller or an inquiry
addressed to a government department.'95 That these things evade Benjamin as
well, make him aware that he is attached to this condition through a similar
naivete concerning the banal, and therein prey to fall victim to its clutches in
future.
Exile Fascism
3 August. Brecht: I know they will say of me that I was a maniac. When the
present has passed on to the future, the capacity to understand my mania
will pass on with it. The times we live in will make a backdrop to my
mania. But what Ishould really like would be for the people to say about
me: he was a moderate maniac.' - On German fascism: 'We must neglect
nothing in our struggle over that lot. What they're planning is nothing
small, make no mistake about it. They're planning for thirty thousand
years ahead. Colossal things. Colossal crimes. They stop at nothing. That
is why we too must think of everything. They cripple the baby in the
mother's womb. We must on no account take leave of the children.' While
he was speaking like this Ifelt a power being exercised over me that was
93Ibid., p. 90.
94 Kafka, Franz, The Trial, Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Epilogue Max Brod, (London: Vintage,
1999), p. 246.
95 Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asetlzetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 90.
142
equal in strength to the power of fascism, a power that sprang from the
depths of history no less deep than the power of the fascists. Its was a very
curious feeling, and new to me. Then Brecht's thoughts took another tum
that further intensified this feeling I had. 'They're planning devastations
on a mind-chilling scale. That's why they can't reach agreement with the
Church, which is also geared to thousands of years.w
At the crossroads of the German fascist project, Brecht and Benjamin are
looking in opposite directions for the Messiah who will bring about redemption
to this crisis. Brecht's maniacal cry that we must no account take leave of the
children goes against the grain of Benjamin's thinking in the "Theses on the
Philosophy of History." Although, Benjamin here attributes this trait to Social
Democracy, it is equally a classic Marxist position to 'assign the working classes
the role of the redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the sinews of
its greatest strength.'97 Benjamin charges that 'this training made the working
classes forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by
the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren.'98
That Brecht himself takes this view shows that in a political climate where
extremity reigns' even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins.'99
Therein one must not only think of the baby in the womb, but of whole
generations who have passed away under a tide of violence and warmongering.
Whilst Brecht is wary of the thirty thousand years to come, Benjamin is looking
thirty thousand years into the past for answers, to the prehistory of what we are
now calling 'civilisation.' In terms, of criminality, what separates a Communist
criminality from Fascist one, when indeed criminality for Brecht marks the true
strain of a potentially revolutionary? Benjamin is aware of this too, 'the Messiah,'
96 Ibid., p. 89-90.
rn Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 252.
98 Ibid., p. 252.
99 Ibid., p. 247.
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he says, 'comes now only as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of the
Antichrist.'IDOOne must approach the moment of danger, insofar as 'the danger
affects both the content of tradition and its receivers.'I01 The' curiosity' that
Benjamin feels again is the sensation of falling. By the end of his summer in
Brecht's company he understands that he must take the fall. Compare this to an
earlier diary entry, this one from Franz Kafka:
In order to be as heavy as possible, which I believe to be an aid to falling
asleep, I have crossed my arms and put my hands on my shoulders, so
that I lay there like a soldier with his pack.102
Benjamin offers 'Quite palpably being loaded down is here equated with
forgetting, the forgetting of a sleeping man.'103However, what is also detectable
here is a form of vigilance, because a soldier with his pack on is only permitted to
sleep lightly, to only sleep so as to save his strength for the next battle. Even
whilst he is slumbering, he cannot fail to remember that 'the enemy has not
ceased to be victorious/P' That is the discipline of his training, the method that
'only the historian will have' in order to fan the flames of hope in the past. .. '105
One sleeps as a soldier when one cannot be a vigilante in his skin.
For Kafka everything was gesture, and this is why Benjamin claims 'he
could see least of all.'I06Nonetheless 'each gesture for him was an event -one
lOO Ibid., p. 247.
101Ibid., p. 247.
102 Ibid., p. 129.
103 Ibid., p. 129.
104lbid., p. 247.
lOS Ibid., p. 247.
I06Ibid., p. 117.
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might even say a drama - in itself.'I07At Brecht's house Benjamin too is forced to
act, to act out the nightmare of this fascism on the small stage of his personal
relations, a place the Gestapo cannot penetrate, and yet somehow, curiously, the
terror found here is more frightening, more palpable on a one-to-one basis. The
stage on which this might been seen to be taking place in Brecht's home. Kafka
however would make the more bold gesture of classifying it as something that
takes place 'in the World Theatre,' one that reaches up toward heaven. Kafka, is
not afraid 'to tear open the sky behind every gesture.'IOBFor an Expressionist, the
'gesture itself would be the decisive thing.'I09 For Kafka it's both the gesture and
what looms behind it.
What Brecht's epic theatre is missing out on is this tearing down of the
staging of the socious, instead its prefers to make its stage out of a black hole, out
of stark emptiness, passing itself off as accessibility. Again one thinks of the ass
in Brecht's office with the sign around his neck 'Even Imust understanding it.'110
And of Brecht's actors who would wear signs around their necks as well, to
gesture at their political identifications in his 'alienating' theatre productions. The
trouble was that the alienation effect here related itself to the actor's body alone.
The public never itself faced the threat of wearing its identifications around its
neck, even when they were apparent to all in attendance. This is similar in a way
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never recognised it as a reflection on them. Brecht included. For Benjamin this
realisation takes place in line with his work on Kafka, who inhabited a literary
universe where everyone was wearing signs around their necks betraying their
political ignorance. Kafka demonstrated this with his descriptions of the
Oklahoma Nature Theatre where everyone is able to contribute to a populism
that covers over a much more sinister aim of political conformity than the
colourful propagandic posters would belie. Anyone is free to be a Communist
and all should act now toward a better life. What is not said is that one who fails
to join the party line, for whatever reason will be brought down, will face
consequences, in a similar way that 'bad (social) actors' get booed off the
(political) stage and seem to disappear from public discourse. Alternatively there
is no other way to act, but to risk such appraisals in a society where no one has
the tools with which to play himself or herself, to be what they claim to be.
Benjamin understands this lesson through his work on Kafka. His appraisal of
the world like Brecht's was aligned to the metaphor of the stage. However, the
productions these two men had in mind could not have been more different it
terms of the crudity of their pronouncements about the future of statecraft.
Benjamin explains:
Kafka's world is a world theatre. For him, man is on stage from the very
beginning. The proof in the pudding is that the Nature Theatre of
Oklahoma accepts everyone. What the standards for admission are cannot
be determined. Dramatic talent, the most obvious criterion seems to be of
no importance. But this can be expressed in another way: all that is
expected is that the applicants play themselves. It is no longer in the realm
of possibility that they could; if necessary, be what they claim to be.'!'
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What ensues is an endless rehearsal of that guilt throughout the span of the
Weimar era emerges as the Expressionist movement. This guilt was felt to be
unique to the times. However, it too possessed a prehistory. In a similar way
fascism was also part of a continuum stretching back in time to the first fall of
man from Paradise.
Falling Down
Itwas in the essay on Kraus from 1931, that Benjamin was first able to
comment on 'the falling sickness' caused ostensibly by guilt over the pervasive
decline that had befallen Viennese society from the previous decade. Benjamin
would note" I share the guilt ... " This is so 'Because this has a ring of the
manifestos of an intelligentsia seeking to call to mind the memory of an epic that
seemed to be turning away from it, there is something to be said about this guilty
feeling in which private and historical consciousness so vividly meet.'l12 This
type of guilt will always lead to Expressionism, from which Kraus' mature work
was nourished by the roots that cracked open their soil. The slogans are well
known - with what scorn did Kraus not himself register them: "gebalt", "estuft",
"gestseilt" [clenched, stepped, steeped], stage sets ... were composed.l!'
The figures that might have comprised such a setting, Benjamin could see
retrospectively, that is to say from behind, with their stepped, steeped, terraces
of human shoulders, necks and backs. They appeared much like the mysterious
figures depicted in medieval miniatures, 'leaning,' 'inclining,' together with
III Benjamin, Walter, llluminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intra. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 121.




'wide open eyes.' They looked as if 'falling sickness had overtaken them thus, in
their running which is always precipitous, they lean toward one another.' 114 This
position echoes that of the exiled intellectuals looking out from their respective
peaks in Benjamin's dream. Their available pathways were blocked due to this
same pack mentality.
These men for Benjamin displayed a radical 'curvature' or 'concavity'
most explicitly viewed from behind. Clenched or huddled in 'steep steps' which
despite appearances 'leads less toward heaven than downward to and even
under the earth.' The nameless power to which their backs are bent is the
unsignified guilt. 'Whatever powers may have fought out their spiritual powers
on these shoulders, one of them, from our experience of the condition of the
defeated masses immediately after the end of the war, we are able to call by its
name. What finally remained of Expressionism, in which an originally human
impulse was converted almost without residue into a fashion, was the experience
and the name of that nameless power to which the backs of people bent: guilt.
"That an obedient mass is led into danger not by an unknown will but by an
unknown guilt makes them pitiable," Kraus wrote as early as 1912.' 115
Guilt does not equal redemption. This was made clear from the other
frontiersman of the Benjaminian project (including Buber, Hoffmannstahl, Korsh,
Bloch, Lukacs) who stood beside Brecht and Kafka in considering the dilemmas
of the age. Kafka starts his own subterranean journey through the Austria-
Hungarian Empire from another set of terms all together. If figures like Brecht
and Kraus were thinking of the German question 'in terms of ages, Kafka thinks
114 Ibid., p. 274.
115 lbid., p. 275.
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of [it] in terms of cosmic epochs.v> That is how Kafka is able to prognosticate
fascism, but not show its dimensions. Hitler's survey plans for German fascism
where always sketched on a cosmic scale. Kafka has the uncanny ability
therefore through the vehicle of the word Sprache to project these outcomes on
both a micro and macro level. He too works in staging events, but ones before
they transpire in real time. This brings us back to Brecht's theatre and his opinion
as well that Kafka is a prophet. Benjamin disagreed with that statement, and
instead credited his powers of perception to something far more prosaic,
tradition, 'Kafka listened to tradition, and he who listens hard cannot see.'117
Perhaps vision in overrated anyway, especially at a time when 'a typical German
man's pathway is blocked by his own frontal bone'118which not coincidentally,
supports his vision. But then again we are searching out something else
altogether. Deleuze and Guattari would assert that 'Whatever minor visions
Kafka does come up with in the process of his literary explorations have no value
within themselves, at least not much beyond' what Benjamin judges them to be:
'a lot rubbish and waste, a lot of pure mystification.'!" However, this ostensible
visual waste material, the emptied contents of the waste bin of bureaucracy, 'is
to be expanded beyond all bounds,' in Kafka's universe, from there it 'will be
projected onto the geographic, historical and political map of the world in order
to reach vast regions of it. .. '120Kafka takes as his starting point the word, and
through the arid landscape that is language, he makes words 'vibrate with a new
116Benjamin, WaIter, Illuminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 126.
117 Ibid., p. 141.
118 Ibid., p. 121.
119Benjamin, Walter "Conversations with Brecht," Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht,
WaIter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno Afterward Fredric Jameson, Asetltetics and Politics, Translation
Editor: Ronald Taylor (NLB: London, 1977), p. 89.
120Deleuze, Giles, and Guattari, Felix. Kafka Toward a Millar Literature, Trans. Dana Polan. Intro.
Reda Bensmaia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 10.
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intensity.'121As Klaus Wagenbach says, "The word is master, it directly gives
birth to the image." 122In using the word in this way Kafka 'never stops operating
by exhilaration and overdetermination and brings about as a result all sorts of
world wide reterritorializations.'123
For Benjamin, 'Kafka's word is a world. The word will lend salvation as
we await the Messiah, who in any case comes always a day late. Salvation is not
a premium on existence but the last way out for a man whose path has been
blocked ...'124 Hence his head is bent against the perceived ceiling of his own
existence. 'The law of this theatre is contained in a sentence tucked away in IA
Report to an Academy:"I imitated people because Iwas looking for a way out,
and for no other reason."'125 Benjamin is making his own report on Brecht, and in
doing so he endeavours to 'lose his rigidity' through imitating Brecht's Marxist
party line, he subsumes this categorisation into himself, 'in order to proliferate or
prepare an upheaval in which he will fall into new lines of intensity.'126 Why do
Kafka, Brecht, and Benjamin all choose the theatre as their basis for their lines of
intensification, their revolution pathways? This motive, though seemingly
obvious with relation to the mass, remains unclear on the level of a person to
person. What is clear is that they want to carry this communications operation
off with as little signification as possible. This means that exchanges must be
discreet, though telling. 'Before the end of his trial K. seems to have some
intimation of these things. He suddenly turns to the two gentlemen wearing top
121 Ibid., p. 19.
122 Ibid., p. 23.
123 Ibid., p. 19.
124Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 121.
125 Ibid., p. 121.
126 Deleuze, Giles, and Guattari, Felix. Kafka Toward a Millar Literature, Trans. Dana Polan. Intro.
Reda Bensrnaia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 6.
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hats who have come for him and asks them: "What theatre are you playing at?"
"Theatre?" asked one, the comers of his mouth twitching as he looked for advice
to the other, who acted as if he were a mute, struggling to overcome a stubborn
disability. The men do not answer this question, but there is much to indicate
that it hit home.' 127
Benjamin concludes then without concluding his views on Kafka, from the
position of a motion sickness, which comes out of a stagnant political climate.
There he takes our judgement of Kafka beyond the speculation that is practised
by a maniacal Brecht, and brings it some way toward the cosmic playing fields
on which catastrophe operates:
It is easier to draw speculative conclusions from Kafka's posthumous
collection of notes than to explore even one of the motifs that appear in his
stories and novels. Yet only these give some clue to the prehistoric forces
that dominated Kafka's creativeness, forces, which to be sure, may
justifiably be regarded as belonging to our world as well. Who can say
under what names they appear to Kafka himself? Only this much is
certain: he did not know them and failed to get his bearings among them.
In the mirror in which the prehistoric world held up before him in the
form of guilt he merely saw the future emerging in the form of judgement.
Kafka, however, did not say what it was like. Was it not the Last
Judgement? Does it tum the judge into the defendant? Is the trial not the
punishment? Kafka gave no answer. Did he expect anything of this
punishment? Or was he rather concerned to postpone it?128
Such postponements are what catastrophe monitoring is all about. The
catastrophe will never culminate at a single moment but rather will come at us
like a constellation of little events, microgestures that result in the political
picture becoming cracked at its foundations. Benjamin never calls for a victory
over these disturbances but rather preaches a constant attentiveness. Catastrophe
127Benjamin, Walter, illuminations, Trans, Harry Zohn, Intra. Hannah Arendt, (New York:
Fontana Press, 1969), p. 121.
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is not the event come; rather it is the present moment awaiting its eruption. That
moment is here in a multitude of formations and yet is largely invisible to us.
The task of bringing this moment to light, allowing us to read it signals, perhaps
for the first time, constitute a politics by other means what I will plot in detail in
the next three chapter as Walter Benjamin's War.
128Ibid., pp. 1241-125.
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What Calls Technology? or Walter Benjamin's
War.
There are certain things you don't see coming, certain things you'd rather
remain blind to. They are nonetheless present and mounting, signals piling atop
one another in quick succession, subtly pressing upon you the signal for a
confrontation that is always already yet to come. Yet it is a confrontation that is
already here in a multitude of formations. Nonetheless, you choose ignore all the
signals around you. That there is a war taking place everyday, for every hour.
That the terms of that war form all around you, at every instant. That you avert
your to gaze to their proximity to your person almost maniacally day in, day out.
Some will refer to this daily bout with present-to-distant desire as technology.
Some will refer to it as politics by other means, a mechanics of the will. Walter
Benjamin's War.
Benjamin names the terms of this coming war in a short piece from 1925
entitled The Weapons of Tomorrow: Chlorazetophenol, Diphenylamchorlizine
and Dichlorlathyl-sulfide.' In this piece Benjamin points the finger directly at I.G.
Farbens Hoescht, Agfa, and Leverkusen plants as well as other respectable
laboratories and institutes responsible for the suffocating death of mankind on
the steps of the capitalistic enterprise. Kafka addresses this situation when he
talks about the dirt of the officials. 'She could not understand why there were
office hours for the public in the first place. To get some dirt on the front staircase
- this is how her question was once addressed by an official, who was probably
annoyed, but it made a lot of sense to her." Benjamin concludes from this
passage, that 'uncleanliness is so much the attribute of officials that one could
1 Benjamin, Walter, 'Franz Kafka,' Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt,
(New York, Fontana Press, 1969), p. 110.
2 Ibid., p. 110.
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almost regard them as enormous parasites wasting at the energy of the caste that
is compelled to serve them from below. This, of course does not refer to the
economic context, but to the forces of reason and humanity from which this clan
makes a living."
Kafka's officials eventually become class warriors 'pushing the German
economic crisis ever further to actualise an agenda that guarantees further
sources of profit." Meanwhile, 'the parallel contract with the public is being
broken by the officials, the one meant to be held between technology and the
proletariat." Instead its bodies are being lost to the putrid stench of trenches
riddled with the fall out of technology's wrath. 'One single aeroplane, loaded
with gas bombs, carries all the necessary power to cut off civilian amenities and
life. The development of military technology enables the tremendous
empowerment of the officials." The dirt that gets on the steps now that officials
have formed a partnership with the fascist war machine, comes from the detritus
of a society under ruination. The economic conditions of wartime makes for a
centralisation of violence in their offices.
It is no coincidence that these men were in the business of insurance in the
time of Kafka, in the business of mobilisation, and preparedness in the time of
Benjamin, and are now in the business of risk management and damage control
as we enter the 21st century. The terms of operation here are always the same,
they consist of dullness, decay and dirt. Filth is the element of the officials/ the
logistics of disposal likewise is their domain. Here we get onto the grounds of
"lbid., p. 110.
4 Leslie, Esther, Overpowering Conformism, (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 31.
5 Ibid., p. 7.
6 Ibid., p. 31.
7 Benjamin, Walter, 'Franz Kafka,'llIuminations,Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt,
(New York, Fontana Press, 1969), p. 110.
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historicism and its always already failed whitewash operation carried out on
history. As Benjamin understood it, 'Fascists do not historicise destructivity." A
wilful underrreading of technology is included in that course. Benjamin
demands an alertness not only to the destructive side of technology, but also to
the conditions which transform that destructivity as a possibility into an
actualisation the first instance. The terms that are recruited in waging the coming
war correspond then not with a partial blindness in the reporting of technology's
hand in warfare, but rather with a recognisance by other means: specifically by
scavenging through the terms by which technology has been authorised from the
first world war onward. This sort of investigation hones in roughly at the sites
where the stink is allowed to rise from the rubbish heap of history: sites such as
Nazi Germany. Those are however only ever initial points of entry, filth and
purity seem to run in aparallel existence anytime you have something forming
like a history, anything which seems to be gesturing a coming into being of the
event.
Offence Analyses
Paul Virilio argues in Pure War9 that in fact, the Second World War never
ended. Technically, 'it's not finished, at least not to the legal specifications of any
international body of law."? Martin Heidegger, in his statements regarding the
war, in the (in)famous volume 'What is Called Thinking?' would go so far as to
say that for him the war essentially 'has decided nothing ...in the sense that it
concerns solely man's essential fate on this earth.'" Rather it seems that man's
confrontation with nihilism had only been postponed by events. Despite its delay,
8 Leslie, Esther, Overpowering Conformism, (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 30.
9 Virilio, Paul, Pure War Revised Edition, (New York: Semiotexte, Columbia University
Press, 1997), p. 14.
10 Ibid., p. 14.
11 Heidegger, Maritn, What is Called Thinking?, Trans. J. Glenn Gray, (London: HarperTorch
Books, 1968), p. 66.
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the moment of that confrontation was indeed still a necessary one, and in due
course it would arise again.
What it had done decisively from Heidegger's point of view, was to
inaugurate total mobilisation as it had been predicted previously in Ernst
Junger's writings of the 1920s and 30s, a dream of tidy efficiency in war making, a
total co-operative fusion between industry and the military. The dream of
'efficient' killing, if not 'clean' killing was ultimately met through the atomic
bomb ironically marketed as a weapon to put an end to the necessity of mass
warfare. Indeed it was positioned to tip the balance of causalities in favour of the
victors, so that the losers would have to count the dead. From its inception it was
thought to be so powerful that it was regarded as beyond multiplicity in its
application, it stood alone as the singular threat to the future." In the shadow of
the atomic bomb, and later the nuclear bomb, something was ironically allowed
to proliferate: the illusion of Total Peace as the ultimate goal of producing
weapons of mass destruction. The goal itself having been assumed after WWI
found its place in the post-WWII vernacular as 'deterrence' a term destined to
become the new international buzzword clamouring the Cold War and later the
Star Wars initiative.
Wartime technology seems to have managed quite easily to obtain an
international business class passport, even as the Second World War 'has yet to
be put out,"! or perhaps the more fitting term here is deported, from the
economic VIP list of Western nations. Moreover wartime technology is
increasingly able to slip into all fields, bypassing most customs agents, including
the intellectual gate. This is how Martin Heidegger can start re-authorising the
12 Poggeler, Otto, 'Heidegger's Political Self Understanding,' The Heidegger Controversy, Ed.
Richard Wolin, (London: MIT Press, 1993), p. 229.
13 Virilio, Paul, Pure War Revised Edition, (New York: Semiotexte, Columbia University
Press, 1997), p. 14.
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place of technology into the field of Big Science in Europe after the War. In his
writings - starting in the early 1950s and 60s, science is assessed alongside
technology as a matter of product assessment as something akin to intellectual
quality control. As early as 1933,Heidegger would assert in his rectoral address
that 'authentic science (philosophy) was the highest mode of...man's being-at-
work.t''This comment critically joined the fate of philosophy to that of techno-
science. Indeed, as the century wore on, technology, in combination with science,
was increasingly meant to combine the highest outputs of philosophy with the
work ethic, synthesising a product, which is increasingly classified in its use value
according to its intelligence. Indeed in America, the job of bringing German
fascist know-how into marketability as US domestic technology was largely
carried out as an ideological refit operation to fit the standards of such post-war
values. An administrative order was placed for the redesign and redistribution of
fascist rhetoric to fit into the always already retro space age vernacular of the
bomb, starting with WWII and progressing through the cultural lexicon well into
the Cold War era." A domestic neglect of fascism was allowed to take place,
because we believed that with the dawn of the nuclear age we had increasingly
more space to think about fascism as an anachronistic politic relegated to the first
half of the century. This could hardly be considered as important as the
democratic future to come, one fuelled conspicuously by technology. As for
historical fascism, it continues to inhabit the marketplace of ideas as a space of
Denkfaulheii, Walter Benjamin's term for the expiration or falling off of
thinking; what Avital Ronell later will translate as mindrot."
This sort of rot ensues as a result of a subtle refusal on the part of the West
to acknowledge that this rot actually has its place outside of the gas chambers of
14 Zimmerman, Michael E., Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana State University Press, 1990), p. 67.
'5 For a further discussion of this situation see, Ronell, Avital, 'Starting from Scratch,'
Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. 207-218.
"lold., p. 211.
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Auschwitz and that the rot has received a transfer to the Academy. As Benjamin
predicted, 'gas warfare has obviously eliminated the distinction between civilian
and military personnel.i.'" in terms the bodies given over to the task of
manufacturing and promoting strategic rhetorics for deployment - in suring up
or breaking down as the case may be - the already embattled disciplinary fields of
the arts and sciences. The anxiety produced in the call to fabricate a resulting
order, has left us with the symptom of a widespread clouding over of what is
called thinking a history of technology within the university system post-WWII.
This condition is further aggrevated by the fact that a large portion of
institutional funding since the 1950s, in the US at least, has come directly, or
more often indirectly, from the coffers of military research and development
schemes. This economy would seem to favour the sciences, and yet without
rhetorical butressing the humanities produce the campaigns of future war, i.e.
invisible and perpetual war, cannot be effectively sustained. What occurs as a
result, Benjamin argues, is that international law is removed to facilitate the
transfer of the rhetorical debates which feed into, again indirectly, the
movements of the war machine as a kind of pre-programming. This leaves us
largely in the rhetorical fog of something vaguely intimated to be a matter of
national defence, as opposed to what it more clearly is: an ongoing defence of
nationalism. That was Benjamin's short-term projection for the coming war.
With a view to the long-term effects, it seems to me that this disbanding of
traditional affinities of inter-nationalism, has also resulted in an intra-
nationalism on debates around fascism. Each nation in turn performing an
internal examination of its role in the old school work of totalitarianism whilst
remaining blind to the appearance of ever burgeoning micro-fascisms within
their own respective, current political bodies.
17 Benjamin, Walter, 'Theories of German Fascism,'Selected Writings Volume 21927-1934, Trans.
Rodney Livingstone and Others, Eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eliand, and Gary Smith, (London:
The Belknap Press of Havard University Press, 1999), p. 315.
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This makes for a massive increase in the production of
contemplative ruination, but not of the redemptive sort Benjamin had in mind
in the late 1930s when writing the Theories of German Fascism'" essay. Rather,
this ruination is technically remastered using the same tuning 'forks' the Nazis
were forced to turn over along with many other looted possessions of their
cultural victims, after fascism had been forcibly taken off the air. Nonetheless,
what we are talking about here persists in being looped into that era, one that is
seeming unsurpassable, one that is showing the same signs of static regression as
German fascism broadcast at its supposed end. Thus the era following on from
German fascism is metaphysically hindered by the very real threat of repossession
by its similar controlling techniques. War always seems an arena where infernal
uses are made of prosaic technologies. Realisations such as these take a long time
to digest in the gut of humanity perhaps it is as Nietzsche suggested, that we need
two sets of guts to be able to pass through our own history. Instead of satiating
ourselves on contemplative ruination, perhaps its high time we swallowed the
necessity of a contemplative rumination. A process whereby the flatulence of the
Event as part of due course is released into the atmosphere of thinking instead of
getting trapped along the circuitous passages of our singular guttural breakdown
system. Avital Ronell alerts us to the fact that
There is a general movement to close things off, to get back to where
we belong, a desire to defect and bond orificial openings ... from which
uncontrollable utterances might be stopped. One of the dreams shared
by the body politic, the academy, and the forces of the body police
consists in shutting down the flow... The latency period of the archival,
viral, historical underground seems to be linkable to the structures
maintaining a secretly cycling poison, the hidden terrorisms that have
taken up residence in the rhetorical bloodlines and bacillary
negotiations, all requiring applications of hyperdetection and a new
examination of the shit we keep walking into ... 19
18 Benjamin, Walter, 'Theories of German Fascism,'Selected Writings Volume 21927-1934, Trans.
Rodney Livingstone and Others, Eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eliand, and Gary Smith, (London:
The Belknap Press of Havard University Press, 1999).
19 Ronell, Avital, Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 223.
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The question becomes how to get on better terms with that shit,
intellectually speaking, without falling victim to the logistics of the systems that
control it. One must remain particularly alert to such pitfalls, especially when one
recognises just whom we are up against. The general movement Ronell is
alluding to is a State sponsored campaign of stupidity. Following Nietzsche,
stupidity must not be considered just some disinterested element, something
endemic of a lackadaisical attitude toward distinguishing the nuances of what
constitutes truth or falsity, nobility or baseness. Rather stupidity must be given its
proper due as the enemy of truth is so far as it uses it as its raw material to
construct stupidity discourses and proliferate them behind a banner of truth.
Stupidity pursues its course through an understanding that it is by right that its
truth should dominate. This is a base way of thinking and therefore is the lowest
possible employment of truth. Such an activity turns the believer into one
possesseding of a slave mentality, and an unthought adherence to the status quo.
Nietzsche's concern therein lies with tracking the movements of this baseness
housed under the rubric of stupidity. As he battles his time Nietzsche's
denunciations of stupidity are constant; 'what baseness is necessary to be able to
say this, to be able to think thatl'"
It is philosophy's job more fully to become the surveyor of stupidity,
to work out a topology for it in every epoch, to acknowledge its complicity in
having perpetuated it through out the ages, and above all to take a sober attitude
towards stupidity in its ability to terrorise understanding and to poison thought.
In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze asks, 'Is there any discipline apart from
philosophy that sets out to criticise all mystifications, whatever their source and
aim, to expose all the fictions without which reactive forces would prevail?
Exposing as a mystification the mixture of baseness and stupidity that creates the
20 Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, (London: The Athlone Press, 1983), p. 105.
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astonishing complicity of both victims and perpetrators. Finally, turning thought
into something aggressive, active and affirmative.':" Deploying such a force for
Deleuze would result in nothing short of 'Creating free men, that is to say men
who do not confuse the aims of of culture with the benefit of the State, morality
or religion.:" These individuals would find affirmation through 'Fighting
ressentiment and bad conscience which have replaced thought for us.
Conquering the negative and its false glamour. Who has an interest in all this but
philosophyl"" Herein philosophy meets a dual task: it must 'not only be vigilant
of stupidity, it must also be its active opponent, it must seek it out in order to stop
its progression, it must unveil it at every opportunity, and moreover its job is to
seek out situations in which the demystification can be achieved. This is a
dangerous task because even philosophy can fail victim to mystification and
reactive thinking.?' Moreover thought must acknowledge and affirm the
necessity of its own violence if it hopes to consistently overpower the forces of
stupidity. The general movement advancing the cause of canonical knowledge
and 'information gathering' like nothing better than to see the force of thought
incapacitated, mollified and dissimulated, way before it ever gets to impact the
minds of the general public.
In What is Philosophy?Deleuze and Guattari pose the question, 'What
violence must be exerted on thought for us to be capable of thinking; what
violence of an infinite movement that, at the same time, takes away from our
power to say "1"?'25 They credit the work of Blanchot and Heidegger as
philosophers who have engaged this second characteristic. But alas even their
suggestions appear to fall short when we consider yet a potential third
21 Ibid., p. 106.
22 Ibid., p. 106.
23 Ibid., p. 106.
24 Ibid., p. 106.
25 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, What is Philosophy?, Trans. Graham Burchell and
Hugh Tomlinson, (London: Verso, 1994), p. 55.
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characteristic of this dilemma: 'an "Incapacity" for thought." They maintain that
'This incapacity rests at the core of thinking even after it has acquired the capacity
determinable as creation. It is then that a set of ambiguous signs arise, and
become diagrammatic features of infinite movements and which take on a value
by right whereas in other images of thought they were simple derisory facts
excluded from selection ... though as such begin to exhibit snarls, squeals and
stammers; it talks in tongues and screams which leads it to create, or to try.:"
What Deleuze and Guattari are describing is the emergence of immanent forces
which might potentially enhance our ability to think fascism in now time, and
moreover in that time span to think both in and out of transcendental or causal
systems of thought. Such a revaluation of these immanent forces away from the
margins of philosophy, toward the advanced regions of understanding represents
our best hope towards commencing a thinking of fascism. This in light of the
glaring failures piously transcendental philosophies have had in coming to terms
with it even categorically.
Code Word Fascism.
Much of the intellectual work produced around thinking fascism, in the last
twenty years 'seems to have proceeded less in the manner of methodology and
more in the manner of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps." 'We
have no reason to take pride in this image of thought, which involves much
suffering without glory and indicates a degree to which thinking has become
increasingly difficuIt ...'29 If thought searches it does so as a junkyard dog prancing
through the debris of modern life.
26 Ibid., p. 55.
27 Ibid., p. 55.
28 Ibid., p. 55.
29 Ibid., p. 55.
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Often thinking fascism amounts to academic journalism," a proliferation of
seemingly factual reports addressing and redressing the vastly disorientating and
seemingly contradictory events that took place in the Nazi era. These events
more often than not then get grafted onto a much larger humanist agenda: the
need to reassess the project of mankind in its supposed entirety following such a
unthinkable trauma. Fascism in these accounts remains an isolated historical
event, one that is consistently conflated with the Holocaust on one hand and
Nazism on the other. Handled in this way its situation resembles nothing so
much as an historical quarantine, its fundamental immorality a scourge
threatening otherwise healthy reports on the progress of civilisation in the last
century. Historians, who dare to examine this era, do so carrying the
recommendation that 'they blot out everything they know about the later course
of history.?'
There is no better way of characterising the method with which Benjamin's
historical materialism has broken. Benjamin in the Theses on the Philosophy of
History' warns that this concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be
sundered from the concept of its progression through 'a homogenous, empty
time.':" On the contrary, history is the subject of a structure whose site is not
homogenous, empty time, but 'time filled with the presence of the now.?' In
light of this view, Benjamin calls for a critique of the concept of such
progression." One that is founded upon' a criticism of the concept of progress
itself.'35
30See Ronell, Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 255.
31Benjamin, Walter, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History,'lIluminations,Trans. Harry Zohn, Intra.
Hannah Arendt, (New York, Fontana Press, 1969), pp. 247-248.
32 Ibid., p. 254.
33 Ibid, p. 255.
34Ibid., p. 252.
35 Ibid., p. 252.
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The start of that critique might commence with an overthrowing of the
assumption that progress necessarily signals healthy, categorical outcomes. Again
it is Benjamin who asserts that all the progressive events of civilisation thus far
have 'emerged in step with a triumphal procession of the victors, whose course
invariably treads over those lying prostrate in defeat.i" Consequently, it would
cause great unrest, and even suffering for one to discover the spiritual afflictions
underlying any era of apparent triumph. Those who would wish to equate the
progress of civilisation with euphoria would obviously seek to avoid that route
of inquiry. This not to say however, that this route up until now has remained
unchartered. Benjamin quotes Flaubert, whom whilst writing within the milieu
of France's Second Republic was compelled to observe: 'Few will be able to guess
how sad one had to be to resuscitate Carthage.?' Perhaps though it is not enough
merely to acknowledge the loathsome taint of barbarism in the documents
handed down to us over the ages as civilisation. It may very well be the case that
one must go further in our treatment of civilisation. It is not necessary to blow
the lid off civilisation in order to 'blast an era out of the homogenous course of
history.:" and therein expose its true diabolical origins. Rather it is better to
reserve such judgements and instead consider the build up of pressures amongst
eras that created the conditions for such an unsavoury alignment of forces. Only
then would it be possible to expose and perhaps then to diagnose the forces at
work creating such underlying grievances.
Our priority is not one siding with good, nor evil, victor or victim. Rather
it is in observing the historical climate that might produce such a relation of
forces affecting one another. Temporally, the concern must lie with the now time
of German fascism, but never in isolation of an appreciation of this eras
36 Ibid., p. 248.
37 Ibid., p. 248.
38 Ibid., p. 254.
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resonance with others that have contiguity to it. To diagnose German fascism in
isolation is to narrow the terms in which we are able to make our historical
diagnoses and therein our potential to treat 'fascisms' as they exist within our
present age.
'It was Nietzsche who first put forth the idea that artists and philosophers
are physiologists, physicians of culture, for whom phenomena are signs and
symptoms that reflect a certain state of forces.'39Nietzsche therein took it upon
himself to diagnosis the disease of his age, nihilism, by isolating its symptoms,
(ressentiment, bad conscience, the ascetic ideal), by tracing its aetiology to a certain
relation of active and relative forces (the genealogical method), and by setting
forth a prognosis (nihilism defeated by itself) and a treatment (the revaluation of
values)." A similar strategy could be applied to diagnose the disease of the era of
National Socialism, fascism.
'To even begin to anticipate such a project one must first accept that history
presupposes a delay of knowledge such that an event must remain 'unlimited'
and continuous' within a greater plane of innumerable happenings."
Consequently, the delay of knowledge itself becomes 'unlimited and continuous
because it does not stop adding one segment of happening to another, contiguous
to another, operating piece by piece, in order to always push the limit of
understanding farther back.'" When one attempts to chart the development of
any segment of history, one quickly finds oneself in a net of spatial complexity,
such that history always emerges in some respects as the inverse of catastrophe.
'In catastrophic events there is not a single fixed point at which a catastrophe
39 Deleuze, Gilles, Essays Critical and Clinical, Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (London,
Verso, 1998) p. xvii.
40 Ibid., p. xvii.
41 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Kafka Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan, Foreword
Reda Bensmaia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986), p. 52.
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occurs but rather a zone of potential events that are described by cusps [between
events] which are themselves defined by multiple possible interactions, implying,
with more or less probability multiple fluid thresholds. What is common to all
catastrophic events is an inability to define exactly the moment at which a
catastrophe occurs.'43 This condition makes for a perpetual crisis of history,
insofar as its potential for catastrophic eruptions is always continuous. This is so
'because it is always on the side of 'the event' that history takes place.:"
History then can be understood as a process itself, the tracing of the field of
past developments. These developments occur on a plane of organisation,
history, one that is literally organising itself. Deleuze and Guattari tell us that this
plane of organisation however, really is two planes acting in sequence with one
another. The first is the plane of transcendence which 'organises and develops
forms' for history to take place and 'assigns and develops subjects'" to act as
agents toward that development. The second plane is the plane of immanence
'where there are only speeds and slownesses between unformed elements' of
Events, and 'affects between nonsubjectified powers ...'46 The two 'continually pass
into one another, by unnoticeable degrees and without being aware of it, or one
becomes aware of it only afterward. Because one continually reconstitutes one
plane on top of another, or one extricates one from the other.?" This process
relies on a constant reterritorialization of the plane of transcendence by making
history solidify into something with dimensional depth, giving it a marked
duration, or halting its take off into other directions of cause and meaning. At the
same time as this is taking place there is a constant deterritorialization on the
43 Lynn, Greg, 'Architectural Curvilinearity The Folded, the Pliant and the Supple' p. 11 in Architectural
Design, AD Profile 102 'Folding in Architecture' vol. 63. No. 3/4, 1993 Mar./Apr.
44 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Kafka Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan, Foreword
Reda Bensmaia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986), p. 52.
45 Deleuze, Gilles and Guttari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian Massumi,
(London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) p. 267.
46 Ibid., p. 267.
47 Ibid., p. 270.
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plane of immanence making history break apart. This deterritorialization
operates by causing particles of Events to spin off the continuum, scrambling
forms of causal understanding by speeding up or slowing down the way we have
come to understand an unfolding of Events, or breaking down groupings of
activities and reassembling them other in ways.
Any diagnoses of history must than in tum concern itself not with
charting the succession of systems (First, Second, Third, Millennial Reich), but
rather with tracing the coexistence of these planes and how they, through acting
together, have compelled Events to emerge. The features of speed up and delay -
attributes of all recountings of history - can then be acknowledged variously as
modes of reterritorialization. Features that act as 'a gain rather than a loss, as
something perfectly positive and active - something that goes a long way toward
the undoing of the systematic machine of historicism, replacing it instead with
the composition of an assemblage, always one piece next to another.?" How these
pieces hang together at a given moment is largely a feature of the speed at which
events congeal. Therein what ultimately constitutes a history on the plane of
composition 'to be precise, are connections, all the connections that operate in
dissembly.:" Such dissembly can only be apprehended through an appreciation of
the variance of speeds at which historical events display themselves to us at a
given juncture in History, always oscillating and tempering themselves in terms
of the urgency of duration we assign to the present moment.
Deleuze and Guattari - through this concept of a plane of organisation -
intimate that history might be viewed as a type of machine, with the plane of
46 Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, Kafka Toward a Minor Literature, Trans. Dana Polan, Foreword
Reda Bensmaia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986) p. 52.
49 Ibid., p. 82.
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organisation acting as a Body without Organs" [that is to say with all the
attendant metabolic flux such an anorganic body might generate externally
within its milieu.] 'In this BwO model the depth of the technology is not so much
the concern, as is the surface [skin] of the machine's assemblage that is given to
function through connections outward to networks of other assemblages. The
details of the operational plan(e) of such a machine must be improvised, the
reading of its guidelines comprised of a combination of transcendent assemblages
and immanent interassemblages, [skin as an organ in communication with other
organs both internal and external contiguously, creating thusly folds of
communication.]'" This approach differs significantly from Heidegger's notion of
a destined ontological plan; one that necessarily aligns the course of nihilism in
tandem with a total mobilisation of being over Being, in a series of disastrous
historical movements that will effectively lay down the last destruction chapter at
the end of metaphysics. In sharp opposition to Heidegger's transcendental brand
of eschatology, Benjamin advocates a distributional approach to history's
seemingly destructive affects. Evidence of this can be found in the historical
materialism that Benjamin advocates in Theses for a Philosophy of History,'
which is comprised along a similar network of transcendent assemblages and
immanent interassemblages to that of Deleuze and Guattari in terms of its
method of historiography.
This superficial feature of historical happening coincides with what
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the plane of consistency: 'Here there are no
longer any forms or developments of forms nor are there any subjects or
formations of subjects. There is no structure, anymore than there is genesis.
There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between
50 For a detailed discussion of the Body without Organs see Deleuze, Gilles and Guttari, Felix, A
Thousand Plateaus, Trans. and Foreward by Brian Massumi, (London: University of Minnesota Press,
1987) p. 163-166.
51 Deleuze, Gilles, Essays Critical and Clinical, Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (London,
Verso, 1998) , p. xxxviii.
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formed elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all
kinds ...'52Nothing develops, but things arrive late or early, and form this or that
assemblage depending on their compositions of speed. This plane we are told is
necessarily a plane of immanence. It is here perhaps that a new type of historical
reading might be taken. One that each time it is played out produces different
time characteristics, different understandings of what constitutes an epoch.
Deleuze and Guattari offer that history conjectured this way should read out as an
act of dissonant time reco(r)ding as opposed to historicism.
This reading would coincide with Benjamin's assertion in 'The Theses on
the Philosophy of History' that after the continuum of history has been exploded
through revolution a new calendar is introduced. 'The initial day of calendar
serves as a historical time lapse camera." 'It is that same day that keeps
returning as a point of remembrance for that event. Therein these calendars do
not measure time as clocks do; they are monuments of a historical consciousness
of which not the slightest trace has been apparent in Europe in the past hundred
years.?' That consciousness is revolutionary consciousness. He recalls that 'in the
July revolution an incident occurred which showed that this consciousness is still
alive and recounts that on the first evening of fighting it turned out that the
clocks in the towers were being fired on simultaneously and independently in
several places in Paris.'S5 Benjamin reports that an eye-witness, whom he may
have owed his insight into the rhyme, wrote as follows:
Who would have believed it! we are told that new Joshuas
at the foot of every tower, as though irritated with
time itself, fired at the dials in order to stop the day."
52 Ibid., p.270.
53 Benjamin, Walter, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History,' Illuminations, Intra. Hannah Arendt, Trans.
Harry Zohn (New York: Fontana Press, 1969), p.253.
54 Ibid., p. 253.
55 Ibid., p. 253.
56 Ibid., p. 253.
169
In this formulation revolutionary consciousness is witnessed as a lapse of
hegemonic timekeeping, as it is enforced by bourgeois convention. Without
timekeeping there is no longer any means of recording development, or charting
a continuum of progress which are the very foundations of bourgeois
civilisation. Stopping the day inaugurates new possibilities, new directives for
what constitutes happening, including that of retroactivity. For instance: The
French Revolution is able reterriorialise itself, 'to view itself as Rome incarnate'?
a symbol of a replete now time without missing a beat, before it is gradually
deterriorialised by the ruling classes who slowly subsume such an evocation into
a fashionable topicality. The strength of Revolution here is presented as a
velocity game, a means of temporarily outstripping body-politics of their apparent
logic, of forging a new set of retroactive, immanent logistics in order to carry out a
temporal refit operation both on civilisation and understanding what makes
history tick. The historian here must be capable of staving off determinate
logistics built into the metaphysical project. This determination is the ghost in
the ontological machine of modernity, one that persists in clocking our human
History unproblematically as the history of progress and eventually the history of
technology as a means to that end.
Messianism is one way that Benjamin's historiography counters historical
determinism, i.e, the notion of a linear, causal concept of historical progress. As a
counter-offensive the historical index we are dealing with under messianism
cannot be measured successively in discreet units of days, months, years, or even
centuries. Rather it exists on such a scale as to include the whole of human
happening. Moreover, Benjamin's messianism is founded on the belief that I a
covenant of responsibility exists amongst all the generations of humanity, both
living and dead, as well as generations to come, and it includes all of the actions
57 Ibid., p. 253.
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of humanity ever performed. The covenant therein surpasses the yoke of anyone
generation and must be the responsibility of all humanity collectively.:" It is the
responsibility of the historian to make us aware that an ethical summons on the
state of mans conduct can be called up at anytime, affecting every agent which has
proceeded in its making. Benjamin cautions us that 'the Messiah comes not only
as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of the Antichrist. Only the historian
will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly
convinced that even the dead will not be not be safe from the enemy if he wins.
And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious."
This diabolical account of history on the part of Benjamin is tempered with
a more laudatory understanding of history as a field of remembrance rather than
of acute prediction. Even the soothsayers of old in Benjamin's estimation relied
on a heterogeneous and replete summoning of the past, rather than recourse to
futural investigations. The magic of the future, perhaps, stripped of its opacity
becomes - for the Jews who share this messianic covenant - a means with which
to remain open to the possibility of redemption at every moment despite a past of
apparent oppression. In other words, a past remembered heterogeneously cannot
be interpreted as a past not won for the victors alone. Recalled at other speeds of
happening, the possibility of victory for the persecuted is still potentially upon us.
In another portion of the 'Theses' Benjamin asserts that 'the past can be
seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised
and is never seen again.:" He utilises this assertion to criticise the workings of
historicism and quotes Gottfried Keller as saying, that 'the truth will not run
58 Ibid.,. pp. 246-247. Benjamin writes: 'The past carries with in it a temporal index by which it is
referred to redemption. There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one.
Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that proceeded us, we have been
endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be
settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that.'
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away from US.'61 To Benjamin's thinking it is outpacing us by leaps and bounds.
Travelling virtually at the speed of light, so much so that 'For every image of the
past that is not recognised by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to
disappear irretrievably.:" Ironically how this occurs is often through a failure of
communications within the organic body of the historian himself, to paraphrase
Benjamin his 'good tidings of the past brought with throbbing heart may be lost
in a void the very moment he opens his mouth. '63 This threat is brought on as
an affect of the technological age, but also of as an affect of a victor's mentality
toward what registers as the historical itself. So long as the big events in history
are manufactured through a recording of warfare, distortion will play through
that record such that minor events transmitted from mouth to mouth will be lost
to a flood of war books documenting what is essentially military history. Therein
the esteem for accuracy in warfare gets a post war transfer off the battlefield and
onto the page of the written account. In an essay on Karl Kraus, Benjamin quotes
the Vienesse satirist's complaint that in wartime the journalist and the warrior
merge into a journalist warrior who is in a prime position to rewrite the actual
experience of war. Baudelaire in the 1860swas the first to connect journalism and
war reportage with the flaneuristic modern eye through his essay 'The Painter in
Modern Life.' 'Baudelaire finds war's repertoire of images, battlefields strewn
with corpses, ruined structures and munitions, a valuable archive and writes
about the terrible poetry of the battlefield. Aestheticisation of the battlefield is
peculiarly spliced with technology." its wiring adjusted to reinforce the ideal of
an optical connection with the world dating back to Cartesian metaphysics. This
scopic regime persistently operates to the virtual exclusion of the other senses in
terms of garnering understanding. It will have its day of reckoning on the same
one as civilisation, both afflicted with the same blindness when it comes to
61 Ibid., p. 247
62 Ibid., p. 247.
63 Ibid., p. 247.
64 Leslie, Esther, Walter Benjamin Overpowering Conformism, (London: Pluto Press, 2000) p. 27.
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valuing the thingy and the 'object' of nature. This blindness is symptomatic of the
illness that befalls the age; nihilism with all its attendant stupidity, its
constituents racked with boredom about their own being in the world.
Experiencing Our Losses.
In his essay 'Experience and Poverty' of 1933 Benjamin addresses these
jaded folk with the hope that they are still capable of emerging as a human
constituency to come. He addresses them in the guise of a Nietzschean
philospher-physician deftly attempting 'to interpret the phenomena of the age as
symptoms, whose sense must be sought in the forces'" at work that produce
them. From there he asks 'What is the mechanism of this "sicknessr?" taking as
his point of trajectory its overarching symptom: 'Experience has fallen in value.:"
Upon closer examination it would seem that the fall off in experiencing appears
to have coincided with the fall off in thinking. Beyond that we are working
'Amid a generation which from 1914 to 1918 had to experience some of the most
monstrous events in the history of the world;" This combination of ailments
prompts Benjamin to switch into the role of diagnostician, and make his first
preliminary assertion: 'Perhaps this sudden fall of experience 'is less remarkable
than it appears.:" Indeed, 'There is nothing remarkable about that [series of
affects] if one takes into account that experience has never been contradicted more
than thoroughly than in this era."?
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It is here that Benjamin migrates over to another Nietzschean role, that of
philosopher-typologist. Herein he begins to model the various types of experience
which have fallen sway to the present atmosphere of contradiction at work. From
there he attempts to situate them within their displaced localities: 'strategic
experience has been contravened by positional warfare; economic experience by
the inflation; physical experience by hunger; moral experiences, by the ruling
powers.": It is through the logic of this step that Benjamin's critique takes on a
logic reminiscent of Kant. Gilles Deleuze criticises Kant's critique on several
points. Firstly, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant appears to have confused
the posivity of critique with the humble recognition of the rights criticised."
Moreover, Deleuze criticises Kant's use of critique 'merely pushes an old concept
of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be
brought to all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth
themselves; a force that should be brought to bear on all claims to morality but
not on morality itself.:" Thus, he asserts that the 'critique turns into the politics
of compromise: even before the battle of the spheres of influence have been
shared out.?'
Furthermore, for Deleuze the Critique of Judgement asserts 'that the only
object of Kant's critique is justification, it begins by believing in what it
criticises.:" This approach seems at first to resonant with Benjamin's use of
critique in assessing the impact of technology on civilisation. He writes, 'With
this tremendous development of technology, a completely new poverty has
descended on mankind.'76 Technology itself is never criticised in its own right
71 Ibid., p. 732.
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rather it is judged under the assumption of its misuse or 'contradictory
applications."
However, Benjamin would appear to triumph over the limitations of
Kant's mode of critique as Deleuze would characterise it, by forming a critique of
experience that is based upon immanent as opposed to transcendent principles.
At first is seems as though Benjamin's argument is slipping into a similar
transcendental trap to Kant. Indeed, his first attempts to describe a 'poverty of
experience' appear to indicate that experience in and of itself should always be a
rich and subtle category. He speaks of 'an oppressive wealth of ideas'" which has
come along to burden experience, to swamp people instead with ideas, some of
which come as a revival of astrology and the wisdom of yoga, Christian Sciene
and chiromancy, vegetarianism and gnosis, scholastisicm and spiritualism.:"
Benjamin offers, however, that 'this is not a genuine revival but a
galvanization. '80 Something in culture has rigidified to allow this consolidation
to happen. Rather than looking at it as a sign of the times Benjamin refers back to
art as a means with which to index this crisis of experience insofar as it can be
acknowledged in aparallel relation to actual experience, that is to say by tapping
into this generation's domain of fantasy. This approach takes up art in the
Nietzschean sense that the philosopher-artist is meant to generate a plurality of
understanding phenomena, and some instances to herald the new forms to
come. The artist also is credited in Nietzsche with introducing pluralism into our
appreciation of truth. To commence this line of inquiry Benjamin pointedly
raises the work of the painter James Sydney Ensor, a Belgian artist whose
paintings and prints are known for their troubling fantasy, explosive colours, and
subtle social commentary.
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...Ensor's magnificent paintings, in which the streets of great cities are
filled with ghosts; philistines in carnival disguises roll endlessly down
the streets, wearing distorted masks covered in flour and cardboard
crowns on their heads ...These paintings are ...the reflection of the
ghastly and chaotic renaissance in which so many people have placed
their hopes ...our poverty of experience is just a part of a larger poverty
that has once again acquired a face -...that of a beggar in the Middle
Ages."
Here Benjamin seems to be saying that with the dearth of experience in
this generation in its own right, the experience of societal, spiritual poverty is one
that must borrow its appearance from the darkest eras of previous generations.
Moreover it must embellish them in even more grotesque ways, in order to stir
the senses in a period where the extremity of unfeeling seems to have reached
new heights. The horror of the modern age is received as a garish imitation, a
death mask resembling in itself the ghastly and chaotic aspects of medievalism
and transmitting them to the future in a heightened diabolical guise. The
characters in this present tragedy keep the company of ghosts and philistines; in
this instance the ghosts of the wartime casualties and the philistines are dogmatic
political commentators. These social actors are called from the right as well as the
left. It is their voices which phantasmatically herald the messianic judgement to
come. Meanwhile, a ruination of a different order in the realm of aesthetics is
being fantastically summoned by the Expressionist movement. Benjamin
however has no interest in forging a counter-aesthetic movement to represent
his view of this horror and upset. Instead his comments call for another approach
all together apart from aesthetics, in this instance focusing on the bare value of
culture itself.
For what is the value of our culture if it is divorced from experience?
Where it all leads when that experience is simulated or obtained by
underhanded means is something that has become clear to us from the
horrific mishmash of styles and ideologies produced in the last century
- too clear for us to not think it a matter of honesty to declare our
81 Ibid., p. 732.
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bankruptcy. Indeed (let's admit it), our poverty of experience is not
merely poverty on a personal level, but poverty of human experience
in general. Hence, a new kind of barbarism.:"
The sense behind the mishmash is one of nihilistic, dialectical approach
toward difference. All difference synthesised and reduced to sameness, means
that one experience is as good as another, one particular world view equal in
value to any other, one style just as pleasing or by turns disturbing as any other
which is hungrily embraced. The bankruptcy here figures not from failed
aquisition, but rather from the bingeing that has taken place on a seeming wealth
of ideas, which has in reality nothing to nourish an ailing body politic.
Benjamin's generation has gone hungry from a lack of intellectual sustenance.
Now they must construct from the crumbs of culture, rather than endlessly
seeking to coat them, or rearrange them pitifully to conceal how meager they
have become. If we read further on in his critique, however we happen upon
something entirely different offered on Benjamin's part, that is to say, the
introduction of 'a new, positive concept of barbarism'" which in my view
amounts to an affirmation of the category in all its forms and connotations.
Benjamin asks, 'What does the poverty of experience do for the barbarian? It
forces him to start from scratch ...looking neither right nor left...there have always
been the inexorable ones who begin by clearing the tabula rasa.?'
What does it mean to affirm barbarism in the Nietzschean sense; to go
beyond the judgmental categories of good and evil, to conceive of a new era of
barbarism that is not entwined with an instinct toward revenge. Rather than see
it as a source of social negation, to view it as a category potentially for personal
liberation, as a bastion of creative wealth in the face of spiritual poverty.
82 Ibid., p. 732.
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What could it mean to attempt to clear the debt on this term's moral
depravity and to enter into a new rhetorical economy, beginning with the task of
assigning a new barbarism? In order to begin babarism would have to be
separated out from a legacy of revenge, and an association with the vengeful
politics of the victors of civilisation. Therein, it must be acknowledged that 'the
instinct of revenge is the force which constitutes the essence of what we call
psychology, history, metaphysics and morality;" 'The spirit of revenge is the
genealogical element of our thought, the transcendental principle of our way of
thinking.:" 'We do not know what a man denuded of such a spirit of revenge
would look like, a man who we would not accuse of depreciate existence -would
he still be a man, would he think like a manj''" Benjamin would claim that this
man has already walked the earth, that 'there have always been the inexorable
ones who begin by clearing the tabla rasa.:" These persons seem to have few
material requirements other than a surface off which to draw their insights.
Benjamin:'They need a drawing table; they were constructors." These
constructors are always figures who seem to draw off the rumble of crumbling
worlds. For Benjamin,
'Such a constructor was Descartes, who required nothing more to
launch his entire philosophy than the single certitude, "I think,
therefore I am" ... Einstein, too, was such a constructor; he was not
interested in anything in the whole wide world of physics except a
minute discrepancy between Newton's equation and the observations
of astronomy. And this same insistence on starting from the very
beginning also marks artists when they follow the example of the
mathematicians and build the world from stereometric forms like the
Cubists, or modeled themselves on engineers, like Klee. For just like
any good car, whose every part, even the bodywork, obeys the needs
above all of the engine, Klee's figures too seem to have been designed
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on the drawing board, and even in their general expression they obey
the laws of the interior. Their interior, rather than inwardness; and this
is what makes them barbaric."
Could it just be a coincidence that the men that Benjamin is choosing to
credit as the great constructors of modernity are equally esteemed by him as some
of the greatest contributors to barbarism in the modern era? On what foundations
does the twentieth century in particular rest if not on Cartesian metaphysics,
Einsteinian physics, and Kleeian art? Indeed it could be argued that these three
major components together are largely responsible for constructing perception in
the modern world. Benjamin lauds these thinkers as engineers, who when posed
with a problem look to the blueprint of how its was previously assembled and
make alternations based on necessity. They are not afraid to confront
singularities, minute discrepancies, to follow other's examples, or build from
unauthorised materials. Their main concern is the engine which fuels them
onward. They have little reverance for what has conventionally gone before
them, instead their interest lies with tapping into the anomalies of the recent
past, with minor points of divergence or disjunction which might act as the lever
that causes whole mechanisms of thought to collapse, in favour of a violent
eruption of the new.
The whole begruding legacy of Cartesian metaphysics only begins when it
leaves behind the supersitious dust of medevalism and inaugurates a new epoch
of rationalism. Einstein's theory of relativity similarly inaugurated a new era of
modern Atomic Physics, leaving behind the rational outcomes of Newtonian
experimentation models in favour of thereoms based on absolute relativity. Art
as conceived by figures like Klee is most constructive when it borrows from the
equipment of science and mathematics, to engender new forms of perception to
take hold. These approaches would establish a new value of interiority, that
90 Ibid., pp. 732-733.
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stresses not so much inwardness as the isolation of a problem. Through such
isolation a problem can be confronted and eventually put down, it can be dealt
with efficiently, brutally in some cases. These are barbaric undertakings insofar as
they are unrefined and care nothing of society's eventual reception of them.
This orientation brings us back to the issue of critique. Critique in order to
be effective must also eschew social normatives. Deleuze tells us that 'Critique
must not be a critique ... by feeling, by experiencing or by any kind of external
instance.:" Discourses must be judged from the inside without the task of being
their own judge. Philosophy, science and art, have to be judged from within the
space of their operational domains, without using these the domains themselves
as a point of justification for their categorial persistence. The question should not
be what is art, but rather which art? In 'The Author as Producer' Benjamin
implicitly criticises Marxist critique. Marx believed that work should be assessed
vis a vis the social relations of production of its time. Benjamin suggests this
approach is limited by 'its answer being too mediated by various factors and
therein 'not always unambiguous.:" Instead he proposes that one examine 'the
position of a work within the relations of production.:" That is to say to critique
it directly in terms of its technique, as opposed to its manifest facticity as an
artform. He speaks of the possibilty of an alternative materialist analysis based
upon the examination of a 'functional interdependency that always, and under
all conditions, exists between the correct political tendency and progressive ...
technique.:" Therein, what must be appreciated, critically speaking, is the 'correct
determination of a relation between tendency and quality, from the outset.:"
91 Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: The Athelone Press,
1988), p. 91.
92 Benjamin, Walter, Selected Writings Volume 2: 1927-1934, Trans. Rodney Livingstone and Others,
Eds., Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1999), p. 769.
93 Ibid., p. 770.
94 Ibid., p. 770.
95 Ibid., p. 770.
180
All of the technical developments that Benjamin speaks of above are a
production of transmutation, or internal genesis; with them we finally get away
from the conditional game of historicism and onto a new mode of inquiry which
reads history against the grain, which takes the exceptional as mark of cultural
stirrings, as a signal of coming epochal change. This process goes hand in hand
with a process of affirmation, a generative mechanism, providing parts for the
engines of the future, from a transmutation of former obsolete workings,
forming in this instance what Benjamin is calling 'a new barbarism.' Those who
practice this new barbarism must have, according to Benjamin, IA total absence of
illusion about the age and at the same time an unlimited committment to it - this
is its hallmark. ...A complex artist like the painter Paul Klee and a programmatic
one like Loos - both rejected the traditional, solemn, noble image of man
festooned with all the sacrificial offerings of the past... 96
It is not the specific ideology that these men possess which makes them
thinkers for the future to Benjamin's mind, but rather their willingness to
sacrifice the idea of sacrifice which stood as a hallmark of an epoch where ascetic
principles ruled. Rather they aim to take a sober look at the man of the future, to
look to upon his struggle, vulnerability, and unfetteredness as creative assets
rather than as deficits. Assets that with any luck will attract a merger with other
kinds of beings. Benjamin cites the novelist Paul Scheerbart as someone who in
the realm of science fiction explored the potential apposability of new human
types with the machine world.
Scheerbart's ideas would seem to lend equal sway to technology and
linguistics in forging possible alternations on what can be understood as human.
96Ibid., p. 733.
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Not only do Scheerbart's interests point the way toward mankind's sensory
elevation on a radical scale, he also predicts a rise in machinic consciousness, AI,
to a level in which machines will achieve a sentience for themselves totally
exterior to human imput. He also predicted that technology might be introduced
into the very genesis of the human being, something that might still read as flesh
and not mechanical robot, and indeed this has already come to pass through IVF
and other genetic fertility programmes. Scheerbart's other concern, linguistics
stood as a potential arena where humanity's capabilities could be prosthetically
altered beyond what had been conceived of in conventional thinking, brought
forward to a stance beyond authenticity, beyond organcity. Scheerbart envisaged
creatures of the future who could 'talk in a completely new language. And what
is crucial about this language is its arbitrary, constructed nature in contrast to
organic language ...No technical renovation of language, but its mobilisation in
the service of struggle or work -or at any rate, of changing reality instead of
describing it.,97
For Scheerbart this is happening programmatically from the beginning of
the Soviet Union. Moreover it is not happening based upon a goal of technical
superiority, but tellingly one of transformation of already standing forms, which
are brought into mobilisation in totally innovative ways. Humanism is rejected
as a category of stagnation that can no longer stand if progress is to be made in the
happy merger of humanity with technology. People in this epoch are conceived
of as movers and thus summoned in favour of those ideals that promote change.
Here the illusion of overall description is jettisoned for a short hand signal to
evoke the event in its spirit rather than in its static content. This makes for a
better digestion of events in an epoch where events seem to travel with ever
increasing rapidity. Those who languish in the search for realness for authenticity
do so at their own expense. Those not visionary enough to adapt to the new
97 Ibid., p. 733.
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simplicity called for in thinking modernism will be left behind in a society
opposed to the endless acquistion of thoughts under a rationalist metaphysical
programme. Benjamin is acutely aware of their condition.
They have "devoured" everything, both "culture and people," and they
have had such a surfeit that it has exhausted them. No one feels more
caught out than they by Scheerbart's words: "You are all so tired, just
because you have failed to concentrate your thoughts on a simple but
ambitious plan." Tiredness is followed by sleep, and then it is not
uncommon for a dream to make up for the sadness and
discouragement of the day - a dream shows us in its realised form the
simple but magnificent existence for which the energy is lacking in
reality. The existence of Mickey Mouse is such a dream for
contemporary man."
Mickey Mouse as ubermensch. A comic strip figure whose representative
existence outstrips man's current capabilities, a rodent who will over run man,
over run society, in the perfect semblance of dream time, a time which is
alarmingly gaining on our own. Who then is a mouse and who is a man? In
some sense, Mickey Mouse represents for Benjamin the prototype for a new
physis for contemporary man, a figure who is as much animal as he is techno-
body. A figure who borrows his lifestuff from both his supporters and his
persecutors, from the object world that surrounds him and from the raw material
nature. Mickey Mouse is resourcefulness incarnate. He simultaneously a product
of nothing and everything. He is a product of a late nineteenth century techno-
romantic society whose modern industrial forms were given over to a facade of
mythical imperial grandeur in all its traditional pagentry. Born of out this heady
phantasmorgic atmosphere, he emerges in the early twentieth century as a perfect
fantasied merger between the epochs of medievalism and modernity, a twentieth
century wonder of technology sprung right from the cabinet of curiosity: 'In
terms, of 'the wonders of technology' appear quite without any machinery to
have been improvised from the body of Mickey Mouse, out of his supporters and
98 Ibid., pp. 733-734.
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persecutors, and out of the most ordinary pieces of furniture, as well as from
trees, clouds, and the sea. Nature and technology, primitiveness and comfort,
have completely merged."
In an formerly unpublished fragment written on 'Mickey Mouse'!" from
1931,a far less optimistic picture of Mickey Mouse's place in the social register
emerges. Benjamin tells us that these particular insights were gleaned in
conversation with Gustav Gluck and Kurt Weill, (Gluck being the character
figured in Benjamin's essay 'The Destructive Character' of that same year.) We
imagine Benjamin scribbling the following comments down in a heated
discussion. 'Property relations in Mickey Mouse Cartoons: here we see for the
first time that it is possible to have one's own arm, even one's own body,
stolen."?' This a comment that eerily prefigures the Nazi co-optation not just of
Jewish private property, but of the Jewish body in its entirety. 'The route taken by
Mickey Mouse is more like that of a file in an office than it is like that of a
marathon runner.'!" Mickey Mouse goes nowhere, yet remains in transit, under
the endless relocation programme of bureaucratic purgatory. He is circulated from
department to department, desk to desk never arriving, perpetually held up. This
figure - similar to Kafka's man - belies no endurance only resignation. 'In these
films mankind makes preparations to survive civilization.?" In doing so,
Mickey Mouse first raises the stakes of 'live animation' to the impossible heights
of indestructability, moreover he manages to do so on a comic scale, thus making
the demise of humanity something we can laugh out loud about.
'Mickey Mouse proves that a creature can still survive even when it has
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thrown off all resemblance to a human being. He disrupts the entire hierarchy of
creatures creatures that is supposed to culiminate in mankind."?' He reverses the
hierarchy of evolution to the point where beastiality is raised to an art form.
Therein he promotes a kind of etheral position. Mickey Mouse is the first
posthuman in the sense that he outstrips human attributes of their humaness
and makes something of them that is nonhierarchical, noncharacterisable and
ultimately nonidentifiable. What are mice if not interchangable beings, always
already a plurality, vermin? Who can say what the personality of Mickey Mouse
is other than one of maligned and outraged citizen of the [Disney] World, a man
without a voice, a man who can only futily from time to time raise an
unintelligible squeal at his opressors.
'These films disavow experience more radically than ever before. In such a
world, it is not worthwhile to have experiences.'!" If experience does amount to
something in the Disney world it is on the order of endless repetition without
disruption, an eternal return that is diabolical in its perpetual restaging of the
same events, it is a world in which one need never grow up, grow old and
transmutate in anyway, Mickey Mouse looks the same every time, everyplace, and
yet is a man without qualities, somehow a lost individual with no attributes and
thus is a profoundly unlocatable figure no matter how many times his likeness
pops up in representation. We have no experience of Mickey Mouse and thus
have no reason to fear him. As a figure of 'nature' Mickey Mouse embodies a
'complicity with liberated man,IJ06a man who has overcome his fears, overman.
It is this characteristic that lends the Mickey Mouse film a 'Similarity to
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fairy tales. Not since fairy tales have the most important and vital events been
evoked more unsymbolically and more unatmospherically .... All Mickey Mouse
films are founded on the idea of leaving home to find out what fear is.'107This
refers to a fairy tale of the Brother's Grimm - "The Boy Who Left Home in Order
to Learn the Meaning of Fear." Certainly this tale could apply to the path taken by
Walter Benjamin himself. The Brother's Grimm were living of course in an era
where one could still identify fear through experience, and not just through its
imitation and simulated responses. As for the lack of symbolism and atmosphere
in the Mickey Mouse film, Benjamin would conclude simply that no one can be
bothered to create such things when circumstances and consequences seem so far
removed from the personal. Even in the event of war, the public cannot be
summoned away from dreamlike dependence on such images and prefer to dally
a bit longer in Disney's World as opposed to this one.
'So the explanation for the huge popularity of these films is not
mechanization, their form; nor is it a misunderstanding. It is simply the fact that
the public recognises its own life in them.'!" Or rather life as it would wish to be.
Or alternatively, its disavowal of life on a more radical scale than previously
thought possible. In ending his essay 'Poverty and Experience' Benjamin
argument takes on a stark, cautionary tone:
We have become impoverished. We have given up one portion of the
human heritage after another, and have often left it in the pawnbroker's
for a hundredth of its true value, in exchange for the small change of "the
contemporary. " The economic crisis is at the door, and behind it is the
shadow of the approaching war. Holding onto things has become the
monopoly of a few powerful people, who, God knows, are no more
human than the many; for the most part, they are more barbaric, but not
in a good way.:"
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Here Benjamin accuses humanity of practicing a kind of 'bad' economics with its
value systems; of devaluing humanity's heritage whilst at the same time
maniacally inflating the value of the contemporary object world in all its hellish
novelty. Such economic folly is the privilege of the few, and yet comes to us at
the cost of many. It is the majority who moreover will have to cope with the
spiritual poverty of the society which ensues from such ill-conceived dealings:
'Everyone else has to adapt-beginning anew and with few resources. They rely on
the men who have adopted the cause of the absolutely new and have founded it
on insight and renounciation. In its buildings, pictures, and stories, mankind is
preparing to outlive culture, if need be.!"
Benjamin proposes that another type of newness altogether is required for
the majority of people, a newness which coincides with a kind of absolution of
culture such that what comes after is characterised by being both irreparable and
resilient. A tactical logic would emerge which says: 'When we have used up all
our lament, we can start to draw on our mirth.'!" A few years prior to this essay
Benjamin had cause to write of Karl Kraus, 'the great type of satirist never had
firmer ground under his feet than amid a generation about to board tanks and
put on gas masks, a mankind that has run out of tears but not laughter. In him
civilization prepares to survive, if it must.'!" Benjamin continues, 'And the
main thing is that it does so with a laugh. This laughter may occasionally sound
barbaric ...Let us hope that from time to time the individual will give a little
humanity to the masses, who will one day repay him with compound interest."?
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Benjamin would assert that such laughter is essential insofar as it reminds
mankind of the absurdity of its tragic predicament and thus its humanity in all its
foibles. Such a realisation should engender generosity amongst men as they
attempt to build out of the rumble of their own self-generated destruction as a
race. Thus the new barbarism requires mankind to be adaptable, to adopt the new
by throwing off the idea of sacrifice along with the idea of suffering, and to
embrace disposability as its model behaviour. No longer can mankind afford the
luxury of monuments, monuments are the money bags of cultural excesses
holding civilisation down, making it impossible to get economically,
sentimentally lean enough to make the crossover from the finitude of culture
into some other form of subsistence. Mankind must take its cue from Mickey
Mouse, adopt his infra-sense, of putting himself back together after his body has
so rudely been pulled apart, or abducted. Mankind needs to adopt Mickey Mouse's
sensibility in order to laugh in the face of a dissapating world as it is tearing at the
very fabric by which the foibles of humanity are clothed.
Even if his attitude seems pestimistic by 1931 Benjamin is still holding out
for affirmation of a sort, and it is on this point that it is helpful to return to one of
the earlier concerns of this section: critique. Benjamin, 'For the true critic, the
actual judgment is the ultimate step -something that comes as a struggle after
everything else, never the basis of activites. In the ideal case, he forgets to pass
judgment.'!" Perhaps there is no cause to judge Mickey Mouse as a symbol of the
direction in which culture appears to be going in, perhaps there is every cause to
observe him, to locate him within larger social schema and therein willfully to
forget to pass judgment in favour of an immanent critique. A critique that shows
up not coincidentally at a place when symbolism and atmosphere meet:' The
114 lbldI " p. 547
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"Lunaparks" as a prefiguration of the santoria?" in the section entitled 'To the
Planetarium' in One Way Street which will aid an ailing humanity back onto the
path of becoming the living - as opposed to the undead creatures inhabiting that
other world ironically part of an art called animation. Animation for Benjamin is
a still a cosmic dream and not merely a celluloid one.
Cosmically Bound.
In One-Way Street in a section entitled To the Planetarium' Benjamin
speaks of man's former absorption with the cosmos. This absorption ceased with
the adoption of an optical orientation toward the heavens at the dawn of the
modem age with the advent of astronomy as a modern science. This new
approach signalled a rupture between man and nature. It was only through
convening with the cosmos that man was able to gain perspective on the
universe to the extent that he was able to gain a certain knowledge of what was
nearest and remotest to him and never one without the other. This resulted in
an understanding that man occupies multiple realms of distanciation from the
things that populate his universe. Given this variability no man standing
individually could hope to reify an estimation of such distances. With that in
mind any reading of the heavens by mankind was pursued as a communal effort.
This activity was seen as an invaluable contribution to mankind collectively.
By contrast, modern man gravely chooses to confine the significance of the
universe to mere poetics or stargazing. This attitude results in an
underestimation of the cosmos time and again throughout the modern era,
threatening both nations and generations with calamitous outcomes when
mankind attempts to comingle with the cosmos under the assumption of its
115 Benjamin Walter, 'To the Planetarium' in One Way Street and Other Writings, Intra. Susan Sontag,
Trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (Verso: London, 1997), p. 104.
189
supremacy over the heavens. Benjamin gives the example of how World War I
signalled an attempt at new and unprecedented cominglings with the cosmic
powers that ended in nothing short of disaster:
Human multitudes, gases, electrical forces were hurled into the open
country, high frequency currents coursed through the landscape, new
constellations rose in the sky, aerial space and ocean depths thundered
with propellers and everywhere sacrificial shafts were dug deep into
Mother Earth. This immense wooing of the cosmos was enacted for the
first time on a planetary scale, that is, in the spirit of technology. But
because the lust for profit of the ruling class, sought satisfaction through it,
technology betrayed man and turned the bridal bed into a blood bath.'"
Here Benjamin is referring to WWI and the heretofore unimagined of
joinings the earth and technnological warfare. Though highly aestheticised in
their descriptions, these activities were at base highly destructive. Rather than
producting glorious offspring, these ill-conceived capitialistically inspired
mergers more often than not resulted in the ruin of the nature world and the
false edification of the economic one.
In Benjamin's configuration of man's conflict with nature, technology acts
as the arbiter of the relationship, keeping mastery over the balance of power
between the two. Should man attempt to gain a hold over nature, technology
would intervene so that the effect is that technology unleashes itself on the
cosmos to trigger off a retaliation against mankind below on earth. Benjamin
associates mankind's hubristic attitude toward nature with a kind of adolescent
mentally which has neglected to acknowledge the power of the cosmos. He
comments that man as a species completed their development thousands of years
ago; but mankind as a species is just beginning his.!" and goes onto suggest that
technology is placing its input into organising that development. Such is the case
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that a physis or new collective, physical humanity, is being developed through a
process described in corporeal imagery, as a dismemberment and
reconstitution.i'" This reorganisation of mankind will in turn reorganise its
relation to the cosmos away from the present forms of organisation: nations and
families. This transformation will take place at different speeds from those of
imperialism and world domination, as it is suggested by Benjamin's comment
that 'One need only recall the experience of velocities by virtue of which
mankind is now preparing to embark on incalculable journeys into the interior
of time to encounter there the rhythms from which the sick draw strength ... '119 In
the meantime, mankind must work off of concurrent timetables as a collective
social body. Beyond this Benjamin offers an insight into the current state of play:
'In the nights of annihilation of the last war the frame of mankind was shaken by
a feeling that resembled the bliss of an epileptic.?" The phrase suggests that a
sensory reorganisation of mankind is also required to accommodate the power of
nature in harmonious coexistence. Benjamin ends with this guidance for
mankind: 'Living substance conquers the frenzy of destruction only in the ecstasy
of procreation.'!" Therein for the life stuff of mankind to persist beyond self
destruction, it would have to make its way toward a productive procreation, one
whose result is nothing short of a new mode of embodiment on earth. The issue
for Benjamin is how to forge a material coexistence with technology, not as end
onto itself, but rather as a means with which to forge harmonious relations with
nature and by extension the cosmos.
This concern extends right the way through to Benjamin's
historiographical method, which rests on the principle of making experience
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historical. That is to say, synchronising experience with technology. A significant
part of that effort however, also has to do with mapping a number of
misalignments that have taken place through the ages. By making us aware of
these past imbalances in the relationships between technology and nature, in
other words the force and relations which mete out production, in all sections of
social functioning, Benjamin is encouraging us to correct those misalignments.
Benjamin warns, that if these misalignments remain unchecked we are left to
inhabit a world where everyone is ruled by commodities and dead labour and the
exertion of machine power over people. The result being a further alienation on
the level of human relations. Benjamin has a somewhat pessimistic view of
what choices mankind, at least initially will make, and therein, 'The body
annihilated, petrified, subject to attack, deformed by weaponry, the body as alien,
the skin of the self hardening, inorganic matter, a thing: such images litter
Benjamin's work.'!" His response to this nightmare vision is to take up counter
arms against this activity by becoming the Destructive Character, a figure on the
horizon who 'knows only one watchword: make room; only one activity:
clearing away.'!" Before this clearing can take place however the rubble of
mankind must be heaped again and again on itself. In Benjamin's view
humanity has gone AWOL in the twentieth century, subsisting as the pre-
organised techno-bodies of late capitalism, most akin to convalescents who await
their salvation in a postcultural world.
Heidegger, like Benjamin, expresses grave concern for the future of these
AWOL bodies, bodies whom for Heidegger have become increasingly 'uprooted
from the earth,'!" torn from it by the very hand of technology itself. Humanity
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does not seeem to be alarmed by this state of affairs, because of the apparent
rewards such a distancing from the earth has given it, as evidenced by the array of
creature comforts available to those living in the most technologically advanced
parts of the world. For Heidegger this is exactly the root of the problem:
'Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is
functioning and that the functioning drives us to even more functioning ...'J25
According to Heidegger, this ceaselessly functioning is actually dissumilating a
much largely malfunctioning in the spiritual bond held between mankind and
the earth. This situation has dangerous consequences for the future of mankind.
This danger is based very much on the fact that 'we still have no way to respond
to the essence of technology.':" Heidegger offers that: 'I was at any rate frightened
when I saw pictures coming from the moon to earth. We don't need any atom
bomb. The uprooting of man has already taken place. The only thing we have left
is purely technological relationships. This is no longer the earth on which man
lives.?" From this statement it would appear that for Heidegger the resulting
decline of mankind is a foregone conclusion. However, he raises the point that
the situation has gone beyond the realm of judgement and as long as it is the case
that 'Pessimism and optimistism are attitudes which we are trying to consider ....
they do not go far enough.t'<These attitudes expresss too instrumental a view of
technology. Rather Heidegger is at pains to express that, 'Above all, modern
technology is not a tool and has nothing to do with tools.'!" Rather it is a frame
around which our world is circumscribed, moreover we have found no way as of
yet to overcome that framework, to transcend it to reveal a greater understanding
on the part of mankind of his connection to the earth. Until this happens we
remain in a state of befalleness in the face of global technological domination.
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Heidegger, does have some hope that this can be achieved at some point in
history, provided that thinking is eventually honed adequately enough to this
task. He says, 'I do not see the situation of man in the world of global technology
as a fate which cannot be escaped or unraveled. On the contrary, I see the task of
thought to consist in helping man in general, within the limits allloted to
thought, to achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of technology.
National Socialism to be sure moved in that direction. But those people were far
too limited in there thinking to acquire an explicit relationship to what is
happening today ...13o That he assigns National Socialism credit for having moved
in the that direction, bespeaks of his belief that metaphysics and its consequential
inauguration of an era of nihilism in the nineteenth century, signalled an end to
philosophy's ability to help mankind. Rather, a purely a thinking of technology
was the only way forward out of mankind's predictament. But how to go about
forging this this line of thought? Heidegger contends that the first step may be
'the preparation of a readiness ...According to my view, this is connected with the
fact that what I name in the word Being, a word which is of longstanding,
traditional, multifaceted, and worn out, needs man for its revelation,
preservation and formation.'!" Therein mankind's first step in formulating a
response to technology would be to attempt to recover his lost relationship to
Being.
The first prepary task toward a readiness for that step, may be for humanity
to acknowledge that somewhere along the line of human transmutation their
AWOL bodies turned away from Being. 'This does not mean that Being and the
being now part ways; instead, they remain without relation.'!" According to
Giorgio Agamben, 'This is the direction in which the late Heidegger's thought
130 Ibid., p. 111.
131 Ibid., p. 107.
132 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Trans. by Daniel He"er-
Roazen, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 60.
194
seems to move, if still insufficently, with the idea of a final event or
appropriation (Ereignis) [the end of metaphysics] in which what is appropriated is
Being itself, that is, the principle that had until then determined beings in
different epochs and historical figures. This means that with the Ereignis, the
"history of Being comes to an end", and the relation between Being and being
consequently finds its "absolution."!" This is why Heidegger can write that with
Ereignis he is trying to think "Being without regard to the being," which amounts
to nothing less than attempting to think ontological difference no longer as a
relation, and Being and being beyond every form of a connection.":" This sort of
thinking on Heidegger's part 'implies nothing less than an attempt to think the
politico-social factum no longer in the form of a relation. This would signal the
coming of a community without interest.'!" Furthermore this community would
be inoperative insofar as its worth was not determined by the sum of its relations,
or collective activity, but rather by the unproductive characteristic of the being
together of being. A status of community where Being doesn't have the form of a
relation. Categories of identity, property, attribute, would no longer be the criteria
for a man belonging to a community of men. By mere virtue of its being it would
belong. Its only remaining issue, or interest would lie with Being itself. Such a
proposal for an ontology of non-relation on Heidegger's part however is far from
innocuous. Its allows facti cal life to become the paramount political object,
beyond all other forms of belonging, or relation. There are material consequences
to this privileging of facticallife to be found both in the racial biology of Nazi
Germany, but also in the ways in which we organise our concept of what registers
as the desireable characteristics of posthuman life. It is specifically when relations
breakdown without alternative cultural provisions being built up that
Benjamin's physis programme falters, along with the bodies meant to be
orchestrating it. What ensues is not exactly a silence on the whole question
'33 Ibid., p. 61.
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concerning humanity, but rather an infernal humming, gurling, cracking of
whole systems of what we understand to constitute the threshold between life
and death, inside and outside, value and use, bodily and state functions. Is it ever
going to be possible given present conditions, to relate to that breakdown or do
we simply go into a zone of operative inoperativity as Heidegger is suggesting
that we already have? To answer that question of non-relational relation we have
to chart the movements of today's postcultural survivors. To envisage the bodies
as they stand.
AWOL BODIES.
When war cries are allowed to proliferate unchecked in the homes of civilians
who dream of being dead warriors, or fallen victims to playstations, we are back
on the territory of Expressionism and are dangerously close to a mass consumer
slumber, or at least in the neighbourhood of mass technological addiction. Every
body post-fascism is potentially a dead body, or even a deadened body stimulated
only through attachment to technological prostheses, which as Benjamin
predicted are invisible and abundant. We may refer to those same prostheses as
tuning forks in a subliminal buzz of intense boredom around the category of life,
in an era that heralds itself as posthuman. Nonetheless, as long as there is a
category of the undead to be located in the unidentifiable and thereby
uninternable holocaust victim, then the rest of us who are technically survivors
are already dead to anything that might resemble the future. 'It is here that the
[Deleuzian] body without organs becomes a model of Death co-extensive with
Life. A moment when the functioning of the organs stops dead, as the intensities
approach a limit where intensity equals zero ... it is at this moment that a gradient
is crossed, a threshold surpassed or retreated from, a migration is brought
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about.'!" The body feels itself becoming something else.
For Martin Heidegger that threshold was technology and in retreat from its
disagreeable affects he migrated into another zone of Being, the zone of National
Socialism. What he resisted in technology was its potential capacity to be an issue
for itself, that technology when joined to the body's modes of perception in
particularly intimate ways would eventually become not only self-reflexive, but
empathic, and thus instrumental in influencing the activities of facticallife. In
response Heidegger wanted to retaliate, to surmount technology and it was here
that he came initally into league with National Socialism. He sought to make Ian
arrangement with a supertechnical power like National Socialism,'!" hoping that
the Nazi's heavy handed programmatics would put technology back in its place.
Ronell offers that, 'Later he would locate himself at a remove from the National
Socialism by linking the movement to technology.'!" In light of that fact,
Heidegger could only view the brutal demise of millions of bodies under the
Nazi regime as a failure to properly reckon itself with technology, its falling
victim to its sway merely constituting the symptoms of the last stage of
metaphysics, an era destined to culminate in modern, technological nihilism. In
this instance of going beyond metaphysics, that is to say to its end, it is man who
is being declared dead in the face of a mass technological power that has finally
proven to be indifferent to him.
Heidegger's infamous 'silence' on the issue of the Holocaust might be
telling us something after all insofar as it spells out a lack of hope for a change of
course in this final stage of systemical metaphysical breakdown. A position which
is indeed spelt out in detail in his lecture 'Overcoming Metaphysics' written
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over the decade spanning 1936-1946.A decade of thinking which coincides with
amongst other events, his lecture series on Nietzsche, otherwise understood by
Heidegger and his followers as his personal war against nihilism.
Overcoming Nihilism.
In the essay 'Overcoming Metaphysics' Heidegger speaks of 'a decline that
has already taken place.'!" 'This decline occurs through the collapse of the world
characterised by metaphysics and at the same through the desolation of the earth
stemming from metaphysics.'!" Heidegger speaks of the 'unhistorical element'
of this 'completed metaphysics' or 'metaphysics at its end,' who will take on the
'strigent 'appearance of what we are calling today technology.'!" This name for
Heidegger 'includes all areas of beings which equip the whole of beings:
objectived nature, the business of culture, manfactured politics, and of ideals
overlying everything.' This technology for Heidegger, 'does not signify the
separate areas of production and equipment of machines.'!" The name
'technology' is understood here in such a way that this meaning coincides with
the term completed metaphysics. The name technology is understood here in
such a way as to make it possible 'for the planetary factor of the completion of
metaphysics and its dominance to be thought without reference to
historiographically demonstratable changes in nations and continents.'!" Instead
it is suggested that these changes might have their reference point stored within
mankind itself.
The battle with nihilism is Heidegger's invisible war to come. His chief
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target for annihilation in this battle is 'the Being of nihilism'!" whose history is
essentially comprised 'of abandonment of Being in that it there occurs the self-
release of Being into machination. This release takes man into unconditional
service. It is by no means a decline and something 'negative' in any sense.
Indeed, for Heidegger this type of humanity has to be brought into Being in order
to achieve 'the unconditional completion of nihilism.'!" This Being is not just
any kind of humanity, it comes equipped with cries about ideas and values and
has moves which include 'the indiscriminate back and forth proclamation of
deeds and indispensibility of "spirit."?"
For Heidegger, 'The 'world wars' and their character of totality are already
a consequence of the abandonment of Being. They press toward a guarantee of the
stability of a constant form of using things up. Man, who no longer conceals his
character of being as the most important raw material, is also drawn into the
process. 'Man is the most important raw material because he remains the subject
of all consumption ... 1147 For Heidegger such phenomenon simply corresponds to
a global trend whereby 'everywhere there are enough beings and it is increasingly
everywhere and always not enough for the will to will escalating itself,
technology has to jump in, create a substitute and consume raw materials.'!" The
raw material being mankind. Therein the programmatic of genocide corresponds
then with a certain technocratic mandate to use up mankind, as part of an
escalating drive to power, following an increasingly diabolical line of
consumerism. This drive toward an endless consumerism, the ban between war
and peace must be lifted, so that this production line of bodies who have turned
away from Being's call to presence, never have cause to be off line in accepting
144 Ibid., p. 83.
145 Ibid., p. 83.
146 Ibid, p. 83.
147 Ibid., p. 83.
148 Ibid., p. 83.
199
the call to annihilation. Heidegger:
The world wars are an antecedent form of the removal of the difference
between "war" and "peace.t'.i.the question of when there will be peace
cannot be answered ... because the question already asks about something
which no longer exists, since war is no longer anything which can
terminate in peace. War has become a distortion of the consumption of
beings which continued in peace ... The long war in its length slowly
eventuated ... in a condition in which warlike characteristics are longer
experienced as such at all and peaceful characteristics have become
meaningless and without content.!"
There is much controversy about Heidegger's decision never to revoke his
Nazi Party membership, but given Heidegger's comments above it seems obvious
that for him the war never ended. Indeed, the World Wars inauguarated nothing
short of an epoch of total war. A war about the manufacture of manfacture, the
will to will, the disposal of mankind by his own hand, through a relentless
nihilism.
In 1949he addresses genocide by way of focusing on it as one in a series of
effects brought on by the age of consumption: 'Agriculture is now a motorized
food industry-in essence the same as the manufacture of corpses in the gas
chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of
nations, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs. 'ISO Heidegger expresses
no particular sympathy for the victims of the Holocaust, instead he pointedly
registers them as part of a series of routinised causalities that mount up in an
epoch of total war held under the sway of technology. The idea that there is no
phenomenological difference between the manufacture of corpses and the
manufacture of hydrogen bombs suggested that the Jews were technically
processed in the concentration camps. Indeed, each of the categories mentioned
are parlayed into use value during a wartime without end. In such an era
149 Ibid., p. 84.
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everything is available for processing. The fact that the motorised food industry is
mentioned amongst these other categories of wartime manufacturing, suggests
that there is a thin line between that method of processing consumption and
other forms of manufacture whose ultimate goal is to annihilate lives of certain
beings that have been put under target and deemed dispensible.
In 'Overcoming Metaphysics' a more complicated picture of his position
toward genocide emerges when Heidegger comments: 'Man is the most
important raw material, one can reckon with the fact that someday factories will
be built for the artifical breeding of human material based on present day
chemical research. The research of the chemist Kuhn, who was awarded the
Goethe prize of the city of Frankfurt, already opens up the possibility of directing
the breeding of male and female organisms according to plan and need.'!" This
sort of directive accomplishes a furthering of the eugentic project, whilst a certain
segment formerly promoted the genocide of a portion of humanity, another
subsequent segment concerns itself with the breeding of a superiorly designed
humanity to fit the needs of consumption. One should not assume that this is
merely about building a master race of men and women as it was conceived of
under Nazi auspices, but rather portends an even larger scale effort to breed
mankind into classes of standing-reserve for future use in the ongoing war
humanity is waging on itself in league with technological nihilism.
Meanwhile for Heidegger continued to steadily predict that
The consumption of materials including the raw material man, for... the
production of everything is determined ...by the complete emptiness in
which beings ... are suspended. This emptiness has to be filled up. But since
the emptiness can never be filled up ...especially when this emptiness can
never be experienced as such, the only way to escape is to incessantly
arrange beings in the constant possibility of being ordered as a form of
guaranteeing aimless activity. Viewed in this way technology is the
151 Heidegger, Martin, 'Overcoming Metaphysics in Wolin, Richard, ed. 'The Heidegger Controversy,
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organisation of a lack, since it is related to the emptiness of Being contrary
to its knowing.l"
This kind of thinking creates a vacuum in its wake for the fate of a
humanity, whose fate under the sway of technology always seems to end in a
paucity of existence, with all the attendant idleness of lambs awaiting the
slaughter. Beyond that it is the case that man is simply unaware of the dangers
that surround him in this vacuum, and that in his ignorance he is incapable of
taking responsibility for the decline of society. In 'Overcoming
Metaphysics, 'Heidegger classifies 'the devastating events of world history in this
century as failure on the part of Western metaphysics, and therein in no way the
responsibility of any people, and most definitely not to burden of the German
people alone.'!" Heidegger would indeed argue that if anything should be
mourned it is the way technology was lead astray by the deviations inherent
within the path of metaphysics in this century. One of the deviations, however in
this line of argument was that Heidegger himself was a practicing metaphysican.
And as Ronell points out 'it is precisely owing to his theory of technology that he
was engaged in the Nazi Party Line.'!" This line of course proved to be one of the
most destructive lines of flight ever conceived. Mournfully, it is precisely when
Heidegger gets on the metaphysical frontline of the Party that the real terror
ensues. Dating as far back as 1927Heidegger willfully underread technology, and
therein Ronell manages to lift its indictment as well as his own as something, or
someone who 'can be identified with the self-constitution of National
Socialism.'!" His famous defense of course is that he was accused by the party of
practicing a 'private national socialism' which for me amounts in real terms to
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practicing a 'private form of ontological terror.'!" Heidegger's private war of
course wages another war on another front in the pages of Being and Time, in the
name of something other than nihilism, though not unrelated to it, the
devaluation of language, what Heidegger refers to specifically as rumour 'Idle
Talk.'157
156 Ronell, Avital. The Telephone Book, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p.
157 Ronell, Avital. Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. 217-218.
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Idle Talk.
According to Avital Ronell 'War traces back etymologically to 'confusion.'"
Heidegger writes in Being and Time of Nachrede the temporal afterlife or afterwards
that marks rumour in the German language.' The route of rumour or passing the
word along creates a condition in which things are so because one says so. Rumour is
constituted in a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand becomes
aggravated to complete groundlessness. Furthermore, 'rumour is the possibility of
understanding everything without making the previous thing one's own." Ronell
argues further that:
With Heidegger ...rumour ...cannot be assimilated. But it does not stand in a
relationship of strict exteriority to those systems of utterance from which it has
been bounced. Having its place neither inside or outside such a language,
whose measure of authenticity would be privileged proximity to Being,
rumour, however, places in question the Heideggerian difference between
authentic and inauthentic Sprache, a language whose greatest fear would be to
fall, into the abyss of Gerede. Rumour, by its very nature, Heidegger argues is a
closing off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something
it leaves undone:'
Benjamin's 'Theories of German Fascism' subtitled 'On the Collection of Essays
War and Warriors by Ernst Junger 'attempts to trespass on that closed off area. As an
area of contention about the authenticity of the first world war; rumour had in recent
years ceased to strictly fall under state jurisdiction, and received transfer instead into
the auspices of literature and literary criticism. Benjamin lays the blame for its
devaluation in the hands of these new minders and asserts somewhat
contemptuously that 'It was the failure of the powers of the state in the face of war that
instigated the first independent thinking of the authors gathered here." Not
coincidentally these authors also happen in most cases to be instigators of the
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Nachkrieg? the German unofficial postwar war that took place in the interim period
between the first world war and the second. To Heidegger's mind this independent
postwar thinking which organised itself under the banner of Nachkrieg was nothing
short of a revolution in thinking. Here it had much in common with rumour at least
insofar as it was mean to share with a characteristic daring. Heidegger asserted that
'rumour is essentially related to the most daring thinking." 'Or rather, a daring
writing enjoys a relationship of enslavement to something like rumour, utterance's
murky rumbling ... More clearly, then, writing that is open is fundamentally open to
rumour." 'Whoever dares to say such things, and what is more, and writing which is
open to the public, knows only too well how prematurely and easily these words,
which only like to induce some reflection are only shut off as murky rumblings,
rumours or are rejected as arbitrary anouncements." While still under the shadow of
negativity, rumour nonetheless the acts as an enabler, the ground and horizon for the
founding of Ia more original and more careful thinking.':"
To Benjamin's mind such thinking on the part of the writer's included in
Junger's collection of essays could not be more banal, or more clumsy in their
announcements: 'Falser notes could not be sounded; more inept thoughts could not be
written; more tactless words could not be uttered.'!' Benjamin specifically criticises
their excessive description of the battle state, 'Only a suitor who embraces his beloved
awkwardly is so loquacious. And indeed these suitors are awkward in their embrace of
thought.'" He accuses them further of complying with 'the desires of the bourgeoisie,
which longed for the decline of the West, the way a school boy longs for an inkblot in
place of his wrong answer. They spread decline, preached decline, wherever they
went.m An insight into the fundamental disagreement of Heidegger and Benjamin
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over the War and Warrior essays might be found in the distinction Benjamin draws
between rumour and gossip wherein rumour belongs to the ec-static while gossip has
something to do with assuring a community's stasis. Benjamin: 'gossip comes about
because people do not wish to be misunderstood.1l4 Benjamin would rather confront a
community mired in stasis, rather than entertain a radically anterior thinking based
on dangerous stupidities and hasty futural miscalculations.
The campaign Nachkrieg waged involves a type of linguistic behaviour that has
always been associated with warfare, 'since at least the time when Homer sent
Rumour, Zeus's messenger speeding through the battlefield.:" As usual, rumour has
advanced on its proper place of disclosure, in the advance guard of any
pronouncement one would presume to make about it. The other field of inquiry then,
[concerning Nachkrieg] will be the restless advancement of rumour. This raises the
question of what Neil Hertz has called 'epistemological anxiety': can you believe your
earsr'"
Once a rumour has been circulated it persists, exceeds even the line of finitude,
becomes open to an endless passing along. In this way it speaks the language of
technology in its ability to be relentlessly appended, made democratic in its populism,
and ultimately become user friendly. A rumour will never die off once activated.
Rumour acts as the spook; the undead castoff of language. In that way it shares
something with technology itself as it 'remains unmournable, that is to say, undead."?
There is of course something unnatural, even inorganic at the base of these
desires and that is the possibility of the 'worst' coming forth. The same 'worst' that
Heidegger in the 1940s would rather indict at all costs, that to slay the dragon of his
dependency on the figure of technology - a figure he gives [est gibt] responsibility to
herald the hubristic judgements modem man has already made against himself.
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Benjamin, in line with Kraus, gives that responsibility over to history. Heidegger's
reliance on technology to perform that task only brings us closer to his reading of Ernst
Junger. A reading that later enables him to propose lining up the 'History of Being,'
with the attendant features of authenticity and biography, into a framework that could
potentially be the basis for historical understanding, as well as a means with which
'enframe' the phenomena of technology." Benjamin will categorise such a
programmatics of history - that is in no way a unique development since the French
Revolution - as a history of the victors, where victory is largely determined through a
volatile contest of technological superiority, both strategic and material. Ronell asserts
that Nazism is the 'worst' moment in the history of technology. She asserts however,
that the term 'worst' is not meant as an indication of closure. On the contrary for
Ronell it seems that technology might not have an off switch, but 'only a modality of
being on.:" Heidegger's ontology functions off a similarly self-perpetuating operating
system, a system modelled not incidentally off the back of Junger's ready concept of
'Total Mobilisation' gleaned from none other than the War and Warriors collection.
Totalitarian Mobilisation.
By the early 1930s Heidegger was openly making alliances away from the
phenomenological camp, publicly calling attention to the fact that he now conceived
the historical situation in terms of Ernst Jungers works: the essay 'Total Mobilisation'
from the 1930 volume War and Warrior and the 1932 book The Worker based upon
it." These of course are the same texts that form the impetus for Benjamin's critique of
fascism in the essay 'Theories of German Fascism.'
Heidegger was know to have discussed these works in a small circle with his
assistant Werner Brock and tried to grasp the idea that from now on within the
context of planetary history everything stands in the light of the universal rule of the
18 Wolin, Richard, ed. 'Introduction, 'The Heidegger Controversy, (London: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 15.
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will to power 'whether its called communism, fascism or world democracy.": The
notion of a planetary history, and universal rule, are tropes that in the intervening
years will stand out at the forefront of Nazi propaganda campaigns. This totalising
rhetorical impulse has some of its earliest beginnings in Junger's style of
argumentation, which at least rhetorically presses all of life into the service of the war.
Following societal trends coming out of the First War, Junger asserts that all forms of
production including commerce, foodstuffs and armament are geared toward the
expectation of a coming war. Indeed, this assertion will come into being for all
industrialised nations in the post World War I period with the advent of the military-
industrial complex. It follows on from there, that what Junger saw as the significant
change in warfare with the arrival of World War I, was a shift in class distribution
amongst its participants, no longer was war the purview of the middle and upper class,
but rather it had become the duty of the working class.
Junger first came to prominence during the 1920s as foremost chronicler of the
front experience of World War I. His well-nigh lyrical descriptions of trench warfare
and the great battles of the materiel that is, of those aspects that made this war unique
in human history in works such as 'In the Storm of Steel' (1920) and 'War as an Inner
Experience' (1922) earned him a reputation as an 'aesthetician of carnage."?
World War I was unique in human history because it was the first war that
strategically relied on the amassing of technological capabilities, over the capabilities of
the soldier at the front. For Junger this meant that soldiers were then allowed free
reign to confront within themselves the primordial impulses of annihilation, death
and terror that ran through them on the battlefield. Junger attempted again and again
in his articles of the late 1920s, (published in leading organs of Germany's conservative
revolutionary movement) to arouse these impulses in his readership, many of whom
were soldiers at the front. It is this movement which first understood that if Germany
2, Ibid., p. 211.
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were to win the next war she would have to amass a technological arsenal. Indeed, the
whole society would have to be transformed to meet the demands of the new
industrial era. What would eventually take place in Weimar Germany happened
when it reached the point where the degree of technological concentration outstripped
the cause for bourgeois liberalism. No sector of society was allowed to remain
unintegrated in the call for a total mobilisation of the nation toward the will of
technology. Wolin asserts 'that for Heidegger National Socialism in the early 1930s was
the legitimate embodiment of the society of workers that had been prophesied by
Junger ... f23 Indeed, it was through his series of conversations with Brock, that
Heidegger was eventually able to draw parallels between Nietzsche's metaphysics and
[unger's concept of history, and the contemporary situation in western Europe.
In the 1945 essay The Rectorship 1933-34:Facts and Thoughts,' Heidegger
would note that it was through Junger's writings, and 'even more essentially on the
basis of their foundations,' in Nietzsche's metaphysics, that he and Brock were able to
'reflect on what was to come ... ,24 'Again an air of prophesy permeates these
reflections.?' A year prior to that in the essay, An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935)
he would remark in a manner consistent with his readings of the doctrines of
Nietzsche and Junger; that there would soon be the resurgence of a new historical
ethos, 'a will to power,' that would place Germany in the forefront of the movement
directed to the self-overcoming of bourgeois nihilism. In 1936Heidegger was to launch
a programmatic for his own 'private form of National Socialism' in the guise of a
critique of Nietzsche's metaphysics in a series of lectures on the subject of 'nihilism.?"
Therein for Heidegger the insights of Nietzsche and Junger are to some degree
nascent forms of a what an alternative National Socialist philosophy, if not
programma tics, would look like. Indeed, Junger begins his essay 'Total Mobilisation'
with the task of identifying 'the special nature of this great catastrophe,' World War I,
23 Ibid., p. 121.
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'by the assertion that in it, the genius of war was penetrated by the spirit of progress.
He refers to this progress as the Nineteenth century's most popular church' moreover,
'the only one enjoying real authority and uncritical faith'" into the Twentieth. Under
the sign of progress, total mobilisation comes to dictate warfare as the responsibility of
anyone who can bear arms. Under an economic system of total mobilisation, there
exists' a stretching of all possible credit, so that even a taxation of the last pfenning
saved, is necessary to keep the [war] machine in motion.?"
In the same way, the image of war as armed combat merges into the more
extended image of a gigantic labour process. In addition to the armies that met
on the battlefields, originate the modern armies of commerce and transport,
foodstuffs, the manufacture of armaments the army of labour in general. In
the final phase ...there is no longer any movement whatsoever be it that of the
homeworker at her sewing machine without at least indirect use for the
battlefield ...H makes the World War an historical event superior in
significance to the French Revolution."
Benjamin also chooses to commence his essay Critique of Violence with an
historical assessment 'the terrorism in the French Revolution."? Benjamin credits this
ideology with instilling the notion within the citizen 'that violence may be used
means to just ends.?' It is just this sort of generalised belief that enables the systemics
of total mobilisation to emerge. The rhetorical conflation of the citizen and the
worker, also dates back to the French Revolution and not coincidentally marks out the
territory of another conflation to come - in World War I, there is no significant
rhetorical distinction between the worker and the soldier. This distinction allows for
an unmarked erasure of gender to take place along the way to all industrialised
peoples becoming ideologically machinic bodies. Women in particular are for the first
time being drawn indirectly onto the frontlines of war and in another way, being
drawn directly onto the frontlines of another battle altogether, the one for economic
superiority and market world domination. Again America will master this lesson
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more efficiently than German, or Italy at the time by not forcing such a transformation
in the appearance of women, nor veil such transformations in the guise of a return to
volk traditions. After World War I American women were fully aware and prepared
to accept their consumer duty toward active mobilisation in step with the trend toward
modernisation: a defence of both home and country.
Indeed, in the eyes of many German women the rise of National Socialism was
linked with a rise in independence for women and exhibited with its doctrines
something that for them resembled a nascent feminism. This idea would later take on
an odd resonance with cold war rhetoric in America 'within the kind of displacement
that has been suggested for the sixties oppositional rhetoric of making war or making
love.':" This implied that most women were as easily prepared to make war, as they
were love, and moreover that the act of making war was somehow meant to signify
something as equally liberatory, and perhaps even revolutionary.
Liberation is not of course a desired feature of a totalitarian programmatics, as
Heidegger is quick to assert. An individual's intellectual freedom in particular under
these mounting regimes was 'false because it was only negating. It meant
predominantly a lack of concern, arbitrariness in ones intentions and inclinations, a
lack of restraint in anything that one does.?' Junger, as well criticises this notion of an
individual's intellectual freedom, asserting that such a privilege has always been
questionable. 'Such an assault takes place in Russia and Italy and then here in
Germany; its aim is to deny the existence of anything that is not a function of the
state.?' Moreover, it aims to deny the existence of anyone that is not a function of the
state, within its bounds of authenticity (i.e., faulty Daseins, Jews, Gypsies,
homosexuals). Junger predicts the crackdown that will take place against these groups
when totalitarianism stakes its claim to society: 'We can predict a time when all
32 Aonell, Avital, Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 212.
33 Heidegger, Martin, 'The Self Assertion of the German University,' The Heidegger Controversy, Ed. Richard
Wolin, (London: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 34.
34 Junger, Ernest, 'Total Mobilization,' The Heidegger Controversy, Ed. Richard Wolin, (London: The MIT
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countries with global aspirations will have to take up the process, in order to sustain
the release of new forms of power.t"
These new forms of power centre around functions which promote a policy of total
mobilisation, what Paul Virilio presently cites as the function of deterrence." Often
these new forms of power distribute themselves amongst nodes of popular culture.
Junger cites 'the model America has offered-already in peacetime for co-operation
between industry and the army'" as one of the first to maintain a social policy of total
mobilisation outside of wartime. This policy is achieved and maintained moreover,
not through overt militaristic propaganda, but rather through 'German war literature'
which 'raised the issues touching on the very essence of armament, forcing the general
public to make judgements about matters of war (if somewhat belatedly and rarely
anticipating the futurel.?' Similarly today the military industrial network is upheld by
communications technologies that encourage the public to simulate war games in
their very own private theatre of war, the living room or bedroom. Every member of
the family is the readied and open for attack. Junger predicted this outcome of total
mobilisation as well: 'Still not only attack but defence demands extraordinary efforts,
and here the world's compulsions perhaps become even clearer. Just as every life bears
the seeds of its own death, so the emergence of the great masses contains within itself a
democracy of death. The era of the well-aimed shot is behind us. Giving out the night-
flight bombing order, the squadron leader no longer sees the difference between
combatants and civilians, and the deadly gas hovers like an elementary power over
everything that lives. But the possibility of such a menace is based neither on partial or
general, but rather total mobilisation. It extends to the child in the cradle, who is
threatened like everyone else-even more SO.'39
What Junger is suggesting is that in the space between the two World Wars a whole
3~ Ibid., p. 127.
36 Virilio, Paul, Pure War Revised Edition, (New York: Semiotexte, Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 14.
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generation was primed for combat. Girls and boys were artificially nurtured on the
promise of a war to come, one in which they could surmount the secure banality of
the bourgeoisie in favour of the summons to a more primeval call to Being in being-
towards death: 'The volunteer sensed it in his exultation, the German demons voice
burst forth mightily, the exhaustion of the old values being united with an
unconscious longing for a new life. Who would have imagined that these sons of a
materialistic generation could have greeted death with such ardourz'" What promise
does such ardour hold within it? The promise no less of a new race: 'The agitation
around us which is the mark of a new race: one that cannot be satisfied by any of the
words, ideas, or images of the past. A fruitful anarchy reigns here, which is born from
the elements of fire and earth, and which hides within itself the seeds of a new form of
domination. The war is the means of the Germans self-own realisation. And for this
reason, the new form of armament, in which we have already for some time now
been implicated, must be a mobilisation of the German nothing else.'41This
mobilisation pointedly does not touch upon death, but rather asserts a strange mixture
of corporeal regeneration and redesignation. What must be mobilised to achieve this
outcome in not the raising an army, but rather the raising a superior type of citizen, an
uberman - a man of singular destructive purpose in society - the German. The
question then becomes how will he be summoned? The question as well as the answer
from here on in will be fought and refought for the next decade onward largely on
rhetorical grounds. Amongst other things, what is truly innovative about World War
I, in the history of war-making, is the sophistication of its rhetorical arsenal. Its is
against this very arsenal that Benjamin deployed his counter-initiative on fascism.
Combating Bodies.
Deleuze and Guattari caution that 'It is essential not to confuse these planes of
immanence with the concepts that occupy it. Although the same elements may
appear twice over, on the plane and in the concept, it will not be in the same guise,
4D Ibid., p. 128.
41 Ibid.,p. 139.
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even when they are expressed in the same verbs and words.:" Having said that, once
established concepts like fascism which have developed in 'a zone of neighbourhood'?
with National Socialism and take on an immanent life of their own. Various
components of this concept therein are prone to re-emergence time and again at
different points in history. This means that even after the National Socialist State had
been destroyed, the microfascisms persisted that gave it an unequalled ability to act
upon the masses. These microfascisms persist today affecting a body that is increasingly
referred to as posthuman. This is a body that necessarily operates in a social war zone
that is both unlimited and continuous.:" one that also always shares some of the
neighbourhood where fascism, under the guise of National Socialism, had previously
claimed its turf.
Mankind necessarily constitutes a greater portion of these zones, Esther Leslie
maintains that it is particularly the proletariat for whom Benjamin assigns the task of
conspiring with technology toward the make up of 'an organic-technological techno-
body.'" Herein 'technology and humanity would scheme together to form a collective
social body.'46·'Themass revolts that follow a world war, are for Benjamin, the first
failed attempts by the developing collective historical subject, the proletarian mass, to
bring its new-born techno-body under control'? and in doing so successfully throw off
the cult of bourgeois subjectivism; The body that Benjamin predicted would emerge
from that struggle would be a collective body; one that would operate as a massive
assemblage of functions geared towards utilising technology as means with which to
harmonise the operations of man with nature. According to Leslie, Benjamin
imagines 'an intepenetrative collective body and Tecnnik ... therein tools and
instruments are not external to people, but organs of communal life in the
collectivity...This collectivised body is then proposed as a site of a bodily collective
47 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, What is Philosophy? ,Trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson,
(London: The Athlone Press, 1994), p. 39.
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enervation, which acts as a charge for revolutionary activity.'?" This uncritical reliance
on the proletariat as the only class capable of becoming revolutionary is a weakness
both in Benjamin's argument and of Leslie's analysis of it, such a determination falls
in line with the 'vulgar' Marxism of the interwar period. That this attitude is being
resuscitated now by 'leftist' intellectual figures such as Leslie suggests that this concept
has sprung up again in another more contemporary neighbourhood of thought one
whose adherents gather around to mourn the passing of materialism in the age of
'virtual reality' and it supposed ushering in of the posthuman condition. This group
also clamours for a return to a representational body politic, not realising that
representation itself issues the founding violence of a Cartesian epistemological
model. To be represented, is to be presented in terms of a mastery based on what is
already assumptively 'known' about a thing. The cause waged in the name of
materiality strives to situate and ossify those knowledges, and therein exists as an
overdetermination of what can known and quantified about a subjective being.
The body then enters into an economy where its life force can be harnessed and
economised as a living wealth that can in turn be capitalised upon. The only way to
slip the net of such quantifications of life force is to transmute the category of life into
something else - into a dysful1ctionality. 'This word should not be made to coincide
with nonfunctionaliiu; but instead with' a nervous 'breakdown' within' the implicit
normativity of a healthy, functioning human being,' may be viewed as an after effect
of 'Dasein's technological tum.' The posthuman body can then be understood as 'a
complicated engine' which wilfully 'short circuits its own performance,' engaging
itself constantly in a 'three pronged metamorphosis' which borrows rites from
'organicity,' 'machinal structures' and finally as Heidegger suggested at the end of the
Der Spiegel from' cybernetics.?" 'The electrical charges which result have
simultaneous currency inside the body' and with network 'tools' that operate outside
of it. The body here becomes 'a manifesto against literature,' and prefer instead to
48 Ibid., p. 23.
49 Heidegger, Martin, 'Only a God Can Save Us,' The Heidegger Controversy, Ed. Richard Wolin, (London:
The MIT Press, 1993), p. 108.
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receive input in easily collapsible code."
According to that same historical imaginary - which comes to us as fallout from
the posthuman condition - the dehumanised subject wants to be dead, much more
than the already dead want to be alive. The undead then is a composite not only of the
profile of the holocaust survivor, but of everyone of us who is deadened to the
persistence of micro-fascisms, dotting the landscape of a passively assumed era of post-
fascism. The condition of never reaching sobriety on that fact means that we continue
to be held back under the sway of further regimes of technology.
Proto-Techiks.
In 'Theories of German Fascism' Benjamin classifies the inorganic joining of
automobiles and warfare in Leon Daudet's comments' a surprising association of
ideas.:" This remark is not made of out an ignorance on the part of Benjamin,
concerning the function of the war machine, but rather functions as a feint, so that
Benjamin can maintain the advantage of stealth in laying down his explosive analysis.
This element of surprise will be crucial to the formulation of Benjamin's judgements
against technology; technology as a type of political strategy that promotes the
characterisation of consumer function as only incidentally destructive. Benjamin's
asserts that this idea of warring consumer drives is 'based on a perception of an
increase in technical artefacts, in power sources, and in tempo generally that the
private sector can neither absorb nor use adequately but that nonetheless demand
vindication.:" What Benjamin suggests here is that the consumer is being sped up
both in his lifestyle and his demands in order to absorb the overflow of saturated
marketplaces. When this is not possible the consumer wishes to find redress for this
mania of need. During their quest for vindication, for essentially what amounts to a
;Q Ronell, Avital, Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), Comments based on p.
343, footnote 11.
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rising consumer bum out, the civilian population turns its gaze to technology and
decides to destroy its objects. War. War however cannot take on the lost subtly, the key
element of conflict being a lack of vindication, which eventually the population
wishes to satisfy off the stores of energy housed in the old conflict between technology
and bodies. Benjamin: 'But vindication can only occur in antithesis to harmonious
balance, in war, and the destructive power of war provides clear evidence that social
reality was not ready to make technology its own organ, and that technology was not
strong enough to master the elemental forces of society.:" The struggle that Benjamin
lays out before us signals that a compromise was somehow forced when prosthetics
came into battle in this long-standing war. Some crucial prosthetic devices that entered
into Nazi Germany's rhetorical war machine seem to have been originally introduced
by foreign markets, namely America.
Benjamin shifts the ground of our argument slightly, when he moves on from
economic calculations of war to moral ones: 'Without approaching the surface of the
significance of economic causes of war, one may say the harshest, most disastrous
aspects of imperialist war are in part the result of the gaping discrepancy between the
gigantic power of technology and the miniscule moral illumination it affords.'?' One
can then ascertain that the future of this concept has its place in the logic of cultural
and economic imperialism, wherein moral illumination constantly yields to the
gigantic power of market interest. The greatest consumers of cultural and economic
imperialism are of course the bourgeoisie which 'immorally,' remain blind to that fact.
Benjamin explains their motivation to do so using the following logic: 'Indeed,
according to its economic nature, bourgeois society cannot help but insulate
everything technological as much as possible from the so-called spiritual, and cannot
help but resolutely exclude technology's right of co-determination in the social order./""
Here Benjamin appears to be exposing a crucial consequence of these international
markets, the unacknowledged co-determination of the social order through a merger
53 Ibid., p. 312.
"Ibid., p. 312.
55 Ibid., p. 312.
217
of the gigantic power of technology with the bourgeois market. This merger results in
the internalisation of a techno body-politic which necessarily operates outside the
zone of morality.
There is a flaw in Benjamin's Marxist logic here. Its comes from the fact that it
relies solely on moral calculations, treating their components as stable forces that
could readily be summed up into transcendent values. The forces that Benjamin is
attempting to juggle are anything but stable. To begin with technology is not a gigantic
power standing against the common man. Its formidable existence emerges as a
feature of imperialist war, not as its root cause. Spinoza suggests that 'we know
nothing about a body until we know what it can do.,56In other words, if we think of
technology itself 'as a body, what its affects are, with the affects of another body,' man,
the options left to it are either 'to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful
body.:" This is the real dilemma of co-determination for those individuals faced with
the body of National Socialism with all of its attendant forces and variations, in the
zones of economy and morality to name but two. Deleuze cautions 'It would be wrong
to think that these [forces and variations] logically entail one another like
propositions, rather they resonate or reverberate, and form a thick fog around the
plane of immanence from. which the attributes of such zones emerge.?' These
developments come out of the plane of immanence, which tends to engender
hallucinations, erroneous perceptions, bad feelings. Spinoza listed four great errors,
but for Deleuze the list is infinite. For him 'the illusion of transcendence perhaps
comes before all others, followed then by the illusion of universals when concepts are
confused with plane of immanence itself.'59Even the most vigilant thinker can fall
victim to his own self-deceptions, mystifications and reactive thinking along the way
towards overcoming these illusions which are plotted everywhere in the modern grid
',6 Deleuze, Gilles, Spinoza and Expressionism, (London: Zone Books, 1991), p. 256.
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system of Cartesian metaphysics.
It is easy to see how Benjamin might get sidetracked at this juncture by dialling
in a Marxist moral code in order to locate his anti-coordinates against a potentially
fascist social order. The call that must come in however, to interrupt this line of
thought, is to slow down. To observe technology rather than to judge it, to calculate its
affect on bodies, rather that to put out the call for their exposure. Deleuze asserts that
to adopt a Spinozist code of ethics means that 'one does not allow for a system of
moral judgement to persist.?" To begin one must endeavour 'to supplant the
opposition of values and in doing so introduce the concept of qualitative difference in
modes of existence'?' into one's analysis. Ethics therein emerges as 'a topology of
immanent modes of existence'? one that might effectively bring Benjamin closer onto
the assembled turf of fascism. Dialling beyond the calling zone of Marxism would
mean for Benjamin effectively 'breaking up the field of moral stasis one is
overpopulated with transcendent values.?" What would remain in its place is 'the
plane of immanence where everything is a composition of fast and slow speeds, of
capacities, of affecting and being affected.?'
Technology runs at a slower pace when observed under these ethical conditions.
Is the thing that must be preserved from within the consumer's fold of being. I say fold
pointedly, because there is a fold in the place where the body merges with technology,
and the cut of subjectivity disappears. Along this fold spirituality haunts the subject, to
remind him of a time when his only world attachments were that of god and man.
However, when one has technology as his master, one finds determination not to be
the work of divine right, but rather of rapid and routine joinings with a trajectory,
technically determined both in and outside the body. As a consequence anything
resembling a social order, goes not the way of dependency-not onto one's social other,
60 Ibid., p. 125.
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but onto one's mechanical others. It is no wonder that the civilian population can find
no means with which to make technology its organ, technologies such as love, career,
family, and school have long stood outside the discreet body, and yet still managed to
powerfully function. Technology is not about steel; it is about flesh, mechanisms of
technology, which even when ostensibly outside the body are flesh in their co-
determination of the individual in any state. For Junger the realisation of that type of
individual took place through feeding the energy of life onto the more powerfully
energised circuit of technology; specifically in its military function. Indeed that was
the task of total mobilisation: 'an act which, as if through a single grasp of the control
panel, 'conveys the extensively branched and densely veined power supply of modern
life towards the greater current of martial energy.:"
This trend in the direction of human energy is what leads Benjamin to echo
Nietzsche's somewhat bombastic statement from the 'Genealogy of Morals'" that 'Each
coming war will also be a slave revolt to technology."? How might this conflict arise
one might ask and on what battlefield would it emerge? Benjamin sets this conflict
within the class politics of the early 20th century. The overriding political factor of the
structures is ownership, relations of production, this promotes a subversion of the
natural elective alliance between the proletariat and technology, to which technology
responds by revolting. When the proletariat under the high command of capitalism,
seekings to turn technology against nature, technology responses by diabolically
waging war on the cosmos. The proletariat is sacrificed as part of the build up of
technology's self-organising war machine, left powerless in the destructive siege of the
earth wrought in the name of technological progress. 'To begin such a revolt would
surely indicate that a time had been reached when combat had replaced judgement.
And no doubt that combat would appear as a combat against judgement, against its
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authorities and personae.?" Deleuze would offer however, that conflict is located more
profoundly elsewhere, namely between the combatant and his own parts. How do we
interpret this statement if we understand his parts as ones that are always already in an
assemblage with various technologies, both ephemeral and material? This field of
battle then emerges within the bounds of this technological network, 'this conflict
would apply to the forces within that either subjugate or are subjugated, between
powers that express these relations of force:" in dealing with technology. Judgement is
itself a technology of the state used to order violence, effectively acting to make
periodic revolts null and void. Judgement need not only be a state owned and
operated technology, often its is an interpersonal dynamic that endeavours to do the
state's will on a microlevel, effectively spreading its gestures amongst bodies.
Deleuze uses the example of Kafka's work, which he asserts could be entitled
'Description of a Combat: the combat against the castle, against the father, against the
financees.?" Conflicts such as these seem to operate simply on a micropolitical scale,
but in fact they yield macropolitical consequence insofar as these conflicts can be
transposed to indicate that
All gestures are defences, or even attacks, evasions, ripostes, anticipations of
a blow one does not always see coming or of an enemy one is not always able
to identify: hence the importance of the body's' postures. But these external
combats, these combats against, find their justification in the combats
between that determine the composition of forces in the combatant. The
combat against the Other must be distinguished from the combat between
Oneself."
Therein an appreciation of gesture, for Deleuze has strategic implication for the
process of territorialisation. These gestural zones are the turf of the coming battle with
technology - a battle waged from within bodies. Deleuze explains: On one hand 'the
combat against tries to destroy or repel a force (to struggle against the the diabolical
6B Deleuze, Gilles, Essays Critical and Clinical, Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (London: Verso,
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powers of the future), but the combat between in contrast, tries to take hold of a force
to make it one's own.?" An understanding of this relationship was what Benjamin was
gesturing toward when he said that the only viable strategy was, in Hegel's phrase to
enter the enemy's strength, the better to tum his destruction against itself.:" The
gesture has nothing whatsoever to do with further incorporating the ressentiment at
base in technology's revolt against the collective for us by collective mankind, rather it
affirms the whole of technology in its essence, not only its destructive elements and is
therein able to diffuse the unmatched fury of technology before it detonates.
How does this sort of conflict relate to the technological war already in progress?
Deleuze reminds us firstly 'that combat is not war.?' War is only a combat against, a
will to destruction, a judgement of God that turns destruction into something 'just.°s
This statement corresponds with Benjamin's wartime strategy. War necessarily takes
as its line of flight a path of destruction, insofar as it must deplete the energy of an
already established set of forces in order to accomplish its aims. Deleuze comments
'Even when war takes hold of other forces, the force of war begins by mutilating these
forces, reducing them to the lowest state. Combat by contrast is a powerful nonorganic
vitality that supplements force with force, and enriches whatever it takes hold.?" The
combatant herein must become a Spinozist body without organs, for we do not even
know what a [combat] body can do. When Spinoza said this it was practically a war
cry." But this sort of exhortation itself, as Spinoza acknowledged, is just idle talk. 'We
speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its effect, of the thousand ways
of moving the body, or dominating the body and the passions'" without ever
acknowledging the network of operations making the body an existential possibility at
any moment. The body without organs itself is at least a partially inorganic force by
design. Its vitality always emerging from an elsewhere. In waging combat as opposed
"Ibid, p. 132.
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to waging war 'herein perhaps lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge."
Rather one must appreciate that the technical being in everyone of its constitutive
parts raises the possibility for technological advancement. As such Being is effaced in
favour of the possibility of joining parts or functions. Therein, if one is going to put
oneself in the business of co-determinations one cannot separate out co-dependent
terms of existence such as this.
War might just be about destruction, but the work of the technical being which
carries out it day to day operations is very much about acquisition and the
reterrioralization of spaces which are essentially of market value. The constantly
adapted and upgraded body of the technical being is as much a commodity of warfare
as aeroplanes and guns. One needs to remind oneself yet again that our war is
comprised of technologies which exceed visibility, whilst nonetheless advancing the
distribution of need. All future war will achieve the countenance of technological
advancement, through such an economic application of diminutive or invisible
forces. Forces whose necessary destruction make way for the next match up of forces.
For Nietzsche war is the lowest degree of the will to power, its sickness. Such is the
plague of war making whose death drive operates at a constant low throttle. According
to Leslie, 'Benjamin's Technik possesses a certain natural disposability ... ,gO technology's
dynamic is an unfolding of energy that will out its demands in war.
National Servicing.
Benjamin's aim in writing 'Theories of German Fascism' was to write the
historiography of a specifically German kind of warfare, which far from being eternal
had something of a telescopic workings. Benjamin's ability to have sections of his
historical analysis of war slide into one another from past, present and future, meant
that he could add a density to his view of events that far exceeded a singular linear
I.Deleuze, Gilles, Essays Critical and Clinical, Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (London: Verso,
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perspective. For example, he was readily aware of that fact that 'behind the recent war
is a technological war.": meaning that the war could be read on at least two levels: that
of the event itself and its rhetorical aftermath. Indeed, Benjamin will carryon with
his comments to suggest that there is something further beyond technology that
makes this war special, and that is the feature of Germany having lost it. Thus he says,
'It was not only one of material warfare but also of a war which was lost. And in that
special sense it was the German war.?" It almost seems as though Benjamin is making
an indictment of German technology. However, upon closer inspection, one is able to
pick up on a more subtle indictment: that technology not only was used as a cause to
make war, but also as a way of recovering from the losses endured as a result of losing
at war.
The specific technology that Benjamin chooses to indict is surprising: the
technology of the self. Far from the obvious innovations of war-making such as
aeroplanes and gas warfare, Benjamin's true vitriol is reserved for the neo-
essentialism of post-war Germany: 'To have waged war out of their innermost
existence, this they cannot claim. What is special about the present and latest stage in
the controversy over the war, which has convulsed Germany since 1919, is the novel
assertion that that it is precisely this loss of the war which is characteristically
German.?" What Benjamin is claiming here is that this cliche of an 'innermost
existence' of the German people, is nothing other than' a novel assertion,' or new
technology in the rhetorical struggle to keep the public fascinated by an idealisation of
warfare. 'One can call this the latest stage because these attempts to come to terms with
the loss of the war show a clear pattern. These attempts begin with an effort to pervert
the German defeat into an inner victory by means of confessions of guilt which were
hysterically elevated to the universally human.?' This is a crucial development insofar
as war-making and defeat have now shifted pattern from the characteristically German
8. Benjamin, Walter, 'Theories of German Fascism,'Selected Writings Volume 21927-1934, Trans. Rodney
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to the universally human. That they have done so on the side of universal guilt as
opposed to characteristic innocence, suggests that an outward victory would only be
attainable through the repossession of one's losses on the world stage.
Equivocal Response
At this moment in 'Theories of German Fascism' Benjamin hands over the
enclosure of events to an alternate messenger, his late friend Florens Christian Rang,
whose programme notes to World War II were made public prior to his death in 1924.
If this sounds peculiar, it may be helpful to bear in mind that Rang was signalling to
the undead at least as early as the birth of German Idealism. Thus he is free to
comment in the following way on the topic of the typical German's character in war:
... without regard for life, flinging it down for an idea-this cloud impregnated
night that has hovered over us for millennia and in which, instead of stars,
gives us only stupefying and confusing thunderbolts to guide the way, after
which the night only envelops us all the more in darkness: this horrible world
view of world-death instead of world-life, whose horror is made lighter in the
philosophy of German Idealism by the notion that beyond the clouds there is
after all a starry sky, this fundamental German spiritual tendency in its depths
lacks will, does not mean what it says, is a crawling, cowardly, know-
nothingness, a desire not to live but also a desire not to die either"
What Rang sees as 'the German half-attitude towards life' corresponds with
Benjamin's assertion that 'A German seldom understands himself. If he has once
understood himself, he will not say so. If he does say so, he will not make himself
understood.:" Rather the German seems to fall victim time and again to a contrariness
when it comes to deciding the value of life, life for himself and for others. This creates
what Benjamin calls a 'comfortless distance' from his fellow man and from his own
will. This distance 'was increased by the war, but not merely through the real and
legendary atrocities that Germans are reported to have committed. Rather, what
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completes the isolation of Germany in the eyes of other Europeans ...is the violence,
incomprehensible to outsiders and wholly imperceptible to those imprisoned by it,
with which circumstances, squalor and stupidity here subjugate people entirely to
collective forces, as the lives of savages alone are subject to tribal laws.?" So heavy is
the pressure from these collective forces, that they penetrate the very psyche of the
German individual compelling him to exercise what Junger refers to 'as an inner
lawfulness.?" which at the same time compels him to carry out the most anti-social
functions in order to remain loyal to the tribe mentality. Junger tells us that this is so
much the case, that the mere 'phrase "for Germany" could send volunteer regimes on
a course of attack.:" 'In Theories of German Fascism,' Benjamin draws a parallel
between the formulae of idealism and the waging of war."? It is a question of the
German's nature vs. the call to nationalism, 'war is the diagonal:" drawing them
together. Benjamin has little sympathy for these volunteers. Referring to them as
'chthonic forces of terror,' he compares them to children, stating bitterly that these
men who Icarry Klages in their packs, will not learn one-tenth of what nature
promises it's less idly curious but more sober children, who possess in technology not
a fetish of doom but a key to happiness.:" Such happiness cannot take seed, however
in a landscape that continues to be dominated by warfare and as Benjamin so ruefully
states:
as far as one could see over the edges of the trenches, the surroundings have
become the very terrain of German idealism. Each shell-crater was a
problem, each wire entanglement an antimony, each barb a definition, each
explosion a thesis. And the sky overhead, by day was the cosmic inside of a
steel helmet, at night the moral code above yoU.93
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This moral code connects the line of volunteer troops back to one ideological
progenitor, Immanuel Kant. Leslie offers that 'In Kant, for the theoretician of absolute
ethical conduct, had called for just such a man who declares: 'the immensity of the
heavens above me, the imperative of my conscience within me. Alluding perhaps to
the ethical basis of dominant justificatory discourse of the Great War, Benjamin
insinuates that a pure ethical stance can be used to justify an idealist withdrawal into
the unethical conduct of war.?' For Ronell it is helpful to bear in mind that war may
in fact respond to the vision Kant conjures up in his 'perpetual peace treaty a vision of
the endless and absolute, perpetual resting in peace.:" Moreover, Ronell reasons that
'if Kant can only draw a philosophical sketch of peace, this is because his leanings push
him toward the edge of undecidability where absolute peace, like war, means you're
dead. To get out of this peace cemetery, Kant will have to institute performative
speech acts; in other words, he will have to declare a certain type of war on war.:"
Following on from Ronell's suggestion here, I would assert that Kant's strategy in
waging a war on war is to conjure it rhetorically at its extreme, before withdrawing
from or rejecting out of hand its potential to reach such an extremity. One can see
where a frustration with Kant might therein be fostered. However, I would like us to
turn our critical attention not to the ultimate moral high ground, seeming to shield
Kant himself away on as the mortar falls around the rest of us, but rather for us to
linger at the calculations Kant is setting up prior to his evacuation of the grounds on
which to base a thinking on war.
In article 6 of Kant's 'Perpetual Peace a Philosophical Sketch' (1759) he writes
'No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make
confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include the
employment of assassins or poisoners, breach of agreements, the instigation of treason
within the enemy state etc.'97 For Kant these are' dishonourable stratagems. 19K He
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argues that, 'it must still remain possible, even in wartime, to have some sort of trust
in the attitude of the enemy, otherwise peace could not be concluded and hostilities
would turn into a war of extermination.' 99 He remains mute on the point of where
this trust might come from. Nonetheless he does manage to stumble upon the ground
of something truly salient. Indeed, it is truly astounding to see Kant use a term like
extermination nearly two centuries prior to the Holocaust. Moreover, the condition
for meeting such a harrowing event are uncannily prefigured in what Kant describes
as 'a war of punishment between states.":" Although he would describe this as being
'inconceivable' in his epoch, 'since there is no relationship of superior to inferior'!"
amongst states, he speculates that nonetheless it 'follows that a war of extermination,
in which both parties and right itself might all be simultaneously annihilated, would
allow perpetual peace only on the vast graveyard of the human race.'!" Therein one
canmake out the spectre of the holocaust emerging in an era in which states would
cohere to this arrangement of superior to inferior. Kant cautions briskly that' A war of
this kind and the employment of all means which might bring it about must thus be
absolutely prohibited,"?" but vacillates, and ultimately concedes that of course, 'the
means listed above would inevitably lead to such a war, because these diabolical arts,
besides being intrinsically despicable, would not long be confined to war alone if they
Werebrought into use. This applies, for example, to the employment of spies, for it
exploits only the dishonesty of others(which can never be completely eliminated).
Such practices will be carried over in peacetime and thus will completely vitiate its
purpose.'?'
Despite Kant's excessive protestations, what he is outlining in this sixth article
are nothing short of a laundry list of the diabolical arts: assassination, poisoning,
breaching of agreements, instigating of treason within the enemy state; that when
brought together in a series of events would ultimately contribute to the emergence of
99 Ibid., p. 96.
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not only of world war, but of total mobilisation, in adherence with Junger's subsequent
definition. Add to that one state feeling that it would need to prove its superiority
over another state who by definition if it lost the war would be proven in its
inferiority, and you have a lethal combination of forces. Forces that might certainly
lead to the immolation of the globe. Forces that when carried over into peacetime,
would surely invalidate the very idea of such a time. The sketch of perpetual peace
than looks more and more like one of perpetual war, drawing a likeness that Kant
doesn't seem ready to own up to. Kant's sketch has been inadvertently instructive,
though of course not as a peace manual per se, but rather as a diabolical prophecy of a
fighting force operating in disassembly that categories modern understandings of total
war. That is to say a war carried out simultaneously on many fronts, which routinely
distributes acts of terrorism that have long since 'taken up residence in the rhetorical
bloodlines and bacillary negotiations'!" of Western civilisation, irregardless of
whether it is peacetime or wartime, making those sorts of distinctions effectively null
and void for the present age. Benjamin writes in "Theories of German Fascism" that
'The most recent war has already shown that the total disorganisation imperialist war
entails and the manner in which it is waged, threaten to make it an endless war."'"
The significance of moral law drops out the picture in this instance only to be replaced
by an ever burgeoning industry which seeks to report on war, as it devolves less into a
campaign for national self-mastery and more into a campaign for rhetorical
gamesmanship. How does mankind account for the suffering such a contest involves?
Moreover, what in the grammar of the age allowed for all of this contemplative
ruination to congeal into an endless recitation of our material losses? Benjamin's
summons these questions to the fore, challenging the very vocabularies of war which
threaten to engulf the possibility of thinking beyond fascism towards future in which
technology can be restored to its more beneficent means.
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Warring Vocabularies.
Cut to footage of Correspondent Benjamin transmitting on loudspeaker:
What does it mean to lose or win a war? How striking the double meaning is
in both words! The first, the manifest meaning, clearly refers to the outcome of
the war, but the second meaning-which creates that peculiar hollow place, the
sounding board in these words-refers to the totality of the war and suggest how
the war's outcome also alters the enduring significance it holds over us. This
meaning says, so to speak, the winner keeps the war in hand, it leaves the
hand of the loser; it says, the winner conquers the war for himself, makes it his
own property, the loser no longer possesses it and must live without it. And
he must live not only without the war per se but without every one of its ups
and downs, even the subtlest of its chess moves every one of its remotest
actions. To win or lose a war reaches so deeply, if we follow language, into the
fabric of our existence that our whole lives become richer or poorer in symbols,
images and sources. And since we have lost one of the greatest wars in world
history, one, which involved the whole material, and spiritual substance of a
people, one can assess the significance of this loss. I
One can anticipate that there will need to be some significant, if seemingly
minor changes in the wording of Benjamin's report after World War II, specifically
around the word and the neo-linguistic warfare that was being waged in the post-war
West:
What does it mean to win or lose a word? How striking the double meaning is
in both wars! The first, manifest meaning, clearly refers to the outcome of tile
word, but the second meaning-iohicn creates that peculiar liolloui space, the
sounding board of these wars-refers to the totality of the word and suggest how
the word's outcome also alters the enduring significance it holds over us. This
meaning so to speak, the uiinner keeps the word ill hand, it leaves the hand to
the loser; it says the winner no longer possesses it and must live without it.
And he must not only live without the word per se but toithout everyone of
its ups and downs, even tile subtlest of its chess moves, everyone of its
remotest actions. To win or lose a word reaches so deeply into the fabric of our
existence that our whole lives become richer or poorer in symbol, images and
sources. And since we have lost one of the greatest words ill world history, one
which inuoloed the whole material and spiritual substance of a people, one
can assess the significance of this loss.
The specific word that has been lost after the second war is Holocaust, a term at
1 Benjamin, Walter, 'Theories of German Fascism,'Selected Writings Volume 21927-1934, Trans. Rodney
Livingstone and Others, Eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eliand, and Gary Smith, (London: The Belknap
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once generated and lost in a firestorm of unintelligibility that could have been seen
coming as far back as World War I, if only we would have been willing to telescope
backward to the romantic expressionism Benjamin alludes to in the Trauerspiel. As
far back as this study, Benjamin was able to begin charting the path of expressionism
for its multivalent significance, its becoming other, its becoming war. The
aestheticisation of expression became a modern phenomenon in Germany around
1919,'a novel assertion" of a technology everyone possessed and yet none where
willing to admit they were capable of using. It was not until 1933 that defeat started to
lift from association with this term, and by that time expression was shifting linguistic
position with concentration. Concentration, a term, of course, which was soon to
encamp with genocide, made destruction once again the task of the universally
human, the co-determinant enterprise of a characteristically German advancement of
society. This was the fall out campaign of yet another linguistic minefield: German
Idealism. In 'Theories of German Fascism' Benjamin is playing with the lens once
again, building them up and collapsing them down, telescoping to a future telecast of
the coming war as it is broadcast seemingly everywhere in the nineteenth century. A
time one could refer to romantically as proto-structuralist -when all of this linguistic
suffering was yet to secure its mappings of what would become the future theatres of
war: communication technologies. Not coincidentally this was also a time when
capitalism could be referred to as a capitalism of concentration, for production and
property.' Thus the whole economy of communication is reliant upon the singular
enclosure of meaning.
In the twentieth century this becomes a situation of meaning that cannot persist in
its market stability with the advent of networked communication, and to some extent
the networked foreclosure of meaning that is brought about with the deployment of
the neologistic referent of the Holocaust. What must be contended here is a logistics of
allegory; as the proverbial ghost in the war-machine. The effect of the allegory,
according to Benjamin's Trauerspiel study, seems 'startling' and 'momentary,' like a
'Ibid., p. 315
J Ibid., p. 312.
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'flash of lightning which suddenly illuminates the dark night,' or the 'sudden
appearance of a ghost." In Ronell's work on Paul de Man and allegory, it appears that
de Man had picked up where Benjamin left off. Where Benjamin had concerned
himself with the proto-fascist uses of allegory, de Man examined the fall out of its
understanding in seemingly post-fascist intellectual terrains. Nonetheless, there are
definitive resonances of the effect of the Holocaust in de Man's rhetoric. Ronell: 'For
de Man, there appears to be something clearly foreclosive about the nature of allegory,
something that will only appear, though without substantially manifesting itself, in a
violent aftermath." This statement in some way serves as an allegorical precursor to
the way the public scandal concerning de Man's own referential association with a
fascist media outlet, Le Soir in the 1940s, would be acutely and violently divulged in
the form of a foreclosive media blitz forty years later.
Such a foreclosure by 1986 allows Derrida to pose the question 'Which war?" in his
defense of de Man's past activities, as if somehow World War II had fallen out of the
scope of the deconstructionist movement, in favour of the Algerian War or the
Vietnam War. It seems that these events are overdetermined as the critical
postmodern developments, along with the cold war obviously, that signaled the build
up of an entirely new type of war-machine of almost militant concern to
deconstructionist practice of the 19708.These wars coincided with the events of May
1968in Paris, which were considered by participants as nothing short of a war against
the establishment forces of education, and therein those responsible for systematic
discipline of meaning. Furthermore, these objections were raised underneath the
banner of Communism. Allegory on the other hand works most efficiently in line
with a capitalist deployment of meaning, 'to the extent that allegory is payrolled by
foreclosure." Therein 'the effects of a manifestation are bound to be startling ...
resembling the sudden appearance of a ghost." Which begs the further question of why
4 Benjamin, Walter, Origin of the German Tragic Drama, Trans. John Osborne, (London: NLB, 1977), p. 167.
5 Ronell, Avital,Stupidity, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002) p. 108.
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the de Man scandal only came to light posthumously? The question leads one to
ponder something else, 'The suddenness of an unwanted return to a condemned site."
It would seem that in maintaining loyalty to the appearance of de Man's ghost, those
sites are ironically open to the contested space of both proliferation and disappearance.
In the meantime, there will be other instances of rattling up citations on the undead
that are contemporary to Benjamin's own wartime media post that also affiliates itself
within a foreclosive atmosphere. It is time now to switch the registers back, beginning
with yet another journalist reterritorialized in the immanent wake of German
fascism, Karl Kraus.
In These Great Times -Listener's Supplement
In the essay 'Karl Kraus,' Benjamin relates the outbreak of World War I to the
'shabby, obtrusive abundance of ... coffee-houses, press and society scandals' that were
'only a minor manifestation of the foreknowledge of that immanent event.'!" It was
only two months later that Kraus condemned the members of this crowd to their fate.
In this address Kraus' prose conjures a force that is nothing short of demonic, it exists
as a reckoning, a wake held for the grim future to come. Its summons is, in
Benjamin's words, 'not content to call on the world as witness to the misdemeanours
of a cashier ...' but instead aims to 'summon the dead from their graves.'!' Thus the
economic register that Kraus is tapping on is firmly beyond finitude, beyond the
superficiality of the monumental suffering of the present age. Indeed, 'to summon the
dead from their graves' would suggest that Kraus has tapped into the deep recesses of
torment concealed within the German culture, a torment that has necessarily been
transferred over the ages, taking up a disturbing plot within the Idealist landscape, the
blood and soil of the Yolk. Therein the summons would extend its task to
summoning the dead from their age; specifically calling upon one group, the medieval
Germans who were always already deadened to their times through a similar epochal
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burden of rehearsed grief in life. Kraus puts himself forward as the channeler of their
furious unexorcised grief.
In following after Kraus Benjamin grows uneasy with this summons and
equates Kraus' exorcise with a further spreading of the torment of his age: 'All the
demons that had populated this possessed man passed into the herd of swine who
were his contemporaries.' 12 It is as though the audience for Kraus' writing not only
becomes absorbed with him, but with all the infernal forces that possess his body and
imagination. Kraus is aware of the frenzy of interest he has created around himself,
and also of the fact that his audience in reading him is swept up in the same energy of
societal detritus. Indeed, it is this very momentum of this social decay that has kicked
up a cultural maelstrom worthy of Kraus' moral outrage. The height of this outrage
peaks with the delivery of his tract 'In this Great Age' which for Benjamin signaled the
pivotal moment of a tactical shift in Kraus' writing; that is to say Kraus' new found
determination to unleash his messengerial furore on the crowd of his listeners:
In these great times, which I knew when they were small, which will be
small again ... in these grave times that laughed themselves to death at the
possibility of growing serious and, overtaken by their own tragedy, long for
distraction ... in these loud times, booming with the fearful symphony of
deeds that engender reports, and of reports that bear the blame for deeds; in
these unspeakable times, you can expect no word of my own from me. None
except this, which just preserves the silence from misinterpretation ... In the
empires bereft of imagination, where man is dying of spiritual starvation
while not feeling spiritual hunger, where pens are dipped in blood and
swords are dipped in ink, that which is not thought must be done, but that
which is only thought is inexpressible ... in the room where someone writes
the noise is so great, and whether it come from animals, from children, or
merely from mortars shall not be decided now ... Those who now have
nothing to say because it is the turn of deeds to speak, talk on. Let him who
has something to say step forward and be silent!"
The question violently bursts forth from the listener, 'Why can we expect no word
fromKraus?' If it is as Kraus suggests, the turn of deeds to speak, what deeds might
those who invade Kraus's space of writing? Furthermore what noisy deeds are
" Ibid., p. 261.
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animals, children, mortar shells capable of that there should be cause enough for the
rest of us to grow silent? What Kraus is suggesting for Vienna - as Benjamin had done
forMoscow in the late 1920s- is not that the deeds of the age remain unaddressed, but
rather rhetorically mimic their most disturbing movements as a way of understanding
what is happening within society. Through mimicry animals, children, and mortar
shells are able to audibly mirror the fearful or bewildering activities that take place
around them, often as a means of communicating distress. Often this is done through
a deterrorialization of language. Fear is no longer the domain of words to categorise,
language as the means normally associated with communicating danger gets turned
inside out, so that deterritorialized sound alone can pierce the silence brought about by
unspeakable events. Within the zone of crisis animals bellow, children cry, mortars
scream. How noisy everything grows, everything in language that is inhuman is
allowed to mimic on its own terms the inhumanity of man. The mouth itself has
been deterritorialized by the violence that has opened it, making it a gaping reminder
of the loss of understanding information has brought to society. Such was the case
with the First World War.
Benjamin asks in 'The Storyteller:'
Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the
battlefield grown silent- not richer, but poorer from communicable
experience? What ten years later was poured out in a flood of war books was
anything but experience that goes from mouth to mouth. And there was
nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been contradicted
more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic
experience by inflation, bodily experience by those in power. A generation
that had gone to school in horse-drawn streetcar now stood under the open
sky in a countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds,
and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and
explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body."
What could be more creatural than the mouth as an organ of communicable
experience? It is through the experiences of tactical warfare, inflation and bodily
.. Benjamin, Walter, 'The Storyteller' illuminations, Intra. Hannah Arendt, Trans. Harry Zohn, New York:
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experience overall, despite having contracted out the space of the mouth, are not
prepared to make payment anytime in the future. The tiny, fragile human body grows
silent, not out of awe, but of a paucity of organs with which to take in what has
transpired. What has been forgotten is that the mouth in the exchange of
communicable experience is not merely an organ of output, but intake as well. The
atrophy of this function in the post-war period causes the citizen back from the front to
enclose everything learned in the shallow slot of information, as the gulf formerly
reserved for understanding has been filled to capacity with the relentless shocks of self-
shattering experience. Benjamin:
Every morning brings us news of the globe, and yet we are poor in
noteworthy stories. This is because no event any longer comes to us without
already being shot through with explanation. In other words, by now almost
nothing that happens benefits storytelling; almost everything benefits
information. In storytelling 'the narrative achieves the amplitude that
information lacks.'"
The story then has to necessarily be told by others, others whose humanity has yet to
be sealed up in the aggression as non-aggression pact of language, something that later
gets set up between Hitler and Stalin, two men who if anything met language with
disbelief. They doubt in the same way soldiers on the battlefield lost sight of the limits
of finitude; which is of course language's false promise to the subject, specifically that
the conflict of being will someday end.
Kafka was all too aware of the potential falsification of all ontological contracts
sealed with the stamp of international law. He had the good sense to stay in Prague, at
least up until the time shortly before his death in 1925 when he came to a proto-
fascisticVienna. And quite possibly then to get closer to the noise emanating from
Kraus' room in the wee hours. It was a sound that not incidentally mimicked his own
space of authority-as-bodily-possession, taking place in the wee hours of creation that
modern man has mostly forgotten. Kraus and Kafka are a similar animal, one whose
courage comes largely from a ritual of becoming-writing. Kafka will eventually claim
15 Ibid., p. 89.
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he has no need for an organic body, that he is made of writing, 'only of writing.'" Such
a transformation is insurgent business, one often picked up only as a near to a silent
operation, the reception of course making it register as far more docile than it is. The
clamorous noise produced by writing then largely falls into 'the receptacles of the
Iorgotten.:"
According to Deleuze and Guattari sound like that' does show up here as a form
of expression, but rather as the unformed material of expression, that will act on other
terms.:" Words for Kafka and Kraus constitute a sonority that ruptures in order to
break away from a chain that is still all too signifying. Those sub-authorial creatures,
children, animals, mortars - possess the ability to listen for the most forgotten of
noises, silence. Not surprisingly they also possess 'the greatest opportunity for
reflection.'" Kraus' ability to grow anxious in the presence of these attentive creatures
suggests that he too had an ear close to the ground, his homing signal poised in the
region of 'distorted life.?" Benjamin would come to survey the same region, starting
from his encounter as a boy with the Little Hunchback for whom he kept vigil at
night.
This sort of vigilance 'reminds one of the reluctance with which children go to
bed; after all, while they are asleep something might happen that concerns them.?'
This is perhaps why both writers work takes on a sense of prophetic vigilance that is
largely lost to the world of the fathers. The sons meanwhile are keeping up a
distressing silence until the time is ripe for disclosure. Still these crisis times are
knocking on the door. Kraus' speech then mimics the cadence of this knocking, which
in its own great age will become a battering.
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Kafka and Kraus practiced their own respective forms of vigilance - ones whose
line of flight commences with chronic insomnia. For them the emergence of the
micro trait of insomnia became symptomatic of the macro social disorder of the age.
Insomnia therein became an essential mode of production, a process manifesting itself
in long bouts of nocturnal writing. Benjamin comments that Kraus' night 'is a not
maternal, or a moonlit, romantic night: it is the hour of between sleeping and waking,
the night watch, the centrepiece of his threefold solitude: that of the coffeehouse
where he is alone with his enemy, of the nocturnal room where he is alone with his
demon, and of the lecture hall where he is alone with his work.'" Kraus is constant on
duty as the observer of his age. He writes in his log book entitled fittingly By Night,
that he worked' day and night.?' As a result he explains, 'I have a lot of free time, to
ask a picture in a room how it likes work, to ask the clock whether it is tired and ask
the night how it slept.?' These comments at first glance might seem peculiar, even
mad and yet they are representative of a kind of lucidity that overcomes the insomniac
as inhabits his nocturnal environment.
Deleuze proposes that insomnia, 'this dreamless sleep is not a state in which we
fall asleep, but one that transverses the night and inhabits it with a frightening
clarity.':" Insomnia is a dreamless sleep in which one does not fall asleep, does not
dream, rather insomnia sweeps the dream along as far as insomnia extends, so that
dreams become something one has alongside insomnia - as a way of registering events
whilst perpetually deferring any imposition of a judgment. Insomnia through its
alongside-ness emerges as a mode of immanence. Whereas 'the dream erects walls,
feeds on death and creates shadows, shadows of all things in the world, shadows of
ourselves.:" insomnia, the dreamless sleep, the dream of the night can be detected,
n Benjamin, Walter, One Way Street and Other Writings, Intra. Susan Sontag, Trans., Edmund Jephcott and
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appropriated, repopulated with other worlds to come, other peoples to come.
Meanwhile in the 'In the dream of the night I see gray dogs, creeping forward to
devour the dream.?" This dream must be called out to, summoned, but silently so as
not disrupt the dream in progress but rather to overtake it, like a storm that seemingly
comes from nowhere, one that announces itself only through the lightening strike.
Benjamin characterises Kraus' cadence of speech as 'a silence that catches the
storm of the event in its black folds, billows, its livid lining turned outward.T'Tire
catastrophe is fascism. For now though the storm is still gathering its forces. Benjamin
alerts us early on to the fact that 'Kraus lived in a world where the most shameful act
was still the faux pas; he distinguishes between degrees of the monstrous, and does so
precisely because his criterion is never that of bourgeois respectability, which once
above the threshold of trivial misdemeanor becomes so quickly short of breath that it
can form no concept of villainy on a world-historical scale.:" So Kraus is not a man
daunted by usual bourgeois limits on intake. And he clearly operates with a stronger
set of lungs then most men of his age. What is less easily inspired from Kraus' writing,
is that eventually these lungs will grow monstrous, and become weak and rotten as
the breath of fascism subsumes them. It happened to Kafka as well, who diagnosed his
tuberculosis as the malady of his age, the animal within roaring to emerge.
In this vein, Benjamin approaches Kafka as someone who 'just as K. lives in the
village on Castle Hill, modem man lives in his body; the body slips away from him, is
hostile toward him. It may happen that a man wakes up on day and finds himself
transformed into vermin.I" Or as a mute demon as was the case with Kraus. 'Exile
-his exile - has gained control over him."' This control centres on Kraus's former
networks of hyper control - language. It sudden catches in his lungs. 'The air in this
II Ibid., p. 130.
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village is not free of all the abortive and overripe elements that form such a putrid
mixture [of discourse]. This is the air Kafka had to breathe.?' This putrid discourse, of
course, also feeds into the materiality of Kraus' age, the breath of an age that he in part
shared with Kafka. Benjamin provocatively asks: 'How was he able to survive in this
air?'33 The answer of course is that he ostensibly fell victim to it.
This final statement of Benjamin acts as a forecast for a villainy that will soon
catch in the air on a world historical-scale; an air that will become as putrid in Vienna
and Berlin, as it was for K. on Castle Hill, Kafka in Prague. This arid sense of villainy
lurking on the Hill, relates back to Benjamin's earliest experiences in West Berlin,
poised on the speculative suburban hilltops outside the city centre. A young Benjamin
was constantly confronted with a deep sense of alienation and foreboding, whenever
he witnessed the blunderings of his class. Itwas a class that seemed to a boyhood
Benjamin curiously lacking in the necessary provisions to cope with the growing
bluster of the age. This is evident in Benjamin's account of his father's attempts to
counter the burglars who invaded his West Berlin home when he was a child
I noticed ... my mother and father coming quietly into my room at an
unusual hour ... A numerous band of burglars had ascended on the house in
the night. Fortunately, the noise they made gave an indication of their
number, so my mother had succeeded in restraining my father ... had wanted
to confront them. The dangerous visit lasted almost until morning ... Much
later they were caught... Itmade me proud that I was questioned about the
events of the previous evening - for a complicity was suspected between the
housebreakers and the maidservant ... What made me even prouder,
however, was the question why had I kept silent about my dream, which I
now, of course, narrated at length as a prophecy."
When the time is right again, at the end of World War I, Benjamin hones in on a
demonic aspect of Adalbert Stifter's work, which in later years will seem to convey a
foreknowledge of his communicatory dilemma in regard to the rise of National
Socialism.Benjamin writes, 'The demonic aspect that characterises his writing to a
1? Ibid., p. 122.
"Jbld., pp. 122-123.
34 Benjamin, Walter, 'A Berlin Chronicle,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Intro. Susan Sontag, Trans.,
Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), p. 341.
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greater or lesser degree is based on [the] inability [to express shock as it must primarily
be expressed in speech] and is most clearly manifested where he chooses a
surreptitious line of advance because he is unable to discover the liberating utterance
that lies near at hand and would assure his salvation.?" What would it mean to make
a liberating utterance, to spell out the name of evil and therein diffuse it of its
mysticism? Identifying evil for Benjamin is more a case of exposing flawed thinking
than castigating true villany. Such an exorcise of evil is carried out by Emmanuel
Levinas when in an article of 1934 entitled 'Some Reflections' he asserts namely that
'Nazism as an "elemental evil" has its condition of possibility in Western philosophy
and in Heideggerian ontology in particular: "a possibility that is inscribed in Being's
care for Being -for the being from whom Being itself is an issue in its being. There
could be no clearer statement that Nazism is rooted in the same experience of
[immanent] facti city from which Heidegger departs. While the greatest achievement of
Heidegger's philosophy was to have elaborated the conceptual categories that kept
[immanent] facticity from presenting itself as [concretized] fact, Nazism ended with
the incarceration of factical life in an objective racial determination and, therefore
with the abandonment of its original inspiration.:" Its concerns could no longer
separate bare life from politicised life. All politics therein literally became biopolitics.
This dire convergence for Levinas, was always potentially evident in the very
beginnings of Western philosophy and in Heideggerian ontology through its
privileging of self care and self-willing over the care and consideration of others, and
in the understanding of individual domain in terms of visual proofs, recorded facts
than with auditory conformation, the pliant voice of the other. As described by
Benjamin, Stifter suffers from a similiar metaphysical fault to the one Levinas
describes.
Benjamin accuses Stifter of being 'able to create only on the visual plane.':"
3; Benjamin, Walter, "Stifter," Walter Benjamin Selected Writings Volume 1913-1926, Eds. Marcus Bullock
and Michael W. Jennings, (london: The Belknap Press of Havard University, 1996)p. 112.
36 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford California: Stanford University
Press, 1998), p. 152.
37 Benjamin, Walter, "Stifter," Walter Benjamin Selected Writings Volume 1913-1926, Eds. Marcus Bullock
and Michael W. Jennings, (london: The Belknap Press of Havard University, 1996), p. 112.
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Benjamin: 'This does not mean that he reproduces only visible phenomena, for as an
artist he possesses style. The problem of his style is that he takes all things as an
approach to the metaphysically visual sphere. One immediate consequence of this is
that he has no way of perceiving any revelation that can only be heard - that is, which
belongs to the metaphysically acoustic realm. This also explains the role of the basic
characteristic of all of his writings: their emphasis on peacefulness. For peacefulness, is
above all, the absence of any acoustic sensation.?" This assertion ironically corresponds
with Kraus's prognosis that the coffee-houses, press and social scandals were nothing
short of a noisy cacophony summoning the chaos of the coming war into being.
Nerve Gas.
' ...How much irony lie in the curious struggle for the 'nerves,' the last root fibres
of the Viennese literary scene to which Kraus could still find Mother Earth adhering.?'
These nerves are also summoned in Junger when he asserts that total mobilization
requires 'extension to the deepest marrow, life's finest nerve.t" The most obvious
place to look for the nerves is at the finger tips as was the case with Loos article of 1908
'Ornamentation and Crime' which links the connoisseur's running of fingers over
engravings and reliefs to the eventual advent of a criminal type known as the art thief.
The type is equivalent in offence to the hack journalist in all his crude rapaciousness.
Kraus became the public defender against such crimes of private life, whilst defending
his own nerve centre against 'police, press, morality, and concepts, finally against
neighbours in every form, constantly finding new enemies, became his [alter]
profession.": Here manifests the strange interplay between reactionary theory and
revolutionary practice that is met everywhere in Kraus.
la Ibid., p.112.
39 Benjamin, Walter, 'Karl Kraus,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Intro. Susan Sontag, Trans., Edmund
Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), p. 265.
41) Junger, Ernst 'Total Mobilisation' Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press, 1993), p. 126.
" Benjamin, Walter, 'Karl Kraus,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Intro. Susan Sontag, Trans., Edmund
Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), p. 259.
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Later Ronell, will accuse Benjamin the DC, who was always 'on the way to
language which is always out of the way, drifting, rubbing over the scratch that
separates the creator from the destroyer.i" Like Nietzsche, and Stifter for that matter,
'his need for fresh air and open spaces is stronger than any hatred.:" Indeed,
Benjamin's quest for pure language follows a similar pathway to hell as does Kraus. In
the process of delving into the bowels of language, he is 'clearing away the tracks for
our own age, the destructive character is a device whose transmissions need ears that
hear, public ears.:" 'Just as the creator seeks solitude, the destroyer must be constantly
surrounded by people, witnesses to his efficacy. The destructive character is a signal.?"
Benjamin: 'In this fight - and only for it- his followers also have their use, since it is
they who must sublimely ignore the anonymity with which the satirist has tried to
surround his private existence, and nothing holds them in check except for Kraus's
decision to step in person before the threshold and pay homage to the ruins in which
he is a private individual.?"
Kraus passes judgement above all on people for what they say, as opposed to
who they are and even what they do. His sentencing takes on a pre-emptive character,
as it is almost exclusively deduced from the single fragment, word or intonation
revealingly uttered from his opponent's mouth. For Benjamin, what emerges for
Kraus in this is 'a sinister identification that constantly creates the illusion that deeds
are reported on before they are carried out, and frequently also the possibility of a
situation, in which in any case exists, that while war correspondents are not allowed to
witness events, soldiers become reporters.:" This is borne out of the considerable
influence of writers, notably Junger amongst them in that period, whose articles first
appeared as accounts of warfare in the popular press: the soldier Junger turned into
42 Ronell, Avital, Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). p. 90.
43 Benjamin, Walter, 'The Destructive Character,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Intro. Susan Sontag,
Trans., Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), p. 157 .
.. Ronell, Avital, Finitude's Score, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). p. 90.
4\ Benjamin, Walter, 'The Destructive Character,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Intro. Susan Sontag,
Irans., Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), p. 158.
46 Benjamin, Walter, 'Karl Kraus,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Intro. Susan Sontag, Trans., Edmund
Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 265-266.
4! Ibid., p. 267.
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would-be war correspondent.
Benjamin has said of Kraus: 'The dark background from which his image
detaches itself is not formed by his contemporaries but in the primeval world or the
world of the demon. The light of the first day falls on him - thus he emerges from the
darkness. But not in all parts, others remain that are more deeply immersed in it than
one suspects. An eye that cannot adjust the darkness will never perceive the outline of
this figure.:" Benjamin's criticism of Stifter implies a similar suspicion of cloaking
one's darker appearance, in a way that those who have an eye to darkness can detect,
leaving those without utterly vulnerable to the sway of the prose.
Kraus has said" Anti-Semitism is the mentality ... that means seriously a tenth
part of the jibes that the stock-exchange wit holds ready for its own blood,' he thereby
indicates the nature of his own opponents to himself. There is no reproach to him, no
vilification of his person, that could not find its own legitimate formulation in his
own writings, in those passages where self-reflection is raised to self-admiration ...In
this way his style comes into being, and with the typical reader of Die Fackel, for
whom the subordinate clause, in particle, indeed a comma, fibres and nerves quiver;
from the obscurest and driest piece of fact, a piece of his flesh hangs.':" From the
beginning Benjamin held that Kraus would perform a Shakespearean turn, by crafting
a bio 'sheet full of war and pestilence, of cries of pain and murder, of danger from
flood and fire, spreading everywhere"? into the 'latest news emanating from the
modern day Shylock whose story sometimes ends with one turning the knife on
himself?' so to speak as a means of cutting one's losses and getting out. 'I am' Kraus
has said, 'perhaps the first instance of a writer who simultaneously writes and acts out
his own wnting.'" In his daring commentaries Kraus's own voice tries on the
abundance of personae inhabiting the performer-persona: that through which sound
48 Ibid., p. 268.
49 Ibid., p. 269.
51) Ibid., p. 258.
I, See volume introduction Ibid., p. 14.
l'lbid., p. 270.
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passes - and about his fingertips, dart the gestures of the figures populating his voice.
He imitates his subjects in order to insert a crowbar of hate into the finest joints of
their posture. As Shylock reveals in the citizens of Venice, 'their venality, and
garrulity, ignominy and bonhomie, childishness and covetousness, gluttony and
dishonesty:" through his public character, so does Kraus in the citizens of Vienna.
'When the age laid hands upon itself, he was the hands, Brecht said?'
For Benjamin Kraus's satire adjudicates the Last Judgement in its foresight, in a
way not dissimilar to the way Shylock's dubious blood libel drew on the barbarism of
his age. Indeed, 'To worship the image of divine justice in language ... is genuinely a
Jewish somersault by which he [Shylock, Kraus] breaks the spell of the demon.:"
Kraus, like Shylock in his trial accuses the law in its substance, not its effect. His charge
is the betrayal of justice by the law. As to witness this betrayal, 'Kraus portrayed
himself as a hopelessly subjugated demon; in the pandemonium of the age he
reserved for himself the most melancholy place in the icy wilderness lit by its
reflective flames. 'The Last Day of Mankind': 'I have taken the tragedy, which is
divided into scenes of decaying humanity, on myself, so that it might be heard by the
sprit who takes pity on the victims, even though he may have renounced for all time
his connection with a human ear. May he receive the keynote of this age, the echo of
my bloodstained madness, through which I share the guilt for these noises. May he
accept it as redemptionl'" This guilt for Benjamin always lead to Expressionism ...
Unmistakable - and the Expressionists themselves proclaim it- is the
influence of medieval miniatures on the world of their imagination. With
these figures 'it is as if a falling sickness has overtaken them ... these backs
are plied ... into terraces of human necks, of human shoulders that, really
clenched in steep steps, lead less toward heaven than downward, to and
even under the earth. What finally remained of Expressionism, in which an
originally human impulse was converted almost without residue into a
fashion, was the experience and the name of that nameless power to which
13Ibid., p. 270.
"Jbid., p. 271.
5; Ibid., p. 272.
56 Ibid., pp. 273-274.
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the backs of people bent: guilt."
This Expressionistic impulse managed eventually to plunge a whole culture
onto a steeped path of hellish defeatism after World War I. The expression Kraus
mimicked in Benjamin's article, 'I share the guilt ...' culminated in a society's obsessive
rehearsal of that guilt until the authenticity of guilty feeling around the nation's defeat
was thoroughly obscured by the mounting inauthenticity of its fashionable
representation, which was in and of itself precipitous. What follows on from the
artistic movement is an equally disturbing one, art for art's sake, which is Benjamin's
mind was only ever able to take place so long as 'poetry was made to shine only against
a foil of hack journalism' seemingly making 'love stand out against perversion.:" It is
perversion itself however that marks out the dark depths of this movement.
Moreover it is where Kraus's task makes the transition to monstrosity. In so doing it
contrives a unique place of calpability for Kraus as the chief satirist of the age.
As that profession goes, a satirist in the style of Kraus,'never had firmer ground
under his feet than amid a generation about to board tanks and put on gas masks, a
mankind that has ruled out tears but not laughter. In him civilization prepares to
survive, if it must, and communicates with him in the true mystery of satire, which
consists of devouring the adversary.:" Benjamin proscribes that 'one would need to
understand Die Fackel from the first number on, literally word for word, to predict
that this aesthetically oriented journalism, without sacrificing or gaining a single
motif, was destined to become the political prose of 1930.'60 'Thus drawing on the
frontiers between the private and public spheres, which in 1789was supposed to
inaugurate freedom, became a mockery.?'
This aesthetically oriented journalism for Benjamin quite simply failed to
address the dark threat posed by National Socialism, instead prefering to review the
11 Ibid., p. 274.
'>8 Ibid., p. 275.
,9 Ibid., p. 278.
6IJ Ibid., p. 278.
6, Ibid., pp. 278-279.
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political situation as a dreamy hangover of social decadence, which soon would
dissipate with the inauguration of policies for stricter public discipline. Ironically, the
utter uselessness of the press industry's stance on Germany's social crisis was revealed
'in the deep nonsense of public discipline - whether it be of the upper ten thousand, a
dance floor or a military state - the deep sense of private licentiousness opens a dreamy
eye.:" Benjamin continues: 'And what as language might have been judicial strictness,
renunciating discrimination, becomes cunning and evasion, obstruction and
postponement.i.:" A counter-voice is needed. It arrives in the figure of Kraus who
refuses to lull the public into a dozy, false assurance, to indulge it any further in the
lazy passivity of its pondering indecision. 'The voice of Kraus speaks rather than sings
this inner music, he tears aside the curtain, and suddenly reveals the interior of his
cabinet of horrors.?" Something therein finally gets enacted. In so doing, Kraus forms a
demonic affinity with another public observer and political commentator, William
Shakespeare. 'Shakespeare had foreknowledge of everything?" that was to transpire
historically as the legacy of the post-Enlightenment world, culiminating allegorically
in the figure of Kraus.
'Shakespeare portrays inhuman figures ... Nature would produce such a
creature if she wished to create something befitting the world as your kind have
fashioned, something worthy of it.?" Such a creature is Kraus. Such is a creature for
whom Benjamin as his own Shakespeare will fashion that same year, 1931, into the
Destructive Character for whom a job description can be found in the last two
paragraphs of this essay starting from a notorious declaration from Loos 'If human
work consists only of destruction, it is truly human, natural noble work'" and ending
with the name of that nameless power: Angelus - the messenger who rushes foward
crying aloud the news of the destruction of our present day. One of these prescient
messengers of the day appeared in the figure of Martin Heidegger, who had in mind a
62 Ibid.• p. 279.
63 Ibid.. p. 279.
M Ibid.• p. 280.
'" Ibid.. p. 280.
60 Ibid.• p. 280.
'll Ibid.• p. 289.
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particular target of destruction, nihilism. He was convinced that for nihilism to meet
its timely demise another social actor would have to be called in, National Socialism;
only it didn't seem to quite know its lines, or rather preferred to obscure them so as to
prolong its auditory reception amongst the cognoscenti This raises all sorts of issues of
understanding and misunderstanding in these great times in which tacid compliance
has become the characteristic goal of the majority of rhetorical campaigns, playing to
increasingly selective audiences.
Am I Being understood?
In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) Heidegger wrote controversially: 'The
works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism
... having nothing whatever to do with the inner truth and greatness of the
movement (namely the encounter between technology and modern man) ....'6H This
sentence has since fueled a great debate about whether the version delivered in 1935
already included the explanatory parenthesis that one can read in a version published
in 1952. Even though the point is much debated, Heidegger has always maintained
that the parenthesis appeared in the manuscript for the lecture but that, convinced of
'the proper understanding of my listeners,' he hadn't considered it advisable at the
time to utter it.?"
Many Heideggerians have argued in the past that it is often the case that there are
significant points at which Heidegger's arguments fail articulation and yet these points
remain crucial to the interpretation of his words. In responding to the criticism
however, Heidegger himself did not challenge the arguments against him on the
grounds of the written word. Nor did he tum over the written manuscript for
inspection, but instead he balanced his defence on a point of utterance, or more
precisely non-utterance to an audience whom Heidegger assumes would have at that
6/j Heidegger quoted in Ferry, Luc and Renaut, Alain, Heidegger and Modernity, (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1988) p. 55.
0" Ibid., p. 56.
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time properly understood him.
All of these rhetorical feints around the content of Heidegger's speech hold great
significance for our understanding of how a tacit exploitation of misunderstanding
may have played a key role in the success of Nazi rhetorical strategy as a larger whole.
Goebbels explains the Nazi strategy regarding propaganda: 'The art of propaganda is to
gather completely, confused, complex and composite ideas into a single catch slogan
and then to instill this idea into the people as a whole.?" Thus propaganda is resolutely
in cahoots with unintelligibility.
There is another slogan related to Nazism, and this one hits upon our keyword
Holocaust, specifically on the moral call placed to surviving Jews after the Holocaust,
'Jews Remember,' which falls ironically into tandem with the slogan 'Germans
Awake,' when articulated. Ostensibly there is a radically different political programme
with regard to intent within each slogan. Yet there aims seem to violently converge on
one point: that of absolute expectation. Absolute expectation is a form of expectation
that can be subject to no rules of exception, and thus anticipates a situation of total
compliance. Total complicance then becomes a requisite of belonging to and answering
the call to the very category of Jew or German. Jews, by virtue of being Jews, must
remember, Germans by virtue of being Germans, must awake. Those who refuse fail
categorically. And yet they are doomed to fail at this mandatory interpolation based on
the fact that each slogan is meant to incite this listener to perform an action that
cannot logically progress. How can a German be called to awaken, when presumably
he had to have been already awake to in order to hear this command? Similarly, how
can a Jew be called to remember, when presumably he had to have been already alert
to these events in order to heed this command? What each of these slogans are in fact
doing are heralding an event that can never take place in present of our
understanding. Consequently, it is either too early or too late to actually response to
their instructions.
/0 Cadava , Eduardo, Words of Light, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 143, footnote 68.
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What these statements do then is create a linguistic possibility, where no actual
possibility can enter and take course. This failure does not signal the defeat of this
technique by any means. The terms of success are of a far different aim. These
statements actually form an extremely powerful and effective means of installation of
political technologies into the citizen. This installation is all the more powerful
because it occurs at a site that can never actually, intelligibly take place, neither in the
body nor the polis. Indeed, this apparatus can only materialise its success temporarily
in the moment of articulation. This installation essentially is the symbolic law of
language. As law it has no interior of its own, and thus no formal appearance. The law
has never been seen, and perhaps this is why justice is blind. In any case, this linguistic
system is fundamentally non-partisan; it is the tool of all discourses indiscriminately.
It assembles itself anew with every speech act, (including silence and unintelligible
speech) and creates exactly the subjective climate, of confusion, complexity and
composition, that internally foster political gadgets like propaganda in the folds of the
politicised citizen.
This linguistic operation is essentially a wet works, plugging into a body whose
vital organs of information gathering exceed anything resembling an organic body,
and repeatedly flow out of its orifices, the favoured one being the mouth, which must
be remembered as an instrument of two-way access. The energy comes from the body
itself,whose desire has it generating more sophisticated and conflicting machines of
response at every hour. Every human after modernity in the West fancies himself a
loud speaker. It must be noted that the technocratic overseer of Nazi propaganda,
Goebbels, refers to this practice as an art and not a science. Moreover, Goebbels infers
that the political use of language is artful, and not scientific, that it, like technology,
cannot be controlled, but unlike technology its outcomes can be readily manipulated.
The Hedeiggerian notion of preparing an audience for an understanding that
need not be articulated is similar in basis to waging a war without visibility. It doesn't
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get you away from the system of language. Proper understanding on the part of the
listeners in this case is to pick up on silent allusions, to detect an understanding in
what defies the appreciation of the general polis. Thus there can be no democracy, no
wide spread freedom, built into a linguistic force field that willfully obscures the
encounter between man and technology, so that its allusion will only come to those
whose hearing has become selective. Those are the same selective listeners who might
well tum around and lend a blind eye to their political system's injustices and
improprieties. It is no accident of speech that in 1938, In 'The Onto-theological
Constitution of Metaphysics' Heidegger would place a call for 'the technological
interpretation of our age."' That is for one to accept modifications on what is called a
speech act, to include that which is not directed nor completely uttered yet nonetheless
sounds a call for our attention.
What determines success or failure in modernity is the capacity to respond to
the call of technology. Heidegger's position has it that he saw France's failure and
Germany's victory as representative of concrete examples of what separates out
democracy from another political system less deaf to this call. The system capable of a
less deafness of course is Nazism and its system of warfare. Benjamin provides
supporting evidence of this goal of a less deafness in German military strategy after
World War I: 'Now and then someone hears of something 'reassuring' such as the
invention of a sensitive listening device that registers the whirl of propellers at great
distances. A few months later a soundless airplane is invented.:" This ideal of
soundlessness, is also followed up in Heidegger's philosophy when he advocates an
internal correspondence between Nazism and modernity, systems that apparently
communicate within the same body of understanding, thus skipping over the need for
external articulation of their conjoined aims.
" Heidegger quoted in Ferry, Luc and Renaut, Alain, Heidegger and Modernity, (Chicago: The University of
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One thing that had to be articulated still in Heidegger's mind, despite this circuit
of knowing, (Cartesian internal metaphysics) was a third term that would distance
Germany from the influences of, on one hand, Russian Communism and the other
American Liberalism. The term of course that cried out within his thinking, was
National Socialism. It too had to come a long distance, to find its authority to raise its
political voice, all the way back to the essence of the German race. This is a race built
for a highly mechanised outcome, or using a favourite of Heidegger's phrases,
"destiny." This destiny, however, appears to be strangely hushed in marking its
arrival. Even Junger's young volunteer regimes of WWI seem to be muttering their
diehard determination under their breath, "For Germany," as they charge from the
trenches. It would seem they are lacking not in resolve, so much as a will to express it.
This despite this self-assertion seems to be a key rectoral trope coming out of
Germany's defeat in WWI and the call to join one's resolve with the rising party of
National Socialism.
Heidegger, in his rectoral address of 1933, 'The Self-Assertion of the German
University,'refers to the great necessity for self-assertion amongst the German people,
and yet in the same breath calls for absolute restraint in freely exercising one's opinion.
Moreover, throughout this speech, he rountinely advocates deeds over words.
Heidegger goes to great lengths to stress the importance of civilian and military forces,
silently carrying out one's duty to the Yolk, and therein forging the greatest possible
loyalties to the emergent community of National Socialism. Furthermore, Heidegger
Writescuriously, 'Each individual has a part in deciding this, even if, and precisely if,
he seeks to evade this decision.i" In other words, whilst every individual might
potentially have a say, it is better for everyone, if one evades the task of speaking out
and instead directs one's self-determination elsewhere to aid the movement. If it were
left up to Heidegger alone, he would wish to let destiny speak through the Yolk, as
opposed to having the Yolk speak for itself, a self whom it has ceased to know and
recognise, as it is so far away from the essence of its Being.
13 Heidegger, Martin, 'The Self-Assertion of the German University' Richard Wolin, ed. The Heidegger
Controversy, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993) p. 38.
252
In the interview 'Only a God Can Save Us' Heidegger is quoted as having said in
the fall of 1933, 'Do not let doctrines and ideas be the rules of your Being. The Furher
himself and he alone is the present and future of German reality and its rule.?' When
he is confronted with this quote by his interviewers, Heidegger maintains that 'These
sentences were not found in the rectoral address, but only in the local Freiburg
Students Newspaper, at the beginning of the 1933-1934 winter semester. When I took
over the rectorship it was clear I would not see it through without some
compromises...even by 1934 I would no longer write such things.'75Heidegger does not
add a further comment however, regarding his willingness to still make such
statements, after 1934. Whether he had or not still remains largely a matter of
speculation, interpretation and hearsay. In terms of asserting a full understanding,
Heidegger would only allow the final sentence of his rectoral address to carry out that
rarely fulfilled task in his writing: 'We can only fully understand the glory and
greatness of this new beginning, however, if we carry within ourselves the deep and
broad thoughtfulness upon which the ancient wisdom of the Greeks drew in uttering
the words: ... "All that is great stands in the storm,'t76Thus understanding is placed
within the category of a private affair, its utterance reserved strictly for internal use
only, resulting in everyman possessing a strong resolution from within.
Here we witness the first stirrings of Heidegger's assertion of a "private National
Socialism," 77 which would later commence in his opinion, into a full fledged
Iconfrontation with National Socialism.:" during the summer semester of 1937, when
Heidegger begain his series of lectures on Nietszche. Heidegger's idea of keeping a
private form of National Socialism is evident as early as 1933, for all who care to hear
it in his inaugural speech as rector, and indeed it signals an early split with the official
14 Heidegger, Martin, 'Only A God can Save Us,' Richard Wolin, ed. The Heidegger Controversy,
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 96.
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populist party line. A line which appeared at least, to encourage Germans to feel that
their individual, contributing voices, (raised of course in party solidarity), were an
outstanding virtue of the National Socialist revolution to come. It was envisaged to
the public, that each voice would contribute to a chorus of workers harmonised to the
din of a technological will, impeccably orchestrated under the most powerful and
booming voice of all, that of the Furher himself.
Artful Dodging.
For Benjamin this call to solidarity was German fascism's most potent strategy,
giving every citizen the assurance, at least in theory, that he could speak out, and that
his individual voice mattered. Marxism in contrast told every man that his voice was
no greater or lesser than any other, thereby signaling a canceling out of his individual
influence. Marxism's inability to select for voices in its vast political strata meant that
it would have no way of structuring foreign political influences. In the end this
blundering discursive inefficiency is left with no more recourse than to respond to
Fascism: see the Hitler-Stalin pact. It is as if Marxism had been slumbering all along,
whilst Fascism was getting on with the business of imperial warfare on one hand, and
on the other a most extraordinary campaign of aesthetic and rhetorical control. Given
that Fascism has such a lead on Marxism, as far as tactical, vocal aestheticism went, it
became ironically in Benjamin's best interest to dismantle the fuehrer's switchboard
using the fuehrer's tools. It was widely known to his friends and colleagues that he
Wasreading Klages and Schmitt alongside Marx in the late 1930s. Thereby, when given
Adorno's outmoded rhetorical instructions, Benjamin's tendency is to switch the
contours of the game, and to willfully redirect these instructions onwards toward a
borderline of 'deceptive reception;' where they might finally head up the enemy
around his own lines of transmission. Firstly, though, Benjamin had to draw up his
own counter-instruction manual to the traditional Marxist copy. He did so by
borrowing some pages out of Heidegger's 1935work, IAn Introduction to Metaphysics.'
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There are systemic overlaps between Benjamin and Heidegger all the time which
call for an awareness on the part of the listener. Whereas Heidegger might choose to
go the way of evacuating categories by denying them truth and authenticity, Benjamin
goes the way of overvaluing categories insofar as he is willing to overpredict the
environmental impact these systems have on the human condition. This Kantian
critique gives us a read out on today's war, with its economic climate instability hinged
on excessive technology, concentrated wealth and short-term planning.
What is being unnaturally stimulated in this economic model is a reliance on the
property system. Benjamin is suggesting political systems such as Capitalism and
Fascism that constantly overvalue their products of technology create an unnatural
need for their continued progress and proliferation. If there is a devaluation of the
property, such is meant to ideally occur under Marxism, then the excesses of
productive desire, created as a byproduct of any technology, are less likely to promote
violent means to redistribute wealth. 'Human materials' under these regimes are
conspicuously manufactured, in such a way that there is always an excessive
workforce. This built in excess creates a system of appearance whereby unemployment
is linked to inutility, and where the class system is highlighted as a 'natural' social
formation.
Benjamin is arguing that this overgrowth of goods and consumers exists as
nothing short of a denial of the natural order that tends toward balance, and not
disharmony and excess. Society's troubles come therefore not as a signal of a natural
error, but as one of human ignorance to utilise technical means toward creating an
effective balance of humanity with nature. Instead, technology is directed toward an
almost maniacal pattern of destruction and clearing way. That this happens so
frequently and indiscriminately in Western nations attests to a profound denigration
of the aura. The aura, whose very nature demands an economy of esteem, is forced,
through the proliferation of a perpetual asetheticisation of war, to shatter under the
coveted sign of invisibility. The status of visibility borders on the cultish by the late
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twentieth Century, ironically to much the same extend as the aura once did prior in
the 17th Century.
If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property
system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of
energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war.
Imperialist war is a rebellion of technology which collects in the form of
'human material,' the claims to which society has denied its natural
material. Instead of draining rivers, society directs its human stream into a
bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary
bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new
way.?"
The broadcast of that fact in Benjamin's remarks, is not so very different from
Heidegger's environmental report against the 'the subjugating demand' by which the
hydroelectric plants sets the Rhine to supply its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the
turbines turning ...'80 By the 1960sHeidegger will be turned onto the new
meteorological technology, which have the potential to monitor earth's climates from
space. The atomic age signaling the nuclear age, as something within the airstream of
progress.
Heidegger will use this upgrade of technology to once again launch his
campaign for National Socialism: In the 'atomic age' as in the civilization of
consumption,' the modern era is consistently characterized by humanity's desire to
have the totality of beings within reach and to acquire the greatest possible power over
this totality through the control of all natural energies, including those of destruction:
this will to 'make completely providable everything that is and can be,' and this
reduction of the real to an 'inventory' available for 'using up' define the technological
relation to the world, 'this unrestrained and complete technicalization of man and of
79 Benjamin, Walter, 'Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro.
Hannah Arendt, (New York: Fontana Press, 1969), p. 235.
60 Heidegger, Martin, 'The Question Concerning Technology,'The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays, Trans., and Intro. William Lovitt, (London: HarperTorch Books:1969), p. 12.
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the world which makes modern man 'the functionary of technology.'?' Natural
energies then in Heidegger's view, are highly destructive, as opposed to Benjamin's
view of them as highly productive; so much so as to be productively manipulative to
the point of excess. Destruction under the rubric of metaphysics it seems, for Heidegger
is the main economic provider for the world's needs. Man becomes therein a
functionary to a system that never allows him to cut his losses by any other means
than war. War becomes the only sanctioned means of checking over-production and
effectively destroying what exceeds inventory i.e., the Real, and replacing its capital
with the smaller r of massive reduction. Technology itself then becomes a functionary
of destructive energies far and away more efficiently than modern man, insofar as
technology has no seeming desire to will itself, whereas man has desires that exceed
his will. Nietzsche is due to arrive in the production plant at a later stage in our
discussion, for a detailed demonstration of this pseudo-scientific principal. For now,
though, its time to head back to the research and development laboratory for a quick
science lesson.
The Science of War.
Whilst, Heidegger never ceased to call for thinking of technology on the basis of its
essence...' 82 Benjamin never ceased to call for a thinking of technology on the basis of
its formulation. This formula for Benjamin had two distinct, though not discrete
elements, a mix of politics and technology. Heidegger was also massively concerned
with this the subtleties of this combination. The difference in their approach came out
of Heidegger's wish to distill the essentials of this formulation, whereas Benjamin
wished to determine the elements as a way of screwing around with the efficacy of
these formulations. Benjamin argues:
War and only war can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale
8. Heidegger quoted in Ferry, Luc and Renaut, Alain, Heidegger and Modernity, (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1988) p. 57.
82 Heidegger, Martin, 'The Question Concerning Technology,'The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays, Trans., and Intro. William Lovitt, (London: HarperTorch Books:1969), p. 6.
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while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula
for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only
war makes it possible to mobilize all of today'S technical resources while
maintaining the property system. It goes without saying that the Fascist
apotheosis of war does not employ such arguments."
It seems then that Fascism is concealing the lack of distribution in some of its
liquid assets. It is at once calling for the property rights of the German race to the land
and to the blood, while remaining silent on the fact that a class system has already
distributed that wealth in advance of the outcomes of warfare. This had been
accomplished through the long-standing installation of the traditional property system
in Germany, heretofore known as TPS. On the technological front it must dodge the
fact that TPS's holdings are stable regardless of technological advancement and
proliferation, in the civilian and military sphere. Wealth will always be determined
far more by long-term holdings, than recent acquisitions. It may seem to the listener
that this has turned into a talk about economics and not politics. Such is the case,
because after World War I war can only function on a circuit of politics by other
means. These means, along with the high cost of technology, war usually ends up
intersecting with an economic track. It is crucial to bare in mind, that such tracks
operate on an increasingly complex system of switch points. Often with other points of
entry than what was initially imagined. Hence they seldom get directly linked in with
Fascist arguments. There are emergent economic terrains of proto-fascism as early as
1919 in Germany. Indeed, Benjamin appears ready to give us a spreadsheet on their
expansion and growth by 1925, when he invites us on his Tour of German inflation in
One-Way Street. This volume is arguably a technical achievement in its own right, a
mechanism built for demonstrating the general levels of political fragmentation the
average Berliner experienced in the inter-war inflationary period. What is precisely
inflated in this economy of the disenfranchised citizen is expression in its
commodified form.
Reading Inflation.
83 Benjamin, Walter, "Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Illuminations,Trans. Harry Zohn,
Intro.Hannah Arendt, (New York: Fontana Press, 1969), p.234.
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The formal title of this section in One-Way Street on German inflation is 'Imperial
Panorama,' and indeed Benjamin's analysis lends a wide-view of a German society in
which wartime inflation has signaled a fall of the bourgeoisie. This class in particular,
by the later 1920s, seems to have fallen into a sort of distorted relief; one that resembles
nothing so much as an Otto Dix painting. This marketing-image of decadence has
made its way from the aesthetic extremes of the Expressionist avant-garde into the
stance of the average citizen; one who stands idly by, while the polis crumbles around
him. He sees himself as nowhere in this scene of rapid social disintegration, and yet is
effected by its every movement and fluctuation. He sees Berlin's destruction as
inevitable, and yet does not so much as stir as the rumble piles around him. All the
while he is seen clutching his property entitlements so as to redress his wounds.
Benjamin begins his assault on this figure with the following character
deconstruction:
In the stock phraseology.i.of the German bourgeois ...referring to the
impending catastrophe.i.things 'can't go on like this". The helpless fixation on
notions of security and property ... keeps the average citizen from perceiving
the quite remarkable stabilities of an entirely new kind that underlie the
present situation. Because of the relative stabilization of the prewar years
benefited him, he feels compelled to regard any state that dispossesses him as
unstable. But stable conditions need by no means be pleasant conditions, and
even before the war there were strata for which stabilized conditions
amounted to stabilized wretchedness ..,,'84
Two motifs stand out here: one of decline, the other of rescue. Decline is what is
anticipated, whereas rescue is what is denied. What is invisible in this scene, yet
droning in the background, is the strata of poverty, which never benefited nor lost as a
result of the war, but rather was kept at a stable level of destitution throughout. It is
then only the bourgeois who are presently feeling the ground buckle beneath their
feet. The poor by implication have never had the luxury of sensing foundations at any
64 Benjamin, Walter, 'One Way Street,' One Way Street and Other Writings, Trans. Edmund Jephcott and
Kingsley Shorter, Intra. Susan Sontag, (London: Verso,1 1979), p. 54.
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historical moment. These are the population who have made a virtue out of
instability, out of moving onwards, whereas the bourgeois have always relied on
societal entrenchments to keep them rooted in place. It is the bourgeois who have
territory to defend, losses to amass. It is the bourgeois who make of property a war.
Benjamin refers to these as the 'People in the national communities of Central
Europe.:" These are people who according to Benjamin,
... live like the inhabitants of an encircled town whose provisions and
gunpowder are running out and for whom deliverance is...scarcely to be
expected-a case of which surrender, perhaps unconditioned should be most
seriously considered. But the silent, invisible power that Central Europe feels
its opposing does not negotiate. Nothing therefore remains but...the perpetual
expectation of the final onslaught, on nothing except the extraordinary event
in which alone salvation now lies...for the suffering of individuals as of
communities there is only one limit beyond which things can not go:
annihilation."
Thus the energies put into entrenching oneself behind one's property and one's
goods, ultimately lead to a kind of mass paranoia of the bourgeoisie. This paranoia
which started as an affect of the TPS, spreads like wildfire, creating what amounts to a
mass hysteria around defense. Defense then builds upon itself to the point where its
only reassurance can be gotten through extraordinary conflict with the outside and
unseen forces which it believes relentlessly threaten its apparent stability. Things of
course can and will go on like this, with the war machine building up and spending its
resources, with the only alternative being annihilation. Mass annihilation being the
only provision made available in modernity that no one seemingly would dare to
profit from or accumulate in a civilized Europe. 'Annihilation,' the final word on the
statement 'things cannot go on like this' ultimately hits upon the Holocaust as its case
for exception; its exceptional moment of foreclosure. Thus its expectation creates not
an end to the reality of wartime human economies, but its harrowing escalation in the
realisation that 'Things can go beyond this,' as the frontier of paranoia and defense
B, Ibid., p. 54.
B6 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
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looms even greater in the future. Benjamin indicts the' decay of the intellect:" as the
sole reason that this statement cannot revert back to its true question: the question
concerning technology and its perpetual imbalance with the state of nature. That
society can only see this on self-reflective terms, that is to say as a social grievance
alone, bespeaks of a nihilism that has afflicted 'the entire German bourgeoisie." In
order to get at this maligned question again, things must be opened, further than they
have been before, airing out philosophically speaking, to extend beyond metaphysical
standpoints to much greater phenomenological sphere than the human subject
standing alone. Making a distance from that subject will provide the contiguity needed
to lay the groundwork for another kind of understanding to broach the social
encounter, and therein itnterpenetrate the social world with its natural surroundings.
Before that can happen thought, a lot of obscurity will have to be breached and
mankind might indeed have to brace for its darkest hour; a nightmarish comeupance
for its utter failure of vision and fortitude in seeing this battle gathering on the
veritable horizon line of what is called thinking.
The Will to Plan.
Where did the philosophical blueprint for 'the question concerning technology'
come from to begin with? To answer this question it might be helpful to bare in mind
Benjamin's concept of origin as 'not intended to describe the process by which the
existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of
becoming and disappearance.:" With that intention in mind it is possible to
deconstruct the question from a standpoint outside of Heidegger's metaphysics,
something which essentially sounds out technology-as-co-constitutive-of-being.
Following Benjamin's site map, the origin of technology is ultimately one distanced
from present reality. As a phenomenon it is unassertively located somewhere beyond
67 Ibid., p. 54.
66lbid., p. 55.
89 Benjamin, Walter, 'Eplstemo-Critical Prologue,' Origin of the German Tragic Drama, Trans. John Osborne,
(London: NLB, 1977). p. 45.
261
the reality of our timely existence (one doesn't always know where) and in the
shadowy regions of potential disappearance within our cultural-historical
imagination. Therefore it is not surprising that the question concerning technology
originally came out of Kant's nightmare.
The trajectory of the existent technology of Being as a phenomenon starts with
Kant's disturbing, unwilling insight, and is picked up again in Heidegger's dark
technologising of the will, via Nietzsche's intermediate will to retire an old model
man through a process of unequivocal affirmation of the will.
Kant's interpretation of I think as I want and particularly his doctrine of the
autonomy of the will set the stage for a technological interpretation of the
world. As an essential link in the process of the technologizing of the real, 'the
autonomy of the will,' as Kant understood it, could in fact be separated from
the ultimate absoluting of the will by a still indispensable mediation: the
Nietzschean theory of the will to power. This will to power being 'the second
to the last stage of the process."
With the Nietzschean will to power, an image of the will looms forth that seems to
want something other than itself. According to an interpretation found in Heidegger's
lectures on Nietzsche starting in 1936, it actually wants more power (more
domination) merely the better to test itself indefinitely as the will mastering the real.
In short, 'the being of the will to power can only be understood as the will to will.?'
The will to will however does not necessarily bring upon itself freedom in the
accumulation of power. Indeed, for Heidegger this excessive want on the part of the
will ultimately joins up with a desire for control, a self-imposed totality of drive,
throwness as an authentic purpose to being.
What Heidegger imagines of the will in Nietzsche now becomes in effect a
manifesto, of technology for technology's sake, one that is not so very different
sounding to the call of art pour l'art:
90 Heidegger quoted in Ferry, Luc and Renaut, Alain, Heidegger and Modernity, (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1988) p. 59.
91 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
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the modem 'mechanical economy,' ... requires a new humanity ...It is not
enough to possess tanks, airplanes, and radio; nor is it enough to have
individuals available who are capable of manipulating engines and
instruments of this kind; it is not enough even that men should be able to
master technology as if it were something inherently neutral, beyond profit
and loss, gains and damages, construction and destruction ... a humanity is
needed that will be thoroughly conformable to the basic and singular essence
of modem technology and its metaphysical truth ...a humanity that will
allow itself to be totally dominated by the essence of technology ...92
Heidegger's comments suggest a proto-type of man, which fully becomes part of the
'mechanical economy."? The commodity of greatest value to fascist rhetoric again
emerges as the body. No other weaponry is as readily controlled as it potentially could
be given some crucial modifications. The most significant of those being the total
compromise of the individual will to the technology good. Assuming here that
technology is always a series of positive developments; which of course with fascism
was not the case. Heidegger's opinion on the failure of the Nazis to be good engineers
of totality will be discussed further on in this section. However, before turning to
Nazi-trained military bodies, one has to deal with the civilian Heidegger imagined on
the ground, well in advance of Nazi troops. These are the intelligentsia of the German
University.
In the Rectoral Address of 1933, Heidegger makes his first attempt to train them up
when he stigmatizes the idea of freedom. He criticizes the Academy directly on this
point, asserting that freedom when understood in the university as 'academic
freedom,' confuses true freedom with the simple 'freedom of concern, as well as with
the arbitrariness of intentions and inclinations.?' He contrasts it with what he calls
'the highest freedom,' 'to give law to oneself'; or better, he stresses that in the act of
'self-assertion' as 'authentic autonomy,' whether by the university or by the people, '




95 Ibid., p. 62.
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humans in general, that to exceed the will to be free, one must actually concede to a
totality of control? That this discourse remains rooted in the body of the individual is
evidenced by Heidegger's exhortation that the highest forms of domination can only
be carried off through the means of 'self-control.' Authentic autonomy then becomes
associated not with the greatest conditions of liberty, but instead with permitting
oneself to submit to the will of group. In this instance it is the university, or the
people, with whom one might collectively will himself, in order for an efficient
means of control to take hold. Thus what Heidegger is attempting to create is a
discursive machine of the university, in which each scholar plays his part in the
running off its ideas in timed conformity with a technological order.
National Socialism failed in a particular way that joins up with and exploits
Heidegger's 'self-care' programmatic. According to Heidegger, the Nazis failed by never
being able to reach a progressive stage of appreciation on what was to be recognised as
the posthuman. Instead, they choose to tactically put modernity's human body to the
test of its extremes. This of course did not happen with bourgeois German bodies,
which were far too precious to submit to such harm, but those of another group, a
group which could be successful marketed as a having disposable bodies, the bourgeois
Jews. The wealth and property of this group could be portrayed as excessive, and
therefore a strain on the ailing inter-war economy. Through such rhetoric they could
then be transferred to an area of political use dominated by technology, and
strategically placed into areas of potential developmental gain such as motorized food
production and biomedical trial. Which are the sorts of way Jews were utilized in the
Holocaust - as a means of product testing for Nazi ideologies. More directly, however,
they were used as the guinea pigs to test the limit of the body against the force of
technology.
Unfit systems of thought, in a way similar to unfit bodies in a much later stage
of National Socialism, will have to be modified through bold thinking and
technological innovation. National Socialism seems to be emphasizing completion in
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this scenario, as something modernity is calling out for, and indeed through the
militarism that will come out of National Socialism it got its wish for a strategical
tactic of infinite preparedness. This rhetoric around preparedness, or what the Nazis
preferred to refer to as 'awakeness' or 'alertness,' is foregrounded by the fact that a
vigilance towards preparedness, and indeed the necessity to move on from one
preparatory phase to the next, (as it was suggested by Nietzsche) founds the very
justification for a move toward the fascist stage of willing; fascism as the politic most
aware of the need for societal progress at the level of the will. This is something that is
fact post-political insofar as the old politics of modernity dealt on the level of
individual will, and not with its excesses. The Nazis will argue that these excesses
mirror the course of technology insofar as technology relies on excess to accomplish its
objectives. Essentially what National Socialism is, according to this logic, is nothing
less than a post-politics running the operations of a post-human community project.
The one that would happen post-World War II, the one which in fact has never been
put down in the West and still remains on the planning board for how to cope with
the postmodern condition. Eerily a great deal of this planning is arriving via the
university, as Heidegger predicted qua Nietzsche, as the next stage of post-
developments in a technologically defined global space, in other words a casting of the
will of the West toward non-development. A non-development which takes hold in
the same moment as the flooding of the world market with military rand d leftovers,
happily snatched up by the civilian core as accessories of freedom, for example: AI, the
internet and mobile telephones.
According to Heidegger the greatest concern of the Nazi movement was helping
'man as such achieve a satisfactory relation to the essence of technicity.:" In his
opinion, the Nazis while going in that direction, were people who 'were far too poorly
equipped for thought to arrive at a really explicit relation to what was happening today
and what had been underway for the past three hundred years. The Nazi goal of
'fashioning a 'free relation to the technological world,' a relation capable of
96Ibid., p. 67.
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counteracting 'Americanism,' i.e., the flooding of products of technology all over the
earth. According to Heidegger's analysis after the war, this trend has turned the earth
into 'a world market. '97 Heidegger is quick to add, however, that what poses the threat
is of course less 'American' as such now that the 'American flood' expresses 'the
inexperienced nature of technology.:" One is left to wonder if technology has finally
moved on into in its adolescent stage with the dawn of digitisation, bringing with it
the unprecedented capability of instantaneous broadcast of war around the globe. A
broadcast service which is largely and pointedly dominated by the Americans, begging
the question which parts of postmodernity are embedded with the fall out of a fascist
technological operating system?" Ronell offers that 'television was canceled out of the
secret service of facisoid transfixion,' and therein television was only put back on the
air as a 'mass invasion' tool after the Second World War.
...TV is not so much the beginning of something new, but instead the
residue of an unassimilable history. Television is linked crucially to the
engima of survival. It inhabits the contiguous neighbourhoods of broken
experience and rerouted memory. Refusing in its discourse and values to
record, but preferring instead to play out myths of liveness, living colour
and being there, television will have produced a counterphobic perspective
to an interrupted history. 100
Television allowed bare life to get on with the programme by other means than
history. It joined forces with life in attempt to corne to some sort of reconcilation with
postwar survival. Television helped life cope with a certain illuctable violence that
seemed to pass through every given time zone, every registered time slot, every
situated memory no matter how much you played it out, or in as many variations.
One couldn't really hope any longer to shake that chord of violence, which like some
staggering umbilicus connecting humanity to everything it helped produce along the
way. Television taught people how to stop wanting to always record stuff and instead
pointed the way postculturally to just being there - on - so that every interruption of
97 Ibid., p. 67.
98lbid., p. 67.
99See Ronell's argument, in Avital Ronell, 'Trauma TV: Twelve Steps Beyond the Pleasure Principle,'




history somehow wins points for the other side, for those who no longer see such
interference as hostile, but rather as a curious flicker from an remote, obsolete mode of
biopolitical transmission.
Walter Benjamin theorised the difference between uberleben and forileben,
surviving and living on. Television plays out the tensions between these
modalities of being by producing narratives that compulsively tum around
crime. These narratives, travelling between real and fictive reference, allow
for no loose ends but suture and resolve the enigmas they name. Television
produces corpses that need not be mourned because, in part, of the
persistence of surviving that is shown. Still, television itself is cut up,
seriated, commerical broken, so that its heterogenuous corpus can let
something other than itself leak out. 101
What is the relationship between surviving and living on as it relates to the crime
scene of the death of God, who in Nietzsche's autopsy notes reads as having been
murdered by mankind and yet obviously hasn't been according to Heidegger's
criticism formally reconciled r'" Could it be that television has acted as a postevent
accomplice, compelled to rerun the death of God season after season, not in hopes of
reaching some solace, but rather so as to establish a parallel infinity to the corpses it
itself manufactures. Television revels in producing corpses who like the New
Testament God, Jesus Christ, die only to return - if not in prime time like some new
Messiah, at least perennially reappear thanks to syndication. Television gives life to
such phenomena not by depleting off its own stores, but rather from borrowing
without interest from the various redigested materials that pass through its
continuity. It borrowed this trick from posthuman life which did away with its
organcity in favour of network affliation, and digital satellite capability. The body like
television now operates from a distance, working as a coglomerate of different
operational needs. There is a down side to all this incidental, disinterested merger,
this cold flow of survival streaming through, living on, on a continuous basis: our
promised technobody future. We forget the thing that was so important in the first
place: bare life, a life without politics at the helm, life without a sales pitch attached.
Now all life is about tradeoffs and tradeins, upgrades and first classes, and above all
101 Ibid., p. 308.
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filling in the place where all those organs used to rest.
...the historical event we call the death of God is inscribed within the last
metaphysical spasm of our history as it continues to be interrogated by the
question concerning technology. The event of the death of God ...is circuited
through much of technology ... In an era of constitutive opaqueness - there is
no transcendental light shining upon us; we dwell in the shadows of
mediation and withdrawal; there will be no revelation, can be no
manifestation as such -things have to be tuned in, adjusted, subjected to
double takes and are dominated by amnesia. Without recourse to any dialect
of incarnation, something however beams through, as though interruption
itself were the thing to watch. 103
Its in choosing to focus on that interruption, that hiatus between events, that we
rejoin with our divinity as humans; each a product of uniquely stored singularities
gleaned from the residue of events. By going through technology, as opposed to being
subsumed under its heading as something less evolved, by allowing ourselves to
become more austere, more selective in our styles of receptivity, by finally accepting a
life lived under the haze of opacity, a means can be found with which to fine tune an
appreciation of what lives beyond culture. That is to say beyond culture as it has so far
existed more often than not, as an endurance test, rather than a potential test. By
accepting that things out last people in this century, something fundamentally will
shift.We do not yet know what a body can do. We do not yet know the effect
repetition and amnesia will have on bodies without organs, on thinking when it no
longer is coming out of a substantive location. What humanity is faced with today is
life flickering under the shock of its proliferation without the guarantee of furthered
persistence. Meanwhile the spectre of total war never seems to take a day off.
What is Called War?
The chapter began by alluding to Clausewitz's formula: 'War is the continuation of
politics by other means.'!" The question is altered after World War II when the ground
103 Ibid., p. 308.
104 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari. Felix. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. and Foreword by Brian Massumi,
(London: Athlone Pres. 1988) . p. 419.
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of political technology shifts in such a way that our focus is no longer on the
realization of war, but on the appropriation of the war machine.!" The concept of the
war machine of course belongs to Deleuze and Guattari, who argue that 'It is at the
same time the State apparatus appropriates the war machine, subordinates it to its
'political' aims, and gives war its direct object.:" Now that Fascism has ostensibly
exited from the stage of war-making, Capitalism is free to take up the production slack.
Indeed, the factors that make State war total war continue to be linked with political
economies. The particular combination of factors adopted by Capitalism according to
Deleuze and Guattari, are Ian investment of constant capital in equipment, industry
and the war economy, and the investment of variable capital in the population in its
physical and mental aspects (both as warmaker and victim of war). Total war is not
only the war of annihilation but when annihilation takes as its 'center' not only the
enemy army, or the enemy State, but the entire population and its economy.'!"
As for Fascism its lurks elsewhere in the machinery of a worldwide war
machine, which directs war as Ian unlimited movement with no other aim than
itself?" which follows a similar doctrine to Heidegger's spin on Nietzsche with the
will to will programme. Secondly, there involves a 'third stage' of this will that is
post-Fascist, which ironically becomes Ia war machine which takes peace as its object
directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival."!" Again Kant's nightmare enters into our
equation of war bringing with it Heidegger's formulation of a disturbing joining of the
will to technology, whereupon the will has as it's only aim the surpassing of its self.
The dream of perpetual peace, according to Deleuze and Guattari's calculation falls
nowhere short of surpassing 'total war itself, toward forming a peace which is more
terrifying still.'!" The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control,
to surround the entire earth. The statement echoes Heidegger's assumption that a
totalising technology would ultimately require a totalising control. This is the point at
.1)', Ibid., p. 420.
HJfl Ibid., p. 420.
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which Clausewitz's formula is effectively reversed; entitling one to say that politics is a
continuation of war by other means. It is not enough to invert the order of the words
as if they could be spoken in either direction; it is necessary to follow the real
movement at the conclusion of which the States, having appropriated the war
machine, and having adapted it to their aims, reimpart a war machine that takes
charge of that aim, appropriates the States, and assumes increasingly wider political
functions.
Deleuze and Guattari contend that it is the earth itself which resists the war
machine. Therein they argue that it 'asserts its own powers of deterriorialization, its
lines of flight, its smooth spaces that live and blaze their way for a new earth.'!" The
also say that the earth is in a constant process of reterriorialization. In this way, the
earth's reterriorilization is largely heralded not by war, but by information
technologies. Such technology however, does not always take on the most ostensibly
sophisticated forms. Something as simple as the publication of a newspaper article,
idle chat on the internet, a telephone call, could be seen as an agent of reterriorizaltion
across thought networks. Such an event could spark off a revolution, even a micro-
war on the surface of rhetorically conflicted areas.
Fascist-Post-Script.
There is one last war to be waged before we close our arguments up, that is of
course Paul de Man's war. A war whose ground we have up until now failed to cover,
failed on some level to enclose into a network of what Avital Ronell will sub-
categorise as 'The Hook up: Stupidity, Irony, Mechanicity and Testing.'!" What I will
be hooking up to is Ronell's expose on de Man insofar as it is exposing him literally as
the technician of deconstruction. The subheading reads 'he would not have claimed,
as did Heidegger to friends, that he greatest accomplishment was the thinking of
II! Ibid., p. 423.
"7 Ronell, Avital,Stupidity, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), p. 97.
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technology. Nonetheless, de Man's work is essentially engaged with and inflected by
the question concerning technology.t'PHow de Man earned his title is very much
through 'his persistent reliance on the unanalyzable, disruptive power of the text,
which devolves from the technicity of a power failure.'!" Such a textual loyalty made
de Man a unique character, one who suffered profoundly, and on more than one
occasion, for the grammar of his age.
What does it mean to take on the grammar of an age? To take its pain as the
starting point for a series of performative actions? To profit from a silent admission of
failure, one that nonetheless is able to yield revenue and power through an
assemblage of trusts patched together out of 'indeterminacy and aberration?' These are
some of the questions Paul de Man must ask himself when taking on the violent
inflections bound up with the question concerning technology. Not only that he must
be seen to be taking them onto such a degree that they vibrate, resonate with a
'stupefying repetitiveness'!" - the very repetitiveness demanded by all mechanicity
and cognitive stupor it necessarily spreads.
Then again this is not an act of transcendence by any means. The toing and
froing, 'the shuttling'!" as Avital Ronell calls it, that de Man is noted for having
performed against the grain of the written word seems to have evaded what we have
come to understand as 'our age of technological dominon.'!" Of de Man Ronell writes:
'De Man converted the logic of parabasis into a technological insight, marking
amongst other things, the priority of the values of disruption and interference over
those of historically established continuity ...t118 This is a logic that falls alongside the
path of immanence, it is one that makes of technology an emerging constellation of
potential affects. It therefore resists making the histoy of technology into a series of
historically progressive events. This pathway toward understand technology requires a
113Ibid.,p. 97.
"' Ibid., p. 97.
liS Ibid., p. 98.
IIij Ibid., p. 97.
"' Ibid., p. 97.
118Ibid., p. 97.
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willingness to unhinge the organicity of the process of technological development so
dear to figures like Heidegger, to step away from the grounds of the figural, in favour
of a group of attributes. Attributes which require a greater precision of naming, which
rely less on a type than on a pattern of behaviour. A pattern that Spinoza would say
was perfect from the fact of its very becoming the thing that it is and persistence in
becoming that thing again and again toward the absolute. After a time such a thing
would develop a machinic diction, and index on itself. The textual body that was Paul
de Man when transformed entirely on attribute gets morphed into a textual machine:
shedding his text-as-body to become another animal.
All this happened supposedly after World War II, but I would argue it happened
at a much earlier developmental stage, indeed from the time de Man the boy was
exposed to experimental levels of radiation by his (meta)physician father.!" A lot of
people call this exposure from a young age to isolation, to toxicity, an accident. But
how can it be an accident when the whole question concerning technology begins from
a moment of irreversible contamination? Now this is Heidegger asking on behalf of de
Man. The same Heidegger who would have claimed to friends that his greatest
accomplishment was the thinking of technology. Nonetheless it is de Man and not
Heidegger that puts his body on the line in search of the truth of technology in
allowing the mechanical nature of its grammar to do its violence against both his body
and its historical meaning. In doing so de Man becomes his own machine, he becomes
something like the grammar of the text when it is isolated from rhetoric, who when
joined again to the Rosseauian Social Contract can do little but stumble and predict his
own critical downfall. As Ronell has observed, 'De Man's work has shown how
cognition and performance diverge.'!" That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way
that he does; you do not know what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know
before hand what a body or mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a
given combination.fl21 Indeed, one of the early discoveries made by father and son
1t9Ibid., p. 105.
12<) Ibid., p. 98.
I?, Deleuze, Gilles, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Trans. Robert Hurley, (San Fransico, CityLights Books,
1988) p. 125.
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involved the non-intentional process of signification. How could the father have
known his was inscribing a lifetime of suffering onto the son's body by irradiating it?
Was his intended goal not ironically to effectively disinfecting it from pathology in
future? The fact is that the machine of language took over. A technical grammar took
over the controls. Finally, a mechanical effect became responsible for effects of
meaning generated by sheer contingency, elements of uncontrol and improvisation.
Ronell offers that 'the disjuncture of performance from meaning or from an
intention, if not always from a revelation, amounts to something of a humanist
affront, a scandal. The disparity between the intentional, meaningful dimension of the
work and its sheerly mechanical, formal component implies violence .. .'122 A random
or mechanical aspect of language exists that Icannot be assimilated to a system of
intentions, desire or motives.'!" Therein no morality has the luxury of sticking to the
codes of languages.
In the end de Man suffers technically from a breakdown of the very system the
grammar of his father's faith in technology was meant to shore up, his humanistic
faith in the simple processes of understanding. In other words an interest in truth. De
Man learns the painful lesson that the truth is limited to a linguistic potential, and
that it is practically irrealisable under the conditions of facticallife. A counter-
actualization of language is thus somehow required for meaning to persist. De Man
appreciated that such a counter-actualization required the sort of switchboarding of
language and meaning. It is those difficult, resistant, or even ostensibly non-existent
connections that de Man felt wi thin himself to be worth suffering most for. This is
suffering is what eventually matures and becomes worthy of (in)forming the
ambiguous grounds on which the project of deconstruction itself are set. In regard to
this subject, Deleuze asks the question 'How can the individual transcend its form and
its syntactial link with a world in order to attain the universal communication of
m Ronell, Avital,Stupidity, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), pp. 98-99.




events?'!" In 'On Language as Such and the Language of Man1l25 Benjamin asserts that
'what is communicated in language cannot be externally limited or measured, and
therefore all language contains its own incommensurable, uniquely constituted
infinity. Its linguistic being, not its verbal meanings, defines its frontier.'!" It is this
type of infinity within the bounds of language, the indiscernability of language's
frontier, which makes the possibility of the transfer of an event outside of its
immediacy possible, despite the immediacy inherent to language. This question is later
taken up by Benjamin in his final work 'Theses on the Philosophy of History: It is
here that he inscribes the historiographical use of monadology as a means through
which to alert the worldwide generation that would come after the fall of National
Socialism, of the grave danger fascism in its nascent forms would continue pose in the
future. A danger moreover that it had posed in other epochs prior to Nazi Germany.
Benjamin's answer was to speed this 'state of emergency?" as a defense against fascism,
'to brush history against the grain?" as a means of forcing the grammar of these
fascisms within history to surface so as to correspond with present understanding.
Taken up by Heidegger finding an answer to Deleuze's question amounts to
telephoning up the Greeks for prophetic advice, and hearing the advice in German.
Afterward, Heidegger would offer that 'Since the Greek poets and thinkers first
produced the grammar of the West - their view of Being -as essence and existence has
prevailed. But that view that man and Being as Being is the essence of Truth, has lead
to a "flattening," to the nihilistic struggle over "values," to the reign of technology,
and to have "fallen out of Being without knowing it." As a consequence, the
"historical destiny of the West" has culminated in a fatal "enfeeblement of the spirit,"
a weakness rendering it incapable of standing up to the singular task of repeating the
primordial achievement of the Greeks at the outset of Western history - of
124 Deleuze, Gilles, The Logic of Sense, Trans. by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Constantin V.
Boundas, ed., (London: Athlone Press, 1990) p. 149.
I~ Benjamin, Walter, 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Man.' One Way Street and Other
Writings, Trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, Intra. Susan Sontag, (London: Verso.1979).
I~ Ibid .• pp. 109-110.
1]7 Benjamin. Walter. Illuminations, Trans. Harry Zohn, Intro. Hannah Arendt. (New York. Fontana Press. 1969)
p.248 .
.,. Ibid, p. 248.
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constituting a new beginning.'!" In order to do this one must move back into the
primordial realm of the Greeks. The means with which to do so are found through
language, but not just anyone, the German language is uniquely able to meet this task.
Indeed, it is its historical destiny to do so. In the Der Spiegel interview Heidegger
speaks of an 'inner relationship of the German language with the language of the
Greeks and with their thought.'!" This approach however is fundamentally rooted in
seeking out a purity of syntatical origins, rather than networking across them so as to
construct a switchboard of various lines of communicatory flight over time.
It is that sort of switchboarding of language and meaning that Benjamin felt
within himself to be worth suffering for. Worthy of having the event act through
him, in language. How does one interpret such a gesture? In The Logic of Sense,
Deleuze asserted that 'A wound is actualised in a state of things or in the lived
experience of an individual; but in itself it is a pure virtuality on the plane of
immanence that sweeps one along a life.'!" Here he quotes Joe Bosquet, a French poet
shot in World War I, who writes, 'My wound existed before me. I was born to embody
it.'!" Within the context of his discussion on Bousquet, Deleuze defines ethics in terms
of 'the relation of the individual to the singularities it embodies: an active life is one
that is able to affirm the singularities that constitute it, to become worthy of the events
that happen to it. A reactive life by contrast, is driven by resseniiment of the event,
grasping whatever happens as unjust and unwarranted.?" Deleuze asserts 'Either
ethics makes no sense at all or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to
be unworthy of what happens to US.,I34 This is what it means to ethically re-stage Paul
de Man's War. This is what it means to have picked up on Walter Benjamin's radar
signal, his infinite transmission of a life lived through the grammar of German
129 Rabinbach, Anson, In the Shadow of Catastrophe, (London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 104.
I~ Heidegger, Martin, 'Only A God can Save Us,' Richard Wolin, ed. The Heidegger Controversy,
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993) p. 113.
131 This quote from the Introduction' "A Life of Pure Immanence" : Deleuze's Critique et Clinique" Project' by
Daniel W. Smith in Deleuze, Gilles, Essays Critical and Ctircel, Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco,
(london: Verso, 1998), p. xxix.
"Deleuze, Gilles, Logic of Sense, Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Ed. Constantin V. Boundas,
(london: Athlone Press, 1990) p. 148.
111 Ibid., p. 149.
1J.4 Ibid., p. 149.
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fascism, whilst always striving to report from its frontiers.
Finally in dealing with Benjamin one must consider the language in which he
dealt. A language at times of Chinese courtesy, a language in effect of endurance.!"
This was a kind of organised speech, one that was 'masked by friendliness, or the most
scrupulous manipulation.':" This is how Benjamin was able to build philosophical
bridges, bridges that stretched far beyond the line of finitude. He did so by laying each
line of thought down carefully in his mind, by holding up phrases carefully honed by
others. Each one attempting to allow for an ordinary man to have his unique and
responsible place in assembling the world atlas of thought. Benjamin's strategy of
thought reminds one of Kafka's story 'The Great Wall of China' where the workers
build the wall in fragmentary style, one section apparently distanced from the other,
yet contiguous insofar as when the moment of joining takes place its inception will be
a transcendental happening, a testiment to the divinity of a combined human labour.
The labour core of the Great Wall is organised so that no one group will have to
endure the totality of its construction, instead a construction detail is send out only to
fill in a particular gap, when that gap is blocked, they are quickly sent far onward to
block another gap and so on. Its is the filling in of the gaps over great distances, that
becomes the agent of relations between divergent peoples and methods, that allows
them, from various points of view, to see the wall empirically as a series of undulating
blocks and gaps. The spatial relationship Benjamin applied to his philosophy also held
true for his relationships with people, his courtesy toward them a matter of diffident
respect for the gaps in relations that might on some occasion yield a fortutious block in
the way of his thinking. Kafka defined such organisation as destiny. This organisation
of language in its most scruplously conducted sense re-assembles fate, makes of fate
something only akin to causality, insofar as causality springs from belief. Belief has no
use for truth, rather it occupies itself only through the vagarities of translation.
'l~ 'Using a word that was also applied to Kafka by those who knew him, Scholem speaks of "the almost
Chinese courtesy" that characterised Benjamin's relations with people.' Walter, Benjamin, One Way Street
and Other Writings, Trans. Kingsley Shorter and Edmund Jephcott, Introduction Susan Sontag (London:
Verso, 1979) p. 15.
'36 Ibid., p. 15.
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Translation is nothing if not a stop gap system of understanding, a way of making the
finite word contiguous, continuing a conversation by hedging through a scrupulous
series of textual impasses, in order to get not at the truth, but at the unlimited
possibilities signalled by its meandering figural bypasses. Perhaps this is not a new
image of thought, but rather a new understanding of the importance of its transfer.
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